15 research outputs found

    On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games

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    We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integer–splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and network routing, where agents have to allocate multiple tasks and can assign a number of tasks to a particular selected resource. Specifically, in an ISWCG, an agent has a certain total demand (aka weight) that it needs to satisfy, and can do so by requesting one or more integer units of each resource from an element of a given collection of feasible subsets. Each resource is associated with a unit–cost function of its level of congestion; as such, the cost to an agent for using a particular resource is the product of the resource unit–cost and the number of units the agent requests.While general ISWCGs do not admit PSNE [(Rosenthal, 1973b)], the restricted subclass of these games with linear unit–cost functions has been shown to possess a potential function [(Meyers, 2006)], and hence, PSNE. However, the linearity of costs may not be necessary for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. Thus, in this paper we prove that PSNE always exist for a larger class of convex and monotonically increasing unit–costs. On the other hand, our result is accompanied by a limiting assumption on the structure of agents’ strategy sets: specifically, each agent is associated with its set of accessible resources, and can distribute its demand across any subset of these resources.Importantly, we show that neither monotonicity nor convexity on its own guarantees this result. Moreover, we give a counterexample with monotone and semi–convex cost functions, thus distinguishing ISWCGs from the class of infinitely–splittable congestion games for which the conditions of monotonicity and semi–convexity have been shown to be sufficient for PSNE existence [(Rosen, 1965)]. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the finite improvement path property (FIP) does not hold for convex increasing ISWCGs. Thus, in contrast to the case with linear costs, a potential function argument cannot be used to prove our result. Instead, we provide a procedure that converges to an equilibrium from an arbitrary initial strategy profile, and in doing so show that ISWCGs with convex increasing unit–cost functions are weakly acyclic

    On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games

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    In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor α\alpha through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold αδ\alpha_\delta (where δ\delta is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that α\alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for ααδ\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta, but not for α<αδ\alpha < \alpha_\delta. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold αδ\alpha_\delta and show that the corresponding decision problem is NP{\sf NP}-hard. We also show that the α\alpha-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is α+1\alpha+1. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum

    Network Topology and Equilibrium Existence in Weighted Network Congestion Games

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    Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively) affected by it. This paper shows that the topology of the underlying (undirected two-terminal) network provides information about the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. For some networks, but not for others, every corresponding game has at least one such equilibrium. For the weighted presentation, a complete characterization of the networks with this property is given. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the network has at most three routes that do traverse any edge in opposite directions, or it consists of several such networks connected in series. The corresponding problem for player-specific costs remains open.Congestion games, network topology, existence of equilibrium

    Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

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    In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to minimize her own delay, or - with a certain probability - the player is malicious in which case her only goal is to disturb the other players as much as possible. We show that such games do in general not possess a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (i.e. a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Moreover, given a game, we show that it is NP-complete to decide whether it admits a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This result even holds when resource latency functions are linear, each player is malicious with the same probability, and all strategy sets consist of singleton sets. For a slightly more restricted class of malicious Bayesian congestion games, we provide easy checkable properties that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we study the impact of the malicious types on the overall performance of the system (i.e. the social cost). To measure this impact, we use the Price of Malice. We provide (tight) bounds on the Price of Malice for an interesting class of malicious Bayesian congestion games. Moreover, we show that for certain congestion games the advent of malicious types can also be beneficial to the system in the sense that the social cost of the worst case equilibrium decreases. We provide a tight bound on the maximum factor by which this happens.Comment: 18 pages, submitted to WAOA'0

    Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses

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    We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing dd+o(d)d^{d+o(d)}-approximate (pure) Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions of degree at most dd. This is an exponential improvement of the approximation factor with respect to the previously best deterministic algorithm. An appealing additional feature of our algorithm is that it uses only best-improvement steps in the actual game, as opposed to earlier approaches that first had to transform the game itself. Our algorithm is an adaptation of the seminal algorithm by Caragiannis et al. [FOCS'11, TEAC 2015], but we utilize an approximate potential function directly on the original game instead of an exact one on a modified game. A critical component of our analysis, which is of independent interest, is the derivation of a novel bound of [d/W(d/ρ)]d+1[d/\mathcal{W}(d/\rho)]^{d+1} for the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of ρ\rho-approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games, where W\mathcal{W} is the Lambert-W function. More specifically, we show that this PoA is exactly equal to Φd,ρd+1\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}, where Φd,ρ\Phi_{d,\rho} is the unique positive solution of the equation ρ(x+1)d=xd+1\rho (x+1)^d=x^{d+1}. Our upper bound is derived via a smoothness-like argument, and thus holds even for mixed Nash and correlated equilibria, while our lower bound is simple enough to apply even to singleton congestion games

    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure

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    We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential function arguments. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing equilibria is such games is a {\sf PLS}-hard problem. The situation gets worse when superlinear latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate equilibria as alternative solution concepts. Do such equilibria exist? And if so, can we compute them efficiently? We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an "approximation" of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ\Psi-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!d!-approximate equilibria, where dd is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate equilibria when dd is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+52+O(γ)\frac{3+\sqrt{5}}{2}+O(\gamma) for arbitrarily small γ>0\gamma>0; for latency functions with maximum degree d2d\geq 2, it is d2d+o(d)d^{2d+o(d)}. The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ1/\gamma. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d2d\geq 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)d^{O(d^2)}-approximate equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as dd is constant.Comment: 31 page

    Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical Games from Behavioral Data

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    We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization (CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability to general graphical games.Comment: Journal of Machine Learning Research. (accepted, pending publication.) Last conference version: submitted March 30, 2012 to UAI 2012. First conference version: entitled, Learning Influence Games, initially submitted on June 1, 2010 to NIPS 201
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