Characterizing cardiac involvement in chronic kidney disease using CMR—a systematic review

Purpose of Review: The aim of the review was to identify and describe recent advances (over the last 3 years) in cardiac magnetic resonance (CMR) imaging in patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD). We conducted a literature review in line with current guidelines. Recent Findings: The authors identified 22 studies. Patients with CKD had left ventricular global and regional dysfunction and adverse remodeling. Stress testing with CMR revealed a reduced stress-response in CKD patients. Native T1 relaxation times (as a surrogate markers of fibrosis) are elevated in CKD patients, proportional to disease duration. Patients with CKD have reduced strain magnitudes and reduced aortic distensibility. Summary: CMR has diagnostic utility to identify and characterize cardiac involvement in this patient group. A number of papers have described novel findings over the last 3 years, suggesting that CMR has potential to become more widely used in studies in this patient group

Cover Pricing and the Overreach of ‘Object’ Liability under Article 101 TFEU

This article uses the example of cover pricing to show a possible overreach of liability under Article 101 TFEU, in relation to arrangements deemed to have the ‘object’ of restricting competition. Cover pricing is where a bidder seeks a non-winning bid from a competitor so that he can participate in a tender process without securing the contract. The wide meaning of ‘concerted practice’ means that a potential breach of Article 101 may arise even where the party receiving the request refuses to provide a cover bid. It is important that a restriction by object (which leads to the finding of an infringement regardless of whether the practice was implemented or had any harmful effect) applies only to the most serious arrangements between undertakings. It is shown that cover pricing very rarely has any anti-competitive effect and indeed the alternative (lawful) behaviour, of openly announcing a non-intention to win the contract, is more likely to reduce competition. It is nevertheless treated as an object restriction, mainly because it involves direct communication between competitors of pricing intentions. Article 101 may therefore be unable to distinguish some arrangements with ambivalent effects from the most serious cartel practices. It is argued that a greater effects analysis is needed (either in applying the law or calculating penalties), to ensure fairness and proportionality

Vertical Restraints Facilitating Horizontal Collusion: ‘Stretching’ Agreements in a Comparative Approach

This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United States (US) to the notions of agreement and concerted practice applied to horizontal collusive consequences of vertical restraints. It concludes that networks of vertical restraints blur the differences between vertical and horizontal agreements; therefore, both options of attack are available for enforcers in the EU and the US context. If the analysed vertical restraints are adopted in parallel by agreement, they should be deemed illegal as long as they restrict competition producing collusive consequences. In the absence of explicit coordination to adopt the practice, I suggest first looking for a stretched concept of horizontal agreement or a broadly interpreted concept of concerted practice, including unilateral ‘communication’ that intentionally reduces uncertainty. Even when the analysed practices are adopted individually and not by all firms, they can represent a commitment to focal points, observable by market players, thus amounting to communication of intent. If that is not possible, I propose that an analysis of market power, incentives, coercion and induction should guide the finding of an illegal vertical agreement and ground the analysis of the consequences. The agreement/concerted practice path is an appropriate, feasible and coherent way to deal with vertical restraints facilitating horizontal tacit coordination, but that does not exclude alternative effective enforcement mechanisms

European "Class" Action: British and Italian Points of View in Evolving Scenarios

The article tackles the state-of-play of the European debate with respect to the representative action as form of enhanced antitrust private enforcement. First it takes into consideration the US precedent. Then it outlines the current debate at European level (White Paper), both on the basis of the British experience and of the Italian 'expectations' of introducing such a tool of consumer and citizen defence vis à vis abuses and collusive agreements carried out by national or multinational undertakings.collective actions, representative actions, white paper on private actions for damages, Bersani, Crehan Courage, Manfredi, European Court of Justice, European Commission

Court of Justice Oversight Over the European Central Bank: Delimiting the ECB\u27s Constitutional Autonomy and Independence in the OLAF Judgment

An article devoted to the European Court of Justice\u27s (“ECJ” or the “Court”) judicial review of the European Central Bank\u27s (“ECB”) level of constitutional autonomy and independence may seem a bit arcane in a book dedicated to honor Advocate General Francis Jacobs upon his retirement from the Court. The topic is, however, eminently suitable, because it highlights his influence in a case remote from the many fields of law in which his impact has been so marked-- e.g., free movement of goods, competition law, trademarks and other intellectual property rights, free movement of services and establishment rights, human rights protection, and taxation. This Article will first discuss the high importance of the principle of independence for the ECB in its control of monetary policy and the European currency, noting some aspects of the academic debate concerning the appropriate level of such independence. The first section also observes that a debate about the constitutional nature and autonomy of the ECB has become intertwined with the appraisal of its level of independence. The Article then reviews the EC Treaty\u27s attribution to the Court of jurisdiction within Monetary Union, including a power of judicial review of the ECB\u27s status, measures and decisions. The following section sets out the conflict between the Commission and the ECB in the OLAF case. The Article concentrates upon the text in Advocate General Jacob\u27s opinion and the Court\u27s judgment concerning the constitutional status of the ECB as an organ or body structured within the Community framework and concerning the scope of the ECB\u27s independence. The final section provides several reflections upon the ultimate impact of the judgment and opinion. The reflections stress the importance of the Court\u27s rejection of the ECB\u27s claim to virtual autonomy in constitutional terms and the related subjection of the ECB to the rule of law within the EC. The final commentary also considers the Court\u27s and especially Advocate General Jacobs\u27 demarcation of the functional nature of the ECB\u27s independence. Advocate General Jacobs\u27 discussion of the value and extent of democratic accountability of the ECB is also highlighted

The CJEU vis-à-vis EU and non-EU investors, between national and european solidarity: golden shares, sovereign investment and socio-economic protectionism under free movement rules

The fundamental issue underlying this essay is the tension between the EU’s aims of market integration on the one hand, and, on the other, the intervention of Member States in the economy and welfare provision and the exercise of public functions by national authorities in sensitive industrial sectors. In this respect I have focused on one specific aspect: the CJEU’s case law on the special powers held by the State in formerly public companies where the rights conferred on shareholders by ordinary law are reduced for the benefit of public entities. Besides European golden shares, my contribution had dealt with the access to the EU’s market of non-EU public/private hybrids, namely sovereign investors such as sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) and state owned enterprises (“SOEs”). The first aim of my research is to investigate in what sense, to what extent and for what reasons the golden shares jurisprudence represents a privileged – although atypical – sedes materiae to illustrate the content and extent of EU economic/market integration, the connection between the latter and the two interrelated concepts of social integration and EU solidarity, and the impact of such dual integration (both economic and social) on Member States’ solidarity. In this regard, three main questions arise: has the CJEU been too activist in condemning Member States with regard to privat(is)e(d) undertakings, or is its approach justified in the light of the EU’s free market objectives? Is the up-to-date case law likely to endanger the solidarity on which the provision of SGEIs is grounded? Is the scope of manoeuvre currently accorded to Member States too narrow to justify national socio-economic policies on golden shares under the free movement rules (especially, as will be seen further on, from the point of view of the exceptions to these rules)?. My second general aim is to identify the main concerns raised by the access of SWFs and SOEs to the EU market and, then, to assess whether action by the EU is welcome and necessary in this area. In this respect, the main questions are: is it conceivable a European golden share to restrict this kind of investments to be shaped on the basis of a European notion of solidarity? Should the CJEU be proactive and, for instance, admit ‘new’ Cassis-Gebhard overriding reasons of general interest that could not be admitted vis-à-vis intra-EU investments? Could the derogation provided for in Art. 65.1 b) allow for a restriction that is compatible with EU law? And in that case, what kind of connection would there be between national and European solidarity?The fundamental issue underlying this essay is the tension between the EU’s aims of market integration on the one hand, and, on the other, the intervention of Member States in the economy and welfare provision and the exercise of public functions by national authorities in sensitive industrial sectors. In this respect I have focused on one specific aspect: the CJEU’s case law on the special powers held by the State in formerly public companies where the rights conferred on shareholders by ordinary law are reduced for the benefit of public entities. Besides European golden shares, my contribution had dealt with the access to the EU’s market of non-EU public/private hybrids, namely sovereign investors such as sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) and state owned enterprises (“SOEs”). The first aim of my research is to investigate in what sense, to what extent and for what reasons the golden shares jurisprudence represents a privileged – although atypical – sedes materiae to illustrate the content and extent of EU economic/market integration, the connection between the latter and the two interrelated concepts of social integration and EU solidarity, and the impact of such dual integration (both economic and social) on Member States’ solidarity. In this regard, three main questions arise: has the CJEU been too activist in condemning Member States with regard to privat(is)e(d) undertakings, or is its approach justified in the light of the EU’s free market objectives? Is the up-to-date case law likely to endanger the solidarity on which the provision of SGEIs is grounded? Is the scope of manoeuvre currently accorded to Member States too narrow to justify national socio-economic policies on golden shares under the free movement rules (especially, as will be seen further on, from the point of view of the exceptions to these rules)?. My second general aim is to identify the main concerns raised by the access of SWFs and SOEs to the EU market and, then, to assess whether action by the EU is welcome and necessary in this area. In this respect, the main questions are: is it conceivable a European golden share to restrict this kind of investments to be shaped on the basis of a European notion of solidarity? Should the CJEU be proactive and, for instance, admit ‘new’ Cassis-Gebhard overriding reasons of general interest that could not be admitted vis-à-vis intra-EU investments? Could the derogation provided for in Art. 65.1 b) allow for a restriction that is compatible with EU law? And in that case, what kind of connection would there be between national and European solidarity?Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc