Política y nihilismo.

Sin resume

Nietzsche on nihilism

Nietzsche, though he used various senses of ‘nihilism’, had two main conceptions: nihilism as the belief that life is meaningless (which I term ‘value-nihilism’), and nihilism as negation of life. I argue that value-nihilism is Nietzsche’s main conception of nihilism prior to 1888. Then, in 1888, Nietzsche introduced the conception of nihilism as negation of life. This explains why Christianity is seen as an antidote (though also a cause) of nihilism in the pre-1888 work, and then comes to be seen as intrinsically nihilistic in the 1888 work: Christianity provided a meaning to life, but did so in ways that negated life. I endorse Bernard Reginster’s view of nihilism as a characterisation of value-nihilism; however, it does not explain Nietzsche’s claims that Christianity is nihilistic. Ken Gemes offers a view that aims to reconcile value-nihilism and the nihilism of Christianity. He sees nihilism as being, fundamentally, a state of ‘wholesale repression’ of the natural drives, which he terms ‘affective nihilism’. Value-nihilism is then said by Gemes to be a cognitive expression of affective nihilism. However, I argue that value-nihilism is not necessarily an expression of affective nihilism. I take Gemes’s view to be more compatible with Nietzsche’s 1888 view of nihilism as negation of life. However, I argue that while affective nihilism is a central feature of Nietzsche’s account of nihilism as negation of life, a more expansive conception of negation of life best captures the diversity of Nietzsche’s use of the notion. I suggest a conception of nihilism as expression of will to nothingness as an alternative unified conception to affective nihilism. This has the advantage that it can be seen to be expressed by value-nihilism as Nietzsche uses the notion in the published works, as well as capturing the diverse forms of negation of life

Kant's practical postulates and the limits of the Critical system

The topic that I wish to consider is that of the significance, both systematic and historical, for Kant's system as a whole of the postulates of pure practical reason, more specifically, of the two theological postulates concerning the existence of God and personal immortality which form the basis of Kant's moral theology. My discussion will proceed by way of an examination of the problems of Kant's moral theology in the eyes of his early contemporaries, for whom it constituted a crux in Kant's project. Different views were taken by Kant's contemporaries of what exactly follows from this regarding the coherence and completeness of Kant's Critical philosophy. For the thinkers I will be looking at here, the miscarriage of the moral theology constituted a fatal fault in Kantianism. For the German Idealists, the moral theology instead provided a vital clue as to how the Kantian system could be, and showed why it needed to be, transformed into a more radical idealism. The role of the practical postulates in the development of German Idealism demands a separate treatment; what I will argue here is simply that the practical postulates do indeed represent a point at which Kant's philosophical system displays a deep and interesting tension, in light of which both historical responses are prima facie intelligible

Algunas observaciones sobre nihilismo y teoría de la imagen de Fichte

This paper explores the relationship between nihilism and image theory in Fichte’s philosophy. It will be shown that Fichte does not only think of nihilism in terms of Jacobi’s criticism to the doctrine of science. He also provides us for an affirmative concept of nihilism, which is essentially connected with his theory of image and his theory of what we are, we can and we ought to become. In order to identify this hitherto ignored notion of nihilism in Fichte’s doctrine of science, the present paper studies the nihilism concept of Jakob Hermann Obereit (1725-1798)

Nietzsche on nihilism

Nietzsche, though he used various senses of ‘nihilism’, had two main conceptions: nihilism as the belief that life is meaningless (which I term ‘value-nihilism’), and nihilism as negation of life. I argue that value-nihilism is Nietzsche’s main conception of nihilism prior to 1888. Then, in 1888, Nietzsche introduced the conception of nihilism as negation of life. This explains why Christianity is seen as an antidote (though also a cause) of nihilism in the pre-1888 work, and then comes to be seen as intrinsically nihilistic in the 1888 work: Christianity provided a meaning to life, but did so in ways that negated life. I endorse Bernard Reginster’s view of nihilism as a characterisation of value-nihilism; however, it does not explain Nietzsche’s claims that Christianity is nihilistic. Ken Gemes offers a view that aims to reconcile value-nihilism and the nihilism of Christianity. He sees nihilism as being, fundamentally, a state of ‘wholesale repression’ of the natural drives, which he terms ‘affective nihilism’. Value-nihilism is then said by Gemes to be a cognitive expression of affective nihilism. However, I argue that value-nihilism is not necessarily an expression of affective nihilism. I take Gemes’s view to be more compatible with Nietzsche’s 1888 view of nihilism as negation of life. However, I argue that while affective nihilism is a central feature of Nietzsche’s account of nihilism as negation of life, a more expansive conception of negation of life best captures the diversity of Nietzsche’s use of the notion. I suggest a conception of nihilism as expression of will to nothingness as an alternative unified conception to affective nihilism. This has the advantage that it can be seen to be expressed by value-nihilism as Nietzsche uses the notion in the published works, as well as capturing the diverse forms of negation of life

Una tipología de las concepciones del intelecto en Kant y Maimon, así como su conexión con el problema del acosmismo

A partir de la idea kantiana de un tipo de entendimiento diferente al del ser humano en cuanto ente racional finito, se busca rastrear el impacto generado por la idea de “otros tipos de conocimiento” en el debate poskantiano. Para ello, se acude a la recepción que Maimon hace de Kant, la cual se proyecta en la idea de un “entendimiento infinito” en cuanto “otro tipo” de conocer. Con esto se busca, por un lado, atender a la posición filosófica de Maimon discutiendo con lo que, por una serie de malentendidos, se ha establecido como su posición “genuina”. Por otro lado, se analizan las consecuencias que obtiene Maimon en su apropiación de la filosofía trascendental, por lo que hace a la relación entre sensibilidad y entendimiento, justamente allí donde la idea de un entendimiento infinito se pone como idea regulativa