Does OPEC still exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation

The aim of this paper is to determine if OPEC acts as a cartel by testing whether the production decisions of the different countries are coordinated and if they have an influence on oil prices. Relying on cointegration and causality tests in both time series and panel settings, our findings show that the OPEC influence has evolved through time, following the changes in the oil pricing system. While the influence of OPEC is found to be important just after the counter-oil shock, our results show that OPEC is price taker on the majority of the considered sub-periods. Finally, by dividing OPEC between savers and spenders, we show that it acts as a cartel mainly with a subgroup of its members.Oil prices, oil production, OPEC, cartel, cointegration, causality.

A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent

This paper highlights the potential for joint OECD (or non-OPEC) carbon taxes to reduce OPEC’s monopoly rent and provide benefit to non-OPEC countries provided jointly agreed trigger strategies are adhered to. In traditional economic theory, the primary purpose of a carbon tax is to internalize a global negative externality. A second benefit for individual countries is that the revenue raised by carbon tax can be used to reduce other tax rates and so lower the deadweight loss of tax system. In this paper, we discuss a third benefit of carbon taxes: transferring rents from OPEC to the oil importing countries.We develop a multi-region general equilibrium structure with endogenously determined oil supply for the purpose in which emissions are endogenously determined. We calibrate our model to 2006 data. Our analytics and numerical simulation results highlight how a uniform carbon tax used by all non-OPEC countries will increase the buyer’s price of oil but decrease the supplier’s price of oil, thus decreasing non-OPEC countries’ oil demand, and transferring OPEC monopoly rent to non-OPEC countries. Carbon taxes reduce the welfare of OPEC and increase the welfare of non-OPEC countries. Results also show how carbon taxes reduce global emissions, but the effect is small.carbon taxes, OECD, monopoly rent

Onto Exchange Rate's Short Run Impact on Oil Prices Dynamics: An OPEC Members' perspective

In this paper, we study the oil price formation for the purpose of understanding price reactions of OPEC member countries to changes in the exchange rate of the US dollar and prices of other members in the short run. The results suggested that there is a partial impact of exchange rates volatility on oil prices dynamics in short runs. Moreover, the study demonstrated that Saudi Arabia behaves as a leader in the OPEC structure market while it behaves differently when linked to other reference markets. Generally, Saudi Arabia behaves more potentially and more moderately than the other OPEC members in responding to change of references markets prices.oil prices, exchange rates pass through, OPEC countries

Oregon Parenting Education Collaborative: Helping Parents Raise Children Who Thrive

This report summarizes the work of the Oregon Parenting Education Collaborative during its first five years, 2010-2015. OPEC is a multi-year initiative led by The Oregon Community Foundation, The Ford Family Foundation and Oregon State University. Financial supporters include The Oregon Community Foundation, The Ford Family Foundation, the Meyer Memorial Trust, The Collins Foundation, and OCF Donor Advised Funds. The initiative supports expanded access to best practice parenting education programs, with a focus on reaching parents of children prenatal to age six, and supports efforts to develop and strengthen regional parenting education "Hubs." OPEC is unique in its collaborative, foundation-led approach to building a statewide infrastructure for parenting education through community-based non-profits and public agencies. The OPEC initiative was launched in July 2010 with the funding of six regional parenting Hubs serving 12 counties, and nine Small Grant projects providing evidence-based classes and/or home visiting for specific groups of parents. As of fall 2015, 15 Hubs reach 26 Oregon counties and Siskiyou County, Calif., and OPEC has provided Small Grant funding to 17 additional Oregon organizations. OPEC has achieved strong outcomes in the building of regional infrastructure and parenting education partnerships, as well as increasing positive parenting capacities

Welcome Address by Jürgen Chrobog

Klimaveränderung; Umweltabkommen; Emissionshandel; Außenpolitik; EU-Staaten; OPEC-Staaten

Political constraints on government cartelization: the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia.

We examine government cartelization efforts in crude oil production. Texas and Saudi Arabia are alleged to act as swing producers to maintain the interstate (1933-1972) and OPEC (1973 on) oil cartels respectively. We analyze the political constraints that affected the ability of Texas and Saudi Arabia to act as residual producers within their respective cartels. In the case of Texas, political factors molded individual firm production quotas, advantaging high-cost producers and hence, reducing total cartel net profits. Further, Texas had limited range for adjusting total state production to maintain interstate output at levels consistent with target prices. Saudi Arabia’s role as swing producer within OPEC raises similar questions regarding how cartel output is shared among members, and the extent to which domestic economic and political pressures coming from various member countries may undermine the effectiveness of the cartel. OPEC ‘s coordination problem has been more difficult than that faced by the interstate cartel for a variety of reasons that we explore. Even so, they have not kept the OPEC members in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, from exerting a strong influence on the level of world oil prices.

Welcome Speech by Christian Ude

Klimaveränderung; Umweltabkommen; Emissionshandel; Außenpolitik; EU-Staaten; OPEC-Staaten

Lenkungsmöglichkeiten und Marktmacht des OPEC-Kartells

Mit hohen Rohölpreisen und einem neuen Lenkungsanspruch brachte eine wiedererstarkte OPEC die Ölverbraucher 2000/01 zum Zittern. Auch fundamentale Rohölmarkt-Daten deuten auf eine Verschiebung der Kräfteverhältnisse zu Gunsten der OPEC hin. Wie mächtig ist die OPEC tatsächlich? Wie ist die Marktmacht des OPEC-Kartells aus der Sicht der Markt- und Ordnungstheorie zu beurteilen? Welche Perspektiven ergeben sich daraus für die Rohölpreisentwicklung

Is OPEC dead? Oil exporters, the Paris agreement and the transition to a post-carbon world

The Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) faces a perfect storm. It is squeezed between the revolution in unconventionals, which has increased global supply of hydrocarbons and lowered their price, and the prospect of a global peak in oil demand, stemming from climate policies and the falling costs of alternative energy technologies. In the face of these challenges, media commentators have declared the death of OPEC as a cartel. This perspective argues that the claims about OPEC’s demise are misguided for four reasons: (1) OPEC never acted as a cartel, let alone a powerful one; (2) thanks to its cheap production costs, OPEC’s oil will remain competitive in a low-cost environment; (3) the group has always proved to be flexible; and (4) OPEC is still attractive to its member states, most notably as a source of prestige, as is illustrated by the recent re-entries of Indonesia and Gabon. That said, over the longer term OPEC will inevitably need to adapt to a changing external environment. A likely possibility would be for the club to gradually morph from an output-setting cartel into a forum for deliberation and information-sharing

Is this the end of the OPEC cartel?

In looking at various circumstances surrounding the OPEC and the present economic crisis, one can come to a conclusion that this is the end of OPEC. This hypothesis could be supported by such factors as, falling OPEC share in the oil market, President Barack Obama's new energy policy for the United States, depleting oil reserves and the increasing worries about environmental protection. Despite these factors, it seems that the most possible scenario would be the continued strong influence of OPEC on oil prices, albeit weakened. The above hypothesis is supported by fluctuation in oil prices, rising oil demands in emerging economies like China, the dominating influence of the automobile lobby, the negative effect of bio-fuel on agriculture and finally, the underdeveloped nature of many developing countries, which in turn mean dependent on oil for years to come