Provably Total Functions of Arithmetic with Basic Terms

A new characterization of provably recursive functions of first-order arithmetic is described. Its main feature is using only terms consisting of 0, the successor S and variables in the quantifier rules, namely, universal elimination and existential introduction.Comment: In Proceedings DICE 2011, arXiv:1201.034

A proof of P!=NP

We show that it is provable in PA that there is an arithmetically definable sequence $\{\phi_{n}:n \in \omega\}$ of $\Pi^{0}_{2}$-sentences, such that - PRA+$\{\phi_{n}:n \in \omega\}$ is $\Pi^{0}_{2}$-sound and $\Pi^{0}_{1}$-complete - the length of $\phi_{n}$ is bounded above by a polynomial function of $n$ with positive leading coefficient - PRA+$\phi_{n+1}$ always proves 1-consistency of PRA+$\phi_{n}$. One has that the growth in logical strength is in some sense "as fast as possible", manifested in the fact that the total general recursive functions whose totality is asserted by the true $\Pi^{0}_{2}$-sentences in the sequence are cofinal growth-rate-wise in the set of all total general recursive functions. We then develop an argument which makes use of a sequence of sentences constructed by an application of the diagonal lemma, which are generalisations in a broad sense of Hugh Woodin's "Tower of Hanoi" construction as outlined in his essay "Tower of Hanoi" in Chapter 18 of the anthology "Truth in Mathematics". The argument establishes the result that it is provable in PA that $P \neq NP$. We indicate how to pull the argument all the way down into EFA

Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht