(Co-)Inductive semantics for Constraint Handling Rules

In this paper, we address the problem of defining a fixpoint semantics for Constraint Handling Rules (CHR) that captures the behavior of both simplification and propagation rules in a sound and complete way with respect to their declarative semantics. Firstly, we show that the logical reading of states with respect to a set of simplification rules can be characterized by a least fixpoint over the transition system generated by the abstract operational semantics of CHR. Similarly, we demonstrate that the logical reading of states with respect to a set of propagation rules can be characterized by a greatest fixpoint. Then, in order to take advantage of both types of rules without losing fixpoint characterization, we present an operational semantics with persistent. We finally establish that this semantics can be characterized by two nested fixpoints, and we show the resulting language is an elegant framework to program using coinductive reasoning.Comment: 17 page

Generalized Vietoris Bisimulations

We introduce and study bisimulations for coalgebras on Stone spaces [14]. Our notion of bisimulation is sound and complete for behavioural equivalence, and generalizes Vietoris bisimulations [4]. The main result of our paper is that bisimulation for a $\mathbf{Stone}$ coalgebra is the topological closure of bisimulation for the underlying $\mathbf{Set}$ coalgebra

Proving Continuity of Coinductive Global Bisimulation Distances: A Never Ending Story

We have developed a notion of global bisimulation distance between processes which goes somehow beyond the notions of bisimulation distance already existing in the literature, mainly based on bisimulation games. Our proposal is based on the cost of transformations: how much we need to modify one of the compared processes to obtain the other. Our original definition only covered finite processes, but a coinductive approach allows us to extend it to cover infinite but finitary trees. After having shown many interesting properties of our distance, it was our intention to prove continuity with respect to projections, but unfortunately the issue remains open. Nonetheless, we have obtained several partial results that are presented in this paper.Comment: In Proceedings PROLE 2015, arXiv:1512.0617

Intelligent escalation and the principle of relativity

Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance in an auction), the agents play forever. The $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game with intelligent agents in which escalation arises. It shows at the light of research on cognitive psychology the difference between intelligence (algorithmic mind) and rationality (algorithmic and reflective mind) in decision processes. It also shows that depending on the point of view (inside or outside) the rationality of the agent may change which is proposed to be called the principle of relativity.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1306.228

Behavioral Equivalences

Beahvioral equivalences serve to establish in which cases two reactive (possible concurrent) systems offer similar interaction capabilities relatively to other systems representing their operating environment. Behavioral equivalences have been mainly developed in the context of process algebras, mathematically rigorous languages that have been used for describing and verifying properties of concurrent communicating systems. By relying on the so called structural operational semantics (SOS), labelled transition systems, are associated to each term of a process algebra. Behavioral equivalences are used to abstract from unwanted details and identify those labelled transition systems that react “similarly” to external experiments. Due to the large number of properties which may be relevant in the analysis of concurrent systems, many different theories of equivalences have been proposed in the literature. The main contenders consider those systems equivalent that (i) perform the same sequences of actions, or (ii) perform the same sequences of actions and after each sequence are ready to accept the same sets of actions, or (iii) perform the same sequences of actions and after each sequence exhibit, recursively, the same behavior. This approach leads to many different equivalences that preserve significantly different properties of systems

On the Rationality of Escalation

Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite games) to study carefully and formally the infinite games especially those called dollar auctions, which are considered as the paradigm of escalation. Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is rational as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence is not rational.Comment: 19 p. This paper is a duplicate of arXiv:1004.525