Agent Based Modeling in Land-Use and Land-Cover Change Studies

Agent based models (ABM) for land use and cover change (LUCC) holds the promise to provide new insight into the processes and patterns of the human and biophysical interactions in ways that have never been explored. Advances in computer technology make it possible to run almost infinite numbers of simulations with multiple heterogeneously shaped actors that reciprocally interact via vertical and horizontal power lines on various levels. Based upon an extensive literature review the basic components for such exercises are explored and discussed. This resulted in a systematic representation of these components consisting of: (1) Spatial static input data, (2) Actor and Actor-group static input data, (3) Spatial dynamic input, (4) Actor and Actor-group dynamic input data, (5) the model with the rules describing the rules, (6) Spatial static output, (7) Actor and Actor-group static output, (8) Dynamic output of Actor behaviour changes, (9) Dynamic output of actor-group behavioural changes, (10) Dynamic output of spatial patterns, (11) Dynamic output of temporal patterns. This representation proves to be epistemologically useful in the analysis of the relationships between the ABM LUCC components. In this paper, this representation is also used to enumerate the strengths and limitations of agent based modelling in LUCC

Establishing norms with metanorms in distributed computational systems

Norms provide a valuable mechanism for establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which there is no central authority. One of the most influential formulations of norm emergence was proposed by Axelrod (Am Political Sci Rev 80(4):1095–1111, 1986). This paper provides an empirical analysis of aspects of Axelrod’s approach, by exploring some of the key assumptions made in previous evaluations of the model. We explore the dynamics of norm emergence and the occurrence of norm collapse when applying the model over extended durations . It is this phenomenon of norm collapse that can motivate the emergence of a central authority to enforce laws and so preserve the norms, rather than relying on individuals to punish defection. Our findings identify characteristics that significantly influence norm establishment using Axelrod’s formulation, but are likely to be of importance for norm establishment more generally. Moreover, Axelrod’s model suffers from significant limitations in assuming that private strategies of individuals are available to others, and that agents are omniscient in being aware of all norm violations and punishments. Because this is an unreasonable expectation , the approach does not lend itself to modelling real-world systems such as online networks or electronic markets. In response, the paper proposes alternatives to Axelrod’s model, by replacing the evolutionary approach, enabling agents to learn, and by restricting the metapunishment of agents to cases where the original defection is observed, in order to be able to apply the model to real-world domains . This work can also help explain the formation of a “social contract” to legitimate enforcement by a central authority