Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2) and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments

Consequences of a Goedel's misjudgment

The fundamental aim of the paper is to correct an harmful way to interpret a Goedel's erroneous remark at the Congress of Koenigsberg in 1930. Despite the Goedel's fault is rather venial, its misreading has produced and continues to produce dangerous fruits, as to apply the incompleteness Theorems to the full second-order Arithmetic and to deduce the semantic incompleteness of its language by these same Theorems. The first three paragraphs are introductory and serve to define the languages inherently semantic and its properties, to discuss the consequences of the expression order used in a language and some question about the semantic completeness: in particular is highlighted the fact that a non-formal theory may be semantically complete despite using a language semantically incomplete. Finally, an alternative interpretation of the Goedel's unfortunate comment is proposed. KEYWORDS: semantic completeness, syntactic incompleteness, categoricity, arithmetic, second-order languages, paradoxesComment: English version, 19 pages. Fixed and improved terminolog

Humanoid Theory Grounding

In this paper we consider the importance of using a humanoid physical form for a certain proposed kind of robotics, that of theory grounding. Theory grounding involves grounding the theory skills and knowledge of an embodied artificially intelligent (AI) system by developing theory skills and knowledge from the bottom up. Theory grounding can potentially occur in a variety of domains, and the particular domain considered here is that of language. Language is taken to be another “problem space” in which a system can explore and discover solutions. We argue that because theory grounding necessitates robots experiencing domain information, certain behavioral-form aspects, such as abilities to socially smile, point, follow gaze, and generate manual gestures, are necessary for robots grounding a humanoid theory of language