1,221 research outputs found

    Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

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    Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate Nash equilibria in these games. In particular, for congestion games with linear latency functions, our algorithm computes (2+ϵ)(2+\epsilon)-approximate pure Nash equilibria in time polynomial in the number of players, the number of resources and 1/ϵ1/\epsilon. It also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with constant maximum degree dd; there, the approximation guarantee is dO(d)d^{O(d)}. The algorithm essentially identifies a polynomially long sequence of best-response moves that lead to an approximate equilibrium; the existence of such short sequences is interesting in itself. These are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in non-symmetric congestion games. We strengthen them further by proving that, for congestion games that deviate from our mild assumptions, computing ρ\rho-approximate equilibria is {\sf PLS}-complete for any polynomial-time computable ρ\rho

    On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games

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    We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integer–splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and network routing, where agents have to allocate multiple tasks and can assign a number of tasks to a particular selected resource. Specifically, in an ISWCG, an agent has a certain total demand (aka weight) that it needs to satisfy, and can do so by requesting one or more integer units of each resource from an element of a given collection of feasible subsets. Each resource is associated with a unit–cost function of its level of congestion; as such, the cost to an agent for using a particular resource is the product of the resource unit–cost and the number of units the agent requests.While general ISWCGs do not admit PSNE [(Rosenthal, 1973b)], the restricted subclass of these games with linear unit–cost functions has been shown to possess a potential function [(Meyers, 2006)], and hence, PSNE. However, the linearity of costs may not be necessary for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. Thus, in this paper we prove that PSNE always exist for a larger class of convex and monotonically increasing unit–costs. On the other hand, our result is accompanied by a limiting assumption on the structure of agents’ strategy sets: specifically, each agent is associated with its set of accessible resources, and can distribute its demand across any subset of these resources.Importantly, we show that neither monotonicity nor convexity on its own guarantees this result. Moreover, we give a counterexample with monotone and semi–convex cost functions, thus distinguishing ISWCGs from the class of infinitely–splittable congestion games for which the conditions of monotonicity and semi–convexity have been shown to be sufficient for PSNE existence [(Rosen, 1965)]. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the finite improvement path property (FIP) does not hold for convex increasing ISWCGs. Thus, in contrast to the case with linear costs, a potential function argument cannot be used to prove our result. Instead, we provide a procedure that converges to an equilibrium from an arbitrary initial strategy profile, and in doing so show that ISWCGs with convex increasing unit–cost functions are weakly acyclic

    On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games

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    In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor α\alpha through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold αδ\alpha_\delta (where δ\delta is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that α\alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for ααδ\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta, but not for α<αδ\alpha < \alpha_\delta. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold αδ\alpha_\delta and show that the corresponding decision problem is NP{\sf NP}-hard. We also show that the α\alpha-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is α+1\alpha+1. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum

    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure

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    We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential function arguments. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing equilibria is such games is a {\sf PLS}-hard problem. The situation gets worse when superlinear latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate equilibria as alternative solution concepts. Do such equilibria exist? And if so, can we compute them efficiently? We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an "approximation" of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ\Psi-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!d!-approximate equilibria, where dd is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate equilibria when dd is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+52+O(γ)\frac{3+\sqrt{5}}{2}+O(\gamma) for arbitrarily small γ>0\gamma>0; for latency functions with maximum degree d2d\geq 2, it is d2d+o(d)d^{2d+o(d)}. The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ1/\gamma. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d2d\geq 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)d^{O(d^2)}-approximate equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as dd is constant.Comment: 31 page

    Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids

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    We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a nondecreasing and convex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium.Comment: 17 page
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