695 research outputs found

    Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

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    In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies

    Entropic selection of Nash equilibrium

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    This study argues that Nash equilibria with less variations in players' best responses are more appealing. To that regard, a notion measuring such variations, the entropic selection of Nash equilibrium, is presented: For any given Nash equilibrium, we consider the cardinality of the support of a player's best response against others' strategies that are sufficiently close to the behavior specified. These cardinalities across players are then aggregated with a real-valued function on whose form we impose no restrictions apart from the natural limitation to nondecreasingness in order to obtain equilibria with less variations. We prove that the entropic selection of Nash equilibrium is non-empty and admit desirable properties. Some well-known games, each of which display important insights about virtues / problems of various equilibrium notions, are considered; and, in all of these games our notion displays none of the criticisms associated with these examples. These examples also show that our notion does not have any containment relations with other associated and well-known refinements, perfection, properness and persistence

    Large Supports are required for Well-Supported Nash Equilibria

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    We prove that for any constant kk and any ϵ<1\epsilon<1, there exist bimatrix win-lose games for which every ϵ\epsilon-WSNE requires supports of cardinality greater than kk. To do this, we provide a graph-theoretic characterization of win-lose games that possess ϵ\epsilon-WSNE with constant cardinality supports. We then apply a result in additive number theory of Haight to construct win-lose games that do not satisfy the requirements of the characterization. These constructions disprove graph theoretic conjectures of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou, and Myers

    On the Existence of Undominated Elements of Acyclic Relations

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    We study the existence of undominated elements of acyclic and irreflexive relations. A sufficient condition for the existence is given in the general case without any topological assumptions. Sufficient conditions are also given when the relation in question is defined on a compact Hausdorff space. We study the existence of fixed points of acyclic correspondences, the existence of stable sets, and the possibility of representing the relation by a real valued function.acyclic relations, undominated elements

    Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games

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    This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games

    Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games

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    Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a t-degree stochastically undominated distribution, and a t-equilibrium is a pair of t-best replies. The paper provides a characterization and existence proofs of t-equilibria in terms of representing utility functions, and shows that for t becoming large-which can be interpreted as the players becoming more risk averse-behavior converges to a specific form of max-min play. More precisely, this means that in the limit each player puts all weight on a strategy that maximizes the worst outcome for the opponent, within the supports of the strategies in the limiting sequenceof t-equilibria.microeconomics ;

    A recursive core for partition function form games

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    We present a new solution to partition function form games that is novel in at least two ways. Firstly, the solution exploits the consistency of the partition function form, namely that the response to a deviation is established as the same solution applied to the residual game, itself a partition function form game. This consistency allows us to model residual behaviour in a natural, intuitive way. Secondly, we consider a pair of solutions as the extrema of an interval for set inclusion. Taking the whole interval rather than just one of the extremes enables us to include or exclude outcomes with certainty.microeconomics ;
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