4 research outputs found
Information Design for Strategic Coordination of Autonomous Devices with Non-Aligned Utilities
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with
non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as
players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their
long-run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network under
investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a strategy, knowing in
advance the strategy of the encoder. We characterize the encoding and decoding
functions that form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The
equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players
choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize their expected
utilities. This problem is closely related to the literature on "Information
Design" in Game Theory. We also characterize the set of posterior distributions
that are compatible with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the
decoder. Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions
corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.Comment: IEEE Proc. of the Fifty-fourth Annual Allerton Conference Allerton
House, UIUC, Illinois, USA September 27 - 30, 201
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder
We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding process is not supervised, it returns the output sequence that minimizes the decoder's distortion function. The encoding process is designed beforehand and takes into account the decoder's distortion mismatch. When the communication channel is perfect and no side information is available at the decoder, this problem is referred to as the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow in the Economics literature. We formulate the strategic communication scenario as a joint source-channel coding problem with side information at the decoder. The informational content of the source influences the design of the encoding since it impacts differently the two distinct distortion functions. The side information complexifies the analysis since the encoder is uncertain about the decoder's belief on the source statistics