Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Point Source” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense

This Article, the fourth in a series of five, examines the continuing struggles to define “point source” and “nonpoint source” under the Clean Water Act. State regulation of nonpoint sources is neither pervasive nor robust, and most continuing water pollution problems can be traced primarily to nonpoint sources. EPA should define nonpoint sources by regulation and begin to expand the definition of point source by incorporating established case law and Agency practice to bring more nonpoint sources into the point source definition

Economics of Water Quality Protection from Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice

Water quality is a major environmental issue. Pollution from nonpoint sources is the single largest remaining source of water quality impairments in the United States. Agriculture is a major source of several nonpoint-source pollutants, including nutrients, sediment, pesticides, and salts. Agricultural nonpoint pollution reduction policies can be designed to induce producers to change their production practices in ways that improve the environmental and related economic consequences of production. The information necessary to design economically efficient pollution control policies is almost always lacking. Instead, policies can be designed to achieve specific environmental or other similarly related goals at least cost, given transaction costs and any other political, legal, or informational constraints that may exist. This report outlines the economic characteristics of five instruments that can be used to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution (economic incentives, standards, education, liability, and research) and discusses empirical research related to the use of these instruments.water quality, nonpoint-source pollution, economic incentives, standards, education, liability, research, Environmental Economics and Policy,

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION: OPTIONS FOR THE SWAN-CANNING RIVER SYSTEM

The management of nonpoint source water pollution presents an immense challenge to economists and policy makers alike. A complex array of physical, economic, political and institutional barriers lie between theoretically appealing textbook prescriptions and their transition into successful real-world solutions. Underlying beliefs about property rights, interest group politics and the transaction costs associated with designing and implementing successful measures have all played a particularly critical role. Building on the theoretical literature and the lessons provided by the practical use of economic instruments for nonpoint source water pollution management around the world, this paper considers these issues in the context of the Swan-Canning river system in Perth. Four innovative economic instruments for the management of nonpoint source nutrient pollution in that system are discussed: auctioned best management practice payments; best management practice incentive charges; an urban nonpoint source emissions offset bank; and a catchment based licensing/trading program.Environmental Economics and Policy, Land Economics/Use,

Stream Water Quality to Support HUC 12 Prioritization in the Lake Wister Watershed, Oklahoma: August 2017 through May 2019

Nonpoint source pollution associated with human land use (agriculture and urbanization) is one of the leading causes of impairment to waterways in the United States (EPA 2000). The primary pollutants associated with agricultural and urban land use are sediment and nutrients which enter nearby streams during rain events and are then carried downstream. These sediments and nutrients may result in water quality issues in the downstream water bodies like increased algal growth or decreased water clarity (e.g. Smith et al., 1999). Best management practices (BMPs) are often used to mitigate the effects of nonpoint source pollution in the watershed. Practices such as riparian buffers installed along the edge of field and conservation tillage (e.g., no-till, spring-till, and cover crops) slow overland flow, reducing erosion and nutrient loss from the landscape (Schoumans et al. 2014). Installing BMPs throughout the entire watershed would have the greatest effect at reducing nonpoint source pollution; however, this is not socially or economically feasible. Targeting critical source areas or priority watersheds for BMPs installation, optimizes the benefits while reducing the overall (Sharpley et al. 2000)

ACCOUNTING FOR SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WATERSHEDS IN EVALUATING WATER POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLICIES

This study evaluates three agricultural nonpoint pollution abatement policies: regulating the spatial pattern of agricultural activities, ambient tax, and abatement tax/subsidy. All three policies incorporate spatial characteristics of agricultural emission loading and movement for an agricultural watershed in the Midwest. The effects of spatial variation in natural conditions and landscape features on agricultural emissions and crop yield are evaluated using a newly developed biophysical simulation model and experimental data. While the policies are equally cost effective in reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution, their implementation feasibility is quite different.atrazine, environmental policy, nonpoint pollution, simulation, watershed management, water quality, Environmental Economics and Policy,

When Should Uncertain Nonpoint Emissions be Penalized in a Trading Program?

When nonpoint source pollution is stochastic and the damage function is convex, intuition might suggest it is more important to control a nonpoint pollution source than a point source. Earlier research has provided sufficient conditions such that the permit price for a unit of ex-ante expected emissions should be higher than the permit price for a unit of certain emissions. Herein we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions such that this is the case. An approach to testing for the validity of the condition set is available, and has been applied to a related problem.agricultural pollution, multiple inputs, permit trading, social optimality, trading ratio, water quality, Environmental Economics and Policy, Q1, Q2, D2, D8,

CONTRACTING FOR NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT

This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.Environmental Economics and Policy,

POINT-NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION TRADING USING COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Point-nonpoint trading markets must accommodate the problem of monitoring individual nonpoint source discharges (NPS). A permit trading market that allows the regulator to monitor noncompliance based on observable aggregate NPS pollution levels, through the use of a collective enforcement mechanism, may be more efficient than traditional technology-based trading.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Transactions Costs and Point-Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Trading

The implications of transactions costs for the performance of water pollution trading involving point and nonpoint sources are examined. The analysis focuses on the impacts of transaction costs on different classes of trading partners and its consequence on the trading equilibrium. The model of point-nonpoint water pollution trading in the context of the total maximum daily loads explicitly incorporates transactions costs for both buying and selling exchanges of nonpoint source and point source permits. Transactions costs unarguably reduce the optimal level of trades in both types of permits compared to the costless trade case.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Agri-environmental Policies for the Chesapeake Bay

Water Quality, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Policy Instrument, Chesapeake Bay, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Q25, Q58,