"Bargaining and Fixed Price Offers: How Online Intermediaries are Changing New Car Transactions"

The Internet has introduced a variety of online buying services that expand the reach of sellers and reduce search costs for buyers. In markets in which traditional outlets establish prices through bargaining, these online intermediaries have also altered the price setting process. Perhaps the most well known example is Autobytel.com which provides referral services in the automobile market. By using Autobytel, a buyer can obtain a non-negotiable price offer as an alternative to bargaining with a car dealership. To understand the effect of online referral systems on the price setting process, we construct a theoretical model of oligopolistic price competition in which one dealership has an exclusive contract with a referral intermediary. We derive market conditions under which the fixed price offered through the referral system will or will not be lower than offline (bargained) prices. Our model provides theoretical insights relevant to results in the empirical literature addressing the role that Autobytel and other infomediaries play in online markets.online markets, E-commerce, intermediary, autobytel, pricing

Probabilistic Patents

We model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers endogenously engage in both brand advertising (to create loyal customers) and price advertising (to attract 'shoppers'). Our analysis allows for 'cross-channel' effects; indeed, we show that price advertising is a substitute for brand advertising. In contrast to models where loyalty is exogenous, these crosschannel effects lead to a continuum of symmetric equilibria; however, the set of equilibria converges to a unique equilibrium as the number of potential e-retailers grows arbitrarily large. Price dispersion is a key feature of all of these equilibria, including the limit equilibrium. While each firm finds it optimal to advertise its brand in an attempt to 'grow' its base of loyal customers, in equilibrium, branding (1) reduces firm profits, (2) increases prices paid by loyals and shoppers, and (3) adversely affects gatekeepers operating price comparison sites. Branding also tightens the range of prices and reduces the value of the price information provided by a comparison site. Using data from a price comparison site, we test several predictions of the model.Price dispersion

Brand and Price Advertising in Online Markets

We model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers endogenously engage in both brand advertising (to create loyal customers) and price advertising (to attract 'shoppers'). Our analysis allows for 'cross-channel' effects; indeed, we show that price advertising is a substitute for brand advertising. In contrast to models where loyalty is exogenous, these cross-channel effects lead to a continuum of symmetric equilibria; however, the set of equilibria converges to a unique equilibrium as the number of potential e-retailers grows arbitrarily large. Price dispersion is a key feature of all of these equilibria, including the limit equilibrium. While each firm finds it optimal to advertise its brand in an attempt to 'grow' its base of loyal customers, in equilibrium, branding (1) reduces firm profits, (2) increases prices paid by loyals and shoppers, and (3) adversely affects gatekeepers operating price comparison sites. Branding also tightens the range of prices and reduces the value of the price information provided by a comparison site. Using data from a price comparison site, we test several predictions of the model.Price dispersion

Inferring market power from retail deposit interest rates in the euro area

This paper tests for the existence of market power in banking, using data on demand deposit rates of households and corresponding market rates in five euro area countries. An implicit measure for market power is based on a partial adjustment model that also allows for an asymmetric response of deposit rates to changes in market rates. The period covers the ten years since introduction of the euro. The analysis indicates that banks are exercising major market power within the euro area. In addition to general sluggishness, bank deposit rates’ reactions are clearly asymmetric: flexible when market rates are decreasing and rigid when rates are increasing. The degree of asymmetric behaviour can be interpreted as a further indication of the market power banks exercise. Despite country differences, a general pattern of interest rate adjustment in demand deposit pricing is observable.competition; banking industry; retail interest rates

Pricing Decisions and Market Power in the UK Electricity Market: A VECM Approach

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Chrysovalantis Amountzias, Hulya Dagdeviren, and Tassos Patokos, 'Pricing Decisions and Market Power in the UK Electricity Market: A VECM Approach', Energy Policy, Vol. 108, pp. 467-473, September 2017. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 27 June 2019. The Version of Record is available online at doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.06.016 © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.This paper examines the influence of market power in the formation of retail and wholesale electricity prices in the UK over 1998–2012 on the basis of Vector Error Correction model (VECM). Market power is measured as the influence of the market share of the Big Six in a dynamic demand and supply VECM. The findings indicate that market power of the Big Six in the wholesale industry has a significant and large positive influence on the wholesale mark-up in the short-run. The long-run estimates support the arguments about ‘revenue rebalancing’ resulting from vertical integration. That is, low market power (and hence low revenues) in the wholesale industry leads to higher prices (hence higher revenues) in the retail industry. These findings are in contrast to the CMA's finding that no market power is exercised in the wholesale industry. Retail electricity prices are affected directly by both the wholesale and retail market concentration ratios in the long-run rather than indirectly through the wholesale mark-up. Overall, the findings in this paper provide support for the view that the UK electricity market exhibits significant anti-competitive conduct in both the retail and wholesale segments.Peer reviewe

Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly

In the economics literature, various views on the likely (efficiency) effects of information exchange, communication between firms and market transparency present themselves. Often these views on information flows are highly conflicting. On the one hand, it is argued that increased information dissemination improves firm planning to the benefit of society (including customers) and/or allows potential customers to make the right decisions given their preferences. On the other hand, the literature also suggests that increased information dissemination can have significant coordinating or collusive potential to the benefit of firms but at the expense of society at large (mainly, potential customers). In this chapter, we try to make sense of these views, with the aim of presenting some simple lessons for antitrust practice. In addition, the chapter presents some cases, from both sides of the Atlantic, where informational issues have played a significant role.

Brand and Price Advertising in Online Markets

We model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers endogenously engage in both brand advertising (to create loyal customers) and price advertising (to attract "shoppers"). Our analysis allows for "cross-channel" effects; indeed, we show that price advertising is a substitute for brand advertising. In contrast to models where loyalty is exogenous, these cross-channel effects lead to a continuum of symmetric equilibria; however, the set of equilibria converges to a unique equilibrium as the number of potential e-retailers grows arbitrarily large. Price dispersion is a key feature of all of these equilibria, including the limit equilibrium. While each firm finds it optimal to advertise its brand in an attempt to "grow" its base of loyal customers, in equilibrium, branding (1) reduces firm profits, (2) increases prices paid by loyals and shoppers, and (3) adversely affects gatekeepers operating price comparison sites. Branding also tightens the range of prices and reduces the value of the price information provided by a comparison site. Using data from a price comparison site, we test several predictions of the model.Price dispersion

Information, Search, and Price Dispersion

We provide a unified treatment of alternative models of information acquisition/transmission that have been advanced to rationalize price dispersion in online and offline markets for homogeneous products. These different frameworks -- which include sequential search, fixed sample search, and clearinghouse models -- reveal that reductions in (or the elimination of) consumer search costs need not reduce (or eliminate) price dispersion. Our treatment highlights a "duality" between search-theoretic and clearinghouse models of dispersion, and shows how auction-theoretic tools may be used to simplify (and even generalize) existing theoretical results. We conclude with an overview of the burgeoning empirical literature. The empirical evidence suggests that price dispersion in both online and offline markets is sizeable, pervasive, and persistent and does not purely stem from subtle differences in firms' products or services.

A waste of energy? A critical assessment of the investigation of the UK Energy Market by the Competition and Markets Authority

This document is the accepted manuscript version of the following article: Chrysovalantis Amountzias, Hulya Dagdeviren and Tassos Patokos, ‘A waste of energy? A critical assessment of the investigation of the UK energy market by the Competition and Markets Authority’, Competition & Change, Vol. 21 (1): 45-60, February 2017. The final version of this paper is available at doi: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1024529416678070. Published by SAGE Publishing.In this paper, we assess the findings of the UK energy market investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority, conducted during June 2014–June 2016.We argue that the results of the investigation have been advantageous for the large energy companies and they risk failing to bring any significant and positive change to the energy industry.We highlight three major aspects of the Competition and Markets Authorities assessment. First, the panel examined retail and wholesale segments of the energy industry in isolation, which can be misleading in the assessment of vertical integration. It also considered new entries to the sector as a sign of competitive strength when many were due to favourable government policies in the form of exemptions from various obligations. Second, its conclusion that a position of unilateral market power by the large energy companies arises from weak customer engagement (i.e. low switching rates) shifts the focus and responsibility for the problems of the energy markets away from the conduct of the companies onto customers. Finally, the investigation placed an overemphasis on competition without due reference to its consequences for consumers’ welfare.Peer reviewe