2 research outputs found
Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference
We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network composed of a source, two
relays, and a destination. In this network, the two relays are untrusted in the
sense that they may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to
the destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination may be
altered, and hence no clean reference observation is available to the
destination. For this network, we identify a large family of Byzantine attacks
that can be detected in the physical layer. We further investigate how the
channel conditions impact the detection against this family of attacks. In
particular, we prove that all Byzantine attacks in this family can be detected
with asymptotically small miss detection and false alarm probabilities by using
a sufficiently large number of channel observations \emph{if and only if} the
network satisfies a non-manipulability condition. No pre-shared secret or
secret transmission is needed for the detection of these attacks, demonstrating
the value of this physical-layer security technique for counteracting Byzantine
attacks.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figures, accepted to appear on IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, July 201