Tajikistan: 'Revolutionary situation' or a Resilient state? EUCAM Policy Brief 12, 19 December 2009

Since 2008, after the period of relative growth and social stability, the situation in Tajikistan has been steadily deteriorating; thus leading to increased speculation that the country could emerge as a failing state. Given its proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the role it plays in the Northern Distribution Network, a line that funnels military supplies from Europe to NATO ISAF troops in Afghanistan, the ramifications of potential instability in Tajikistan would resonate beyond the country. The current brief assesses to what extent such danger is in fact real by outlining developments in the key areas of economy and security, and examining the regime’s coping capacity to deal with emerging challenges

Etnicidad, nacionalismo y el Estado en Afganistán

The paper begins by surveying the cultural, linguistic, occupational and sectarian diversity of Afghanistan's population, going on to discuss the origins of the modern Afghan state in the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in the late 19th century. It explains that it has almost always been dominated by Pashtuns, particularly Durranis, and that this has often been resented by non-Pashtuns. It looks at the way that starting in the 1920s efforts were made to link Afghan national identity with Pashtun culture and values. Opposition to King Amanullah's modernisation programme led to his departure in 1928. For a brief period in 1929 a Tajik ruler, Habibullah II, held power, but Amanullah's third cousin, Nadir Khan, soon restored the Durrani monarchy. A renewed emphasis on the Pashtun character of the Afghan state followed, with for instance Pashtu being proclaimed the official language in 1937. After drawing attention to the significance of the Prime Minister Daud Khan's support for an independent Pashtun state, Pashtunistan, in the 1950s, the paper looks at the emergence of a somewhat more inclusive ethos and a stronger sense of a shared national identity in the 1960s. Finally it examines the impact of the Saor Revolution in April 1978, the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s and the rise of Taliban in the mid-1990s on identity, concluding that ethnic divisions and tensions became more marked in the last quarter of the 20th century

Pakistan and the Future of U.S. Policy

A spreading Islamic insurgency engulfs the amorphous and ungoverned border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. After initial victories by the United States and the Northern Alliance in autumn 2001, hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters fled Afghanistan to seek refuge across the border in Pakistan's rugged northwest. Since 2007, the number of ambushes, militant offensives, and targeted assassinations has risen sharply across Afghanistan, while suicide bombers and pro-Taliban insurgents sweep through settled areas of Pakistan at an alarming pace. For better and for worse, Pakistan will remain the fulcrum of U.S. policy in the region -- its leaders continue to provide vital counterterrorism cooperation and have received close to $20 billion in assistance from the United States, yet elements associated with its national intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, covertly assist militant proxy groups destabilizing the region.Instead of "surging" into this volatile region, the United States must focus on limiting cross-border movement along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier and supporting local Pakistani security forces with a small number of U.S. Special Forces personnel. To improve fighting capabilities and enhance cooperation, Washington and Islamabad must increase the number of Pakistani officers trained through the U.S. Department of Defense International Military Education and Training program. In addition, U.S. aid to Pakistan must be monitored more closely to ensure Pakistan's military does not divert U.S. assistance to the purchase of weapons systems that can be used against its chief rival, India. Most important, U.S. policymakers must stop embracing a single Pakistani leader or backing a single political party, as they unwisely did with Pervez Musharraf and the late Benazir Bhutto. America's actions are not passively accepted by the majority of Pakistan's population, and officials in Islamabad cannot afford to be perceived as putting America's interests above those of their own people. Because the long-term success of this nuclear-armed Muslim-majority country depends on the public's repudiation of extremism, and our continued presence in Afghanistan is adding more fuel to violent religious radicalism, our mission in the region, as well as our tactics, our objectives, and our interests, must all be reexamined

Polio Eradication: How the War on Terror Has Led to the Persistence of Polio in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria

In 1988, the World Health Organization (WHO) initiated a campaign to eradicate the polio virus from the world population (Bari 2006). Since 1988, the WHO has used polio vaccines to successfully interrupt transmission of the disease to new individuals in all but three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria (WHO 2012). This paper examines how The War on Terror, stated by President George W. Bush to be a war against every terrorist group of global reach and the governments that support these groups, has led the populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria, as well as vaccinators and health officials in these countries, to adopt the culture of war (Bush 2001). The purpose of this paper is to examine how this culture, marked by insecurity, hostility, and distrust, has affected the polio eradication campaign. The insecurity felt by the populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria led Muslim and Taliban leaders in these countries to act out against all Western activity within their borders, including the polio vaccination campaign (Jegede 2007). Although Nigeria is not directly linked to the War on Terror, it participated in the culture of war through its shared Islamic faith with Afghanistan and Pakistan. By participating in the culture of war, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria have harmed eradication efforts and have allowed the polio virus to persist within their countries. If the war continues, it risks potentially unleashing the virus, paralyzing hundreds of thousands of children (Walsh 2012)

From Drug War to Culture War: Russia’s Growing Role in the Global Drug Debate

No abstract available

Afghanistan

Since 1905 Britain had paid the Afghan ruler, Amir Habibullah, a subsidy and had controlled Afghanistan's foreign relations, and he maintained Afghanistan's neutrality throughout WWI in spite of strong pressure to induce him to join the Central Powers. The war did not have much of an impact on most Afghans (although there were shortages of some commodities), but many died in the global influenza outbreak which began in 1918. When the war ended Britain failed to reward the Amir for his refusal to take advantage of British weakness during it, and he was assassinated early in 1919. His successor, Amir Amanullah, launched the third Anglo-Afghan War, following which the country became fully independent, but Amanullah's hasty modernization was to lead to his overthrow in 1929