1. DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE FOR TRADE, INDUSTRY AND ENTERPRISE

DOCUMENT FOR INFORMATION Note by the secretariat This paper highlights the most important achievements of the Working Party on Industry and Enterprise Development (WP.8) during 2004 and gives an overview of the activities envisaged in the 2005-2007 exercises. In section 1, the Working Party requests the Committee to approve the renewal of two subgroups and the establishment of a new subprogramme directly under the Working Party. This document supplements the report of the Working Party (TRADE/WP.8/2005/17), which the Committee will be asked to endorse. Additional information on the Working Party is available at the following website address

Defining Original Presentism

It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level. The problem is that presentists have tried to express their view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call that framework the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Frege’s atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated as common ground in the debate rests on this very same Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative, inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus, yielding original presentism. According to original presentism, temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the Fregean nexus, but by their form—in particular, by their form of predication

Ephemeral: An Original Play

Interesting conversations are had when an American woman spends a weekend with her Czech penpal and his relatives at his recently deceased mother\u27s cottage. Based on a series of interviews with Czech citizens and personal experiences, Kierstan DeVoe\u27s play focuses on the complex nature of tragedy and nostalgia, complete with moments of warm laughter and great tension

A Pedagogy for Original Synners

Part of the Volume on Digital Young, Innovation, and the UnexpectedThis essay begins by speculating about the learning environment of the class of 2020. It takes place entirely in a virtual world, populated by simulated avatars, managed through the pedagogy of gaming. Based on this projected version of a future-now-in-formation, the authors consider the implications of the current paradigm shift that is happening at the edges of institutions of higher education. From the development of programs in multimedia literacy to the focus on the creation of hybrid learning spaces (that combine the use of virtual worlds, social networking applications, and classroom activities), the scene of learning as well as the subjects of education are changing. The figure of the Original Synner is a projection of the student-of-the-future whose foundational literacy is grounded in their ability to synthesize information from multiple information streams

Sixty original plays for primary grades

Thesis (Ed.M.)--Boston Universit

The Original Theory of Constitutionalism

The U.S. Constitution embodies a conception of democratic sovereignty that has been substantially forgotten and obscured in today’s commentary. Recovering this original idea of constitution-making shows that today’s originalism is, ironically, unfaithful to its origins in an idea of self-rule that prized both the initial ratification of fundamental law and the political community’s ongoing power to reaffirm or change it. This does not mean, however, that living constitutionalism better fits the original conception of democratic self-rule. Rather, because the Constitution itself makes amendment practically impossible, it all but shuts down the very form of democratic sovereignty that authorizes it. No interpretive strategy succeeds in overcoming the dilemma of a constitution that at once embodies and prohibits democratic sovereignty

The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power

In this paper, the author refutes any claim that judicial review was invented in Marbury v. Madison, or that, because it is contrary to the original meaning of the Constitution, it must be justified by some nonoriginalist interpretive methodology. He will do so, not by discerning the shadowy and often counterfactual intentions of the founding generation, but by presenting as comprehensively as he can what the founders actually said during the constitutional convention, in state ratification conventions, and immediately after ratification. These statements, taken cumulatively, leave no doubt that the founders contemplated judicial nullification of legislation enacted by the states and by Congress. In short, the author shall demonstrate that the original meaning of the judicial power in Article III, included the power of judicial nullification. Many constitutional scholars who do not consider themselves to be originalists nevertheless acknowledge that originalism provides the starting point of constitutional interpretation or at least is a factor to be considered among others. It is equally important that these nonoriginalists are made aware of the substantial evidence that the original meaning of the judicial power included the power to nullify unconstitutional laws