On the security of digital signature schemes based on error-correcting codes

We discuss the security of digital signature schemes based on error-correcting codes. Several attacks to the Xinmei scheme are surveyed, and some reasons given to explain why the Xinmei scheme failed, such as the linearity of the signature and the redundancy of public keys. Another weakness is found in the Alabbadi-Wicker scheme, which results in a universal forgery attack against it. This attack shows that the Alabbadi-Wicker scheme fails to implement the necessary property of a digital signature scheme: it is infeasible to find a false signature algorithm D from the public verification algorithm E such that E(D*(m)) = m for all messages m. Further analysis shows that this new weakness also applies to the Xinmei scheme

Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes

In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic (QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic decoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work against QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and we use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We devise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our results. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the effectiveness of our approach

EVALUATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS

This article represents a synthesis of the evaluation methods for cryptographic algorithms and of their efficiency within practical applications. It approaches also the main operations carried out in cryptanalysis and the main categories and methods of attack in order to clarify the differences between evaluation concept and crypto algorithm cracking.cryptology, cryptanalysis, evaluation and cracking cryptographic algorithms

Cryptanalysis of a One-Time Code-Based Digital Signature Scheme

We consider a one-time digital signature scheme recently proposed by Persichetti and show that a successful key recovery attack can be mounted with limited complexity. The attack we propose exploits a single signature intercepted by the attacker, and relies on a statistical analysis performed over such a signature, followed by information set decoding. We assess the attack complexity and show that a full recovery of the secret key can be performed with a work factor that is far below the claimed security level. The efficiency of the attack is motivated by the sparsity of the signature, which leads to a significant information leakage about the secret key.Comment: 5 pages, 1 figur

LEDAkem: a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism based on QC-LDPC codes

This work presents a new code-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) called LEDAkem. It is built on the Niederreiter cryptosystem and relies on quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check codes as secret codes, providing high decoding speeds and compact keypairs. LEDAkem uses ephemeral keys to foil known statistical attacks, and takes advantage of a new decoding algorithm that provides faster decoding than the classical bit-flipping decoder commonly adopted in this kind of systems. The main attacks against LEDAkem are investigated, taking into account quantum speedups. Some instances of LEDAkem are designed to achieve different security levels against classical and quantum computers. Some performance figures obtained through an efficient C99 implementation of LEDAkem are provided.Comment: 21 pages, 3 table