Privacy in the Genomic Era

Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection and analysis of such data has the potential to support various applications, including personalized medical services. While the benefits of the genomics revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased availability of such data has major implications for personal privacy; notably because the genome has certain essential features, which include (but are not limited to) (i) an association with traits and certain diseases, (ii) identification capability (e.g., forensics), and (iii) revelation of family relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the likelihood that genome data will be made available in less regulated environments, such as the Internet and for-profit companies. The problem of genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science, medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data privacy for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated to genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systematization of knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so, we address some of the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we report on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical specialists. Then, after characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art regarding privacy attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing these attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an enumeration of the challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize the analysis of threats and the design of countermeasures as the field moves forward

No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint

This essay reviews Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts, which I consider the most serious, sustained, and thoughtful effort to defend the Bush administration’s aggressive tactics in the war on terror yet written. That the book is ultimately deeply flawed only underscores the failure of the Bush administration’s approach. Where most historians view with regret the excesses of past security crises, from the criminalization of speech during World War I to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, Posner and Vermeule advance the contrarian view that the system worked exactly as it should have, because in each instance, executive officials took aggressive action in response to perceived security threats, and courts and Congress deferred to or approved of the executive’s initiatives. In Posner and Vermeule’s view, there is no reason to believe that government officials will overreact during times of crisis, and no basis for judging what executive officials have done, because they have the expertise and access to information that the rest of us lack. I argue that Posner and Vermeule’s argument for deference to the executive is misguided for three reasons. First, their assumption that there is a necessary and “straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security” is far too simplistic. Executives often sacrifice liberty without achieving an increase in security. Security may be advanced in a variety of ways without infringing on liberty. There is no reason to assume that sacrificing liberty is necessary to further security or that such sacrifices are warranted simply because the executive chooses to make them. Second, Posner and Vermeule’s account of the political dynamics of emergency periods fails to take into account significant factors that predictably contribute to overreaching by the executive, infringement of human rights, selective targeting of disempowered minority groups, and institutionalization of authorities that last well beyond the emergency itself. Once these factors are properly considered, there are strong reasons not to defer to executive power, especially in emergencies. Third, the authors’ argument that the executive is best situated to balance liberty and security in emergencies fails to consider the full range of qualities that one might want in an agency tasked to strike such a balance. Precisely because we rely so heavily on the executive to maintain our security, we should be skeptical of its ability to give sufficient weight to the liberty side of the balance. Judicial review plays an essential role in achieving an appropriate balance; deference to the executive undermines that role

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Sony, Cyber Security, and Free Speech: Preserving the First Amendment in the Modern World

Reprinted from 16 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 309 (2016). This paper explores the Sony hack in 2014 allegedly launched by the North Korean government in retaliation over Sony’s production of The Interview and considers the hack’s chilling impact on speech in technology. One of the most devastating cyber attacks in history, the hack exposed approximately thirty- eight million files of sensitive data, including over 170,000 employee emails, thousands of employee social security numbers and unreleased footage of upcoming movies. The hack caused Sony to censor the film and prompted members of the entertainment industry at large to tailor their communication and conform storylines to societal standards. Such censorship cuts the First Amendment at its core and exemplifies the danger cyber terror poses to freedom of speech by compromising Americans’ privacy in digital mediums. This paper critiques the current methods for combatting cyber terror, which consist of unwieldy federal criminal laws and controversial information sharing policies, while proposing more promising solutions that unleash the competitive power of the free market with limited government regulation. It also recommends legal, affordable and user-friendly tools anyone can use to secure their technology, recapture their privacy and exercise their freedom of speech online without fear of surreptitious surveillance or retaliatory exposure

Election Surveillance

For most of this country\u27s history, we have relied on human eyes and ears to oversee our system of elections. Modern surveillance tools, from cell phones to video streaming platforms, are now cheap and ubiquitous. Technology holds great promise to increase election transparency. But the 2020 election confirmed what has become quite clear: the use of technology to record election processes does not always serve the goal of reassuring the public of the integrity of elections; in fact, it can do the opposite. As legislatures around the country reexamine rules governing elections following the 2020 election, an underexplored question is whether election surveillance should be promoted or curbed. The line between democracy-enhancing election transparency and civil liberty-trampling election surveillance is fuzzy. This Article examines the history and present of election surveillance and reviews legislation and litigation surrounding it. The goal is to better understand how election surveillance can promote confidence in election outcomes while dodging the dark sides of both transparency and surveillance. As historic levels of public mistrust of election outcomes threaten American democracy, Election Surveillance examines these urgent questions

Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy

This Article examines the central role that knowledge plays in determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. What people know about surveillance practices or new technologies often shapes the “reasonable expectations of privacy” that define the Fourth Amendment’s boundaries. From early decisions dealing with automobile searches to recent cases involving advanced information technologies, courts have relied on assessments of knowledge in a wide variety of Fourth Amendment contexts. Yet the analysis of knowledge in Fourth Amendment law is rarely if ever studied on its own. This Article fills that gap. It starts by identifying the characteristics of Fourth Amendment knowledge. It finds, for instance, that courts typically look to societal knowledge rather than individual knowledge, allowing them to establish broad precedents to govern police behavior. The Article then draws on communications scholarship and research on the spread of innovations to identify conceptual problems inherent in assessing societal knowledge. It also uses original empirical evidence to evaluate courts’ claims regarding societal knowledge in a variety of important cases. And it contends that a knowledge-based Fourth Amendment will shrink and weaken over time as public awareness of new technologies and threats to privacy continues to grow. In light of these findings, the Article proposes that the knowledge inquiry in Fourth Amendment law, and the reasonable expectation of privacy test with which it is intertwined, be replaced with a legal regime better able to adjust to technological and social change. The Article offers two alternatives, one based on existing laws and property concepts, and the other based on direct normative balancing of the benefits and harms of new surveillance practices. It analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives, with the goal of developing a Fourth Amendment regime that can effectively protect privacy in novel technological and social contexts

Policy to Carry Us Beyond the Next Election: The 2022 midterm election showed resilience in election administration. Now, we must build it.

This report is a departure from the "sky is falling" tone that has become typical of debates about election administration. Protecting democracy is and always will be urgent. However, with 20 months before the next federal election, we have a rare opportunity to consider not just the next election but the next 100: to think long term about where we want our democracy to be for future generations, and what policy changes must be made now to get us there.This report pairs long-term vision with concrete, interim reforms. We lay out six goals for the future of election administration and detail actionable policy recommendations that, if implemented soon, would help make those goals a reality. We strive to supersede partisan politics as a motivator and instead place voters and election administrators front and center

Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy

This Article examines the central role that knowledge plays in determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. What people know about surveillance practices or new technologies often shapes the “reasonable expectations of privacy” that define the Fourth Amendment’s boundaries. From early decisions dealing with automobile searches to recent cases involving advanced information technologies, courts have relied on assessments of knowledge in a wide variety of Fourth Amendment contexts. Yet the analysis of knowledge in Fourth Amendment law is rarely if ever studied on its own. This Article fills that gap. It starts by identifying the characteristics of Fourth Amendment knowledge. It finds, for instance, that courts typically look to societal knowledge rather than individual knowledge, allowing them to establish broad precedents to govern police behavior. The Article then draws on communications scholarship and research on the spread of innovations to identify conceptual problems inherent in assessing societal knowledge. It also uses original empirical evidence to evaluate courts’ claims regarding societal knowledge in a variety of important cases. And it contends that a knowledge-based Fourth Amendment will shrink and weaken over time as public awareness of new technologies and threats to privacy continues to grow. In light of these findings, the Article proposes that the knowledge inquiry in Fourth Amendment law, and the reasonable expectation of privacy test with which it is intertwined, be replaced with a legal regime better able to adjust to technological and social change. The Article offers two alternatives, one based on existing laws and property concepts, and the other based on direct normative balancing of the benefits and harms of new surveillance practices. It analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives, with the goal of developing a Fourth Amendment regime that can effectively protect privacy in novel technological and social contexts

Election Integrity: A Pro-Voter Agenda

President Trump recently claimed millions voted illegally in the 2016 election, and called for a "major investigation" into fraud in our election system. His remarks come after years of battles in the states over voting laws that make it harder for many citizens to participate in our elections. Yet the clamor over voter suppression should not obscure a fundamental shared truth: American elections should be secure and free of misconduct. This paper outlines a six-part agenda to target fraud risks as they actually exist -- without unduly disenfranchising eligible citizens