Non-Altruistic Equilibria

Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, i.e. one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal form games and extensive form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive form games as equilibrium concepts of noncooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts

Non-Altruistic Equilibria

Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, i.e. one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal form games and extensive form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive form games as equilibrium concepts of noncooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts

ON THE PAYOFF REPRESENTATIONS OF NORMAL FORM GAMES

The literature on normal form games generally depicts the payoff matrices of two or three players. However, many such games discuss n-players. Therefore, this note studies the payoff representations of n-player normal form games.Normal form game, payoff representation, JEL Classification: C72