4 research outputs found
Notes On The Design Of An Internet Adversary
The design of the defenses Internet systems can deploy against attack,
especially adaptive and resilient defenses, must start from a realistic model
of the threat. This requires an assessment of the capabilities of the
adversary. The design typically evolves through a process of simulating both
the system and the adversary. This requires the design and implementation of a
simulated adversary based on the capability assessment. Consensus on the
capabilities of a suitable adversary is not evident. Part of the recent
redesign of the protocol used by peers in the LOCKSS digital preservation
system included a conservative assessment of the adversary's capabilities. We
present our assessment and the implications we drew from it as a step towards a
reusable adversary specification
A Security Reference Architecture for Blockchains
Due to their interesting features, blockchains have become popular in recent
years. They are full-stack systems where security is a critical factor for
their success. The main focus of this work is to systematize knowledge about
security and privacy issues of blockchains. To this end, we propose a security
reference architecture based on models that demonstrate the stacked hierarchy
of various threats (similar to the ISO/OSI hierarchy) as well as threat-risk
assessment using ISO/IEC 15408. In contrast to the previous surveys, we focus
on the categorization of security incidents based on their origins and using
the proposed architecture we present existing prevention and mitigation
techniques. The scope of our work mainly covers aspects related to the
decentralized nature of blockchains, while we mention common operational
security issues and countermeasures only tangentially
The Security Reference Architecture for Blockchains: Towards a Standardized Model for Studying Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Defenses
Blockchains are distributed systems, in which security is a critical factor
for their success. However, despite their increasing popularity and adoption,
there is a lack of standardized models that study blockchain-related security
threats. To fill this gap, the main focus of our work is to systematize and
extend the knowledge about the security and privacy aspects of blockchains and
contribute to the standardization of this domain.
We propose the security reference architecture (SRA) for blockchains, which
adopts a stacked model (similar to the ISO/OSI) describing the nature and
hierarchy of various security and privacy aspects. The SRA contains four
layers: (1) the network layer, (2) the consensus layer, (3) the replicated
state machine layer, and (4) the application layer. At each of these layers, we
identify known security threats, their origin, and countermeasures, while we
also analyze several cross-layer dependencies. Next, to enable better reasoning
about security aspects of blockchains by the practitioners, we propose a
blockchain-specific version of the threat-risk assessment standard ISO/IEC
15408 by embedding the stacked model into this standard. Finally, we provide
designers of blockchain platforms and applications with a design methodology
following the model of SRA and its hierarchy
Notes On The Design Of An Internet Adversary
The design of the defenses Internet systems can deploy against attack, especially adaptive and resilient defenses, must start from a realistic model of the threat. This requires an assessment of the capabilities of the adversary. The design typically evolves through a process of simulating both the system and the adversary. This requires the design and implementation of a simulated adversary based on the capability assessment. Consensu