13,718 research outputs found
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation
of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the
question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to
determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from
standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods
benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision
making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these
processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures
fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel
characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl
equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our
knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a
broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a
non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our
theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting
voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for
utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the
relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address
concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized
approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential
mechanism from differential privacy
- …