Classical Homomorphic Encryption for Quantum Circuits

We present the first leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme for quantum circuits with classical keys. The scheme allows a classical client to blindly delegate a quantum computation to a quantum server: an honest server is able to run the computation while a malicious server is unable to learn any information about the computation. We show that it is possible to construct such a scheme directly from a quantum secure classical homomorphic encryption scheme with certain properties. Finally, we show that a classical homomorphic encryption scheme with the required properties can be constructed from the learning with errors problem

Delegating Quantum Computation in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

A delegation scheme allows a computationally weak client to use a server's resources to help it evaluate a complex circuit without leaking any information about the input (other than its length) to the server. In this paper, we consider delegation schemes for quantum circuits, where we try to minimize the quantum operations needed by the client. We construct a new scheme for delegating a large circuit family, which we call "C+P circuits". "C+P" circuits are the circuits composed of Toffoli gates and diagonal gates. Our scheme is non-interactive, requires very little quantum computation from the client (proportional to input length but independent of the circuit size), and can be proved secure in the quantum random oracle model, without relying on additional assumptions, such as the existence of fully homomorphic encryption. In practice the random oracle can be replaced by an appropriate hash function or block cipher, for example, SHA-3, AES. This protocol allows a client to delegate the most expensive part of some quantum algorithms, for example, Shor's algorithm. The previous protocols that are powerful enough to delegate Shor's algorithm require either many rounds of interactions or the existence of FHE. The protocol requires asymptotically fewer quantum gates on the client side compared to running Shor's algorithm locally. To hide the inputs, our scheme uses an encoding that maps one input qubit to multiple qubits. We then provide a novel generalization of classical garbled circuits ("reversible garbled circuits") to allow the computation of Toffoli circuits on this encoding. We also give a technique that can support the computation of phase gates on this encoding. To prove the security of this protocol, we study key dependent message(KDM) security in the quantum random oracle model. KDM security was not previously studied in quantum settings.Comment: 41 pages, 1 figures. Update to be consistent with the proceeding versio

Lattice-Based proof of a shuffle

In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Systematizing Genome Privacy Research: A Privacy-Enhancing Technologies Perspective

Rapid advances in human genomics are enabling researchers to gain a better understanding of the role of the genome in our health and well-being, stimulating hope for more effective and cost efficient healthcare. However, this also prompts a number of security and privacy concerns stemming from the distinctive characteristics of genomic data. To address them, a new research community has emerged and produced a large number of publications and initiatives. In this paper, we rely on a structured methodology to contextualize and provide a critical analysis of the current knowledge on privacy-enhancing technologies used for testing, storing, and sharing genomic data, using a representative sample of the work published in the past decade. We identify and discuss limitations, technical challenges, and issues faced by the community, focusing in particular on those that are inherently tied to the nature of the problem and are harder for the community alone to address. Finally, we report on the importance and difficulty of the identified challenges based on an online survey of genome data privacy expertsComment: To appear in the Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), Vol. 2019, Issue