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THE EVOLVING PHILOSOPHERS PROBLEM - DYNAMIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT
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Semantic verification of Behavior Conformance
This paper introduces a formal yet practical method to verify whether the behavior design of a distributed application conforms to the behavior design of the enterprise in which the application is embedded. The method allows both enterprise architects and application architects to talk about designs in their own terms, and introduces a common set of terms as the linking pin between enterprise and application designs. The formal semantics of these common terms allows us to verify the conformance between an enterprise and its applications formally and automatically
Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack
EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments
worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be
introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can
execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS)
terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for
each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered that some EMV
implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to
supply this number. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is
indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available
to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to
clone a card physically (in the sense of extracting the key material and
loading it into another card). Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV
was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a
survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence
from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of
proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest
manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of
frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards
cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be
mistaken or complicit. Pre-play attacks may also be carried out by malware in
an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the
acquirer. We explore the design and implementation mistakes that enabled the
flaw to evade detection until now: shortcomings of the EMV specification, of
the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing, formal
analysis, or monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss
countermeasures
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