9,792 research outputs found
On the Complexity of Chore Division
We study the proportional chore division problem where a protocol wants to
divide an undesirable object, called chore, among different players. The
goal is to find an allocation such that the cost of the chore assigned to each
player be at most of the total cost. This problem is the dual variant of
the cake cutting problem in which we want to allocate a desirable object.
Edmonds and Pruhs showed that any protocol for the proportional cake cutting
must use at least queries in the worst case, however,
finding a lower bound for the proportional chore division remained an
interesting open problem. We show that chore division and cake cutting problems
are closely related to each other and provide an lower bound
for chore division
Chore division on a graph
The paper considers fair allocation of indivisible nondisposable items that
generate disutility (chores). We assume that these items are placed in the
vertices of a graph and each agent's share has to form a connected subgraph of
this graph. Although a similar model has been investigated before for goods, we
show that the goods and chores settings are inherently different. In
particular, it is impossible to derive the solution of the chores instance from
the solution of its naturally associated fair division instance. We consider
three common fair division solution concepts, namely proportionality,
envy-freeness and equitability, and two individual disutility aggregation
functions: additive and maximum based. We show that deciding the existence of a
fair allocation is hard even if the underlying graph is a path or a star. We
also present some efficiently solvable special cases for these graph
topologies
Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods or Chores with Entitlements
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores
to agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of
indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as
envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) for
agents with equal entitlements, we present, in this study, the first set of
impossibility results alongside algorithmic guarantees for fairness among
agents with unequal entitlements.
Within this paper, we expand the concept of envy-freeness up to any good or
chore to the weighted context (WEFX and XWEF respectively), demonstrating that
these allocations are not guaranteed to exist for two or three agents. Despite
these negative results, we develop a WEFX procedure for two agents with integer
weights, and furthermore, we devise an approximate WEFX procedure for two
agents with normalized weights. We further present a polynomial-time algorithm
that guarantees a weighted envy-free allocation up to one chore (1WEF) for any
number of agents with additive cost functions. Our work underscores the
heightened complexity of the weighted fair division problem when compared to
its unweighted counterpart.Comment: Appears in the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), 202
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their
preferences. It is being used in many settings, such as school choice, course
allocations and residency matches. In some cases, several `items' are given to
each participant. Without having any information on the underlying cardinal
utilities, arguing about fairness of allocation requires extending the ordinal
item ranking to ordinal bundle ranking. The most commonly used such extension
is stochastic dominance (SD), where a bundle X is preferred over a bundle Y if
its score is better according to all additive score functions. SD is a very
conservative extension, by which few allocations are necessarily fair while
many allocations are possibly fair. We propose to make a natural assumption on
the underlying cardinal utilities of the players, namely that the difference
between two items at the top is larger than the difference between two items at
the bottom. This assumption implies a preference extension which we call
diminishing differences (DD), where X is preferred over Y if its score is
better according to all additive score functions satisfying the DD assumption.
We give a full characterization of allocations that are
necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.
Based on this characterization, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for
finding a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation if it exists. Using
simulations, we show that with high probability, a necessarily-proportional
allocation does not exist but a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation exists,
and moreover, that allocation is proportional according to the underlying
cardinal utilities. We also consider chore allocation under the analogous
condition --- increasing-differences.Comment: Revised version, based on very helpful suggestions of JAIR referees.
Gaps in some proofs were filled, more experiments were done, and mor
Chore division on a graph
Le PDF est une version non publiée datant de 2018.International audienceThe paper considers fair allocation of indivisible nondisposable items that generate disutility (chores). We assume that these items are placed in the vertices of a graph and each agent’s share has to form a connected subgraph of this graph. Although a similar model has been investigated before for goods, we show that the goods and chores settings are inherently different. In particular, it is impossible to derive the solution of the chores instance from the solution of its naturally associated fair division instance. We consider three common fair division solution concepts, namely proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability, and two individual disutility aggregation functions: additive and maximum based. We show that deciding the existence of a fair allocation is hard even if the underlying graph is a path or a star. We also present some efficiently solvable special cases for these graph topologies
Externalities in Chore Division
The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous,
undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each
agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be
concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally
appear in fair division situations. We first demonstrate the generalization of
the classical concepts of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the
classical model by taking externalities into account
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