23,693 research outputs found
To Teach Modal Logic: An Opinionated Survey
I aim to promote an alternative agenda for teaching modal logic chiefly
inspired by the relationships between modal logic and philosophy. The guiding
idea for this proposal is a reappraisal of the interest of modal logic in
philosophy, which do not stem mainly from mathematical issues, but which is
motivated by central problems of philosophy and language. I will point out some
themes to start elaborating a guide for a more comprehensive approach to teach
modal logic, and consider the contributions of dual-process theories in
cognitive science, in order to explore a pedagogical framework for the proposed
point of view.Comment: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Tools for
Teaching Logic (TTL2015), Rennes, France, June 9-12, 2015. Editors: M.
Antonia Huertas, Jo\~ao Marcos, Mar\'ia Manzano, Sophie Pinchinat,
Fran\c{c}ois Schwarzentrube
Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract
In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is
realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core
insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we
employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The
structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between
what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the
foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these
notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles
Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle
equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker
"evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads
to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in
topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge
and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic
as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that
preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for
any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these
irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide
sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this
paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205
Originalist Ideology and the Rule of Law
This essay contends that one of the basic tenets of the New Originalism -- the so-called contribution thesis -- compromises our underlying commitment to the rule of law. By locating some binding substantive content of constitutional language in a historical record beyond the text itself, originalism undermines the fundamental concepts of formal legality and public accessibility. With these issues in mind, the essay concludes that originalism is not a philosophical account of how the Constitution has meaning in our legal system, but is instead a judicial ideology intended to promote the constitutional policy judgments of an earlier generation
The knowing ear : an Australian test of universal claims about the semantic structure of sensory verbs and their extension into the domain of cognition
In this paper we test previous claims concerning the universality of patterns of polysemy and semantic change in perception verbs. Implicit in such claims are two elements: firstly, that the sharing of two related senses A and B by a given form is cross-linguistically widespread, and matched by a complementary lack of some rival polysemy, and secondly that the explanation for the ubiquity of a given pattern of polysemy is ultimately rooted in our shared human cognitive make-up. However, in comparison to the vigorous testing of claimed universals that has occurred in phonology, syntax and even basic lexical meaning, there has been little attempt to test proposed universals of semantic extension against a detailed areal study of non-European languages. To address this problem we examine a broad range of Australian languages to evaluate two hypothesized universals: one by Viberg (1984), concerning patterns of semantic extension across sensory modalities within the domain of perception verbs (i .e. intra-field extensions), and the other by Sweetser (1990), concerning the mapping of perception to cognition (i.e. trans-field extensions). Testing against the Australian data allows one claimed universal to survive, but demolishes the other, even though both assign primacy to vision among the senses
The difference between epistemic and metaphysical necessity
Philosophers have observed that metaphysical necessity appears to be a true or real or genuine form of necessity while epistemic necessity does not. Similarly, natural necessity appears genuine while deontic necessity does not. But what is it for a form of necessity to be genuine? I defend an account of genuine necessity in explanatory terms. The genuine forms of necessity, I argue, are those that provide what I call necessitarianexplanation. I discuss the relationship of necessitarian explanation to ground
Imaginative Vividness
How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not take much reflection to see that these terms are ill understood. In this paper, I review both some relevant empirical literature as well as the philosophical literature attempt to get a handle on what it could mean, in an imaginative context, to talk of vividness. As I suggest, this notion ultimately proves to be so problematic as to be philosophically untenable
Modal Rationalism and the Objection from the Insolvability of Modal Disagreement
The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical statements presupposes some prior grasp of modal notions. If this is correct, then the idea that we may have a total agreement concerning empirical facts and disagree on modal facts, which is the starting point of the objection from the insolvability of modal disagreement, is undercut. This paper examines the no-separation thesis and shows that some of the arguments against the classical (empiricist) distinction between empirical and modal statements fail to be conclusive if they are taken to defend a strong notion of metaphysical possibility. The no-separation thesis appears to work only in theoretical frameworks where metaphysical modalities are considered (broadly) conceptual. For these reasons, the no-separation thesis cannot save modal rationalism from the insolvability of modal disagreement
The trilogy ‘ambiguity, ambivalence, exhibition'
In an introduction, we have to call back what will be qualified as being an organizational model before being able to do some comments about the trilogy ‘ambiguity - ambivalence – exhibition'.modèle organisationnel;ambiguïté;ambivalence;exhibition
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