4 research outputs found
On beta-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
Let be a set of points in , called voters. A point
is a plurality point for when the following holds: for
every the number of voters closer to than to is at
least the number of voters closer to than to . Thus, in a vote where
each votes for the nearest proposal (and voters for which the
proposals are at equal distance abstain), proposal will not lose against
any alternative proposal . For most voter sets a plurality point does not
exist. We therefore introduce the concept of -plurality points, which
are defined similarly to regular plurality points except that the distance of
each voter to (but not to ) is scaled by a factor , for some
constant . We investigate the existence and computation of
-plurality points, and obtain the following.
* Define \beta^*_d := \sup \{ \beta : \text{any finite multiset V\mathbb{R}^d\beta-plurality point} \}. We prove that , and that for all
.
* Define \beta(p, V) := \sup \{ \beta : \text{p\betaV}\}. Given a voter set , we provide an
algorithm that runs in time and computes a point such that
. Moreover, for we can compute a point
with in time.
* Define \beta(V) := \sup \{ \beta : \text{V\beta-plurality
point}\}. We present an algorithm that, given a voter set in
, computes an plurality point in
time .Comment: 21 pages, 10 figures, SoCG'2
On beta-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
Let V be a set of n points in Rd, called voters. A point p∈Rd is a plurality point for V when the following holds: for every q∈Rd the number of voters closer to p than to q is at least the number of voters closer to q than to p. Thus, in a vote where each v∈V votes for the nearest proposal (and voters for which the proposals are at equal distance abstain), proposal p will not lose against any alternative proposal q. For most voter sets a plurality point does not exist. We therefore introduce the concept of β-plurality points, which are defined similarly to regular plurality points except that the distance of each voter to p (but not to q) is scaled by a factor β, for some constant 0<β≤1. We investigate the existence and computation of β-plurality points, and obtain the following results.
* Define β∗d:=sup{β:any finite multiset V in Rd admits a β-plurality point}. We prove that β∗2=3–√/2, and that 1/d−−√≤β∗d≤3–√/2 for all d≥3.
* Define β(V):=sup{β:V admits a β-plurality point}. We present an algorithm that, given a voter set V in Rd, computes an (1−ε)⋅β(V) plurality point in time O(n2ε3d−2⋅lognεd−1⋅log21ε)
On beta-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
Let V be a set of n points in Rd, called voters. A point p∈Rd is a plurality point for V when the following holds: for every q∈Rd the number of voters closer to p than to q is at least the number of voters closer to q than to p. Thus, in a vote where each v∈V votes for the nearest proposal (and voters for which the proposals are at equal distance abstain), proposal p will not lose against any alternative proposal q. For most voter sets a plurality point does not exist. We therefore introduce the concept of β-plurality points, which are defined similarly to regular plurality points except that the distance of each voter to p (but not to q) is scaled by a factor β, for some constant 0<β≤1. We investigate the existence and computation of β-plurality points, and obtain the following results. * Define β∗d:=sup{β:any finite multiset V in Rd admits a β-plurality point}. We prove that β∗2=3–√/2, and that 1/d−−√≤β∗d≤3–√/2 for all d≥3. * Define β(V):=sup{β:V admits a β-plurality point}. We present an algorithm that, given a voter set V in Rd, computes an (1−ε)⋅β(V) plurality point in time O(n2ε3d−2⋅lognεd−1⋅log21ε)