6 research outputs found
Distributed Game Theoretic Optimization and Management of Multichannel ALOHA Networks
The problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA networks
is considered. First, we study the problem of constrained distributed rate
maximization, where user rates are subject to total transmission probability
constraints. We propose a best-response algorithm, where each user updates its
strategy to increase its rate according to the channel state information and
the current channel utilization. We prove the convergence of the algorithm to a
Nash equilibrium in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks using the
theory of potential games. The performance of the best-response dynamic is
analyzed and compared to a simple transmission scheme, where users transmit
over the channel with the highest collision-free utility. Then, we consider the
case where users are not restricted by transmission probability constraints.
Distributed rate maximization under uncertainty is considered to achieve both
efficiency and fairness among users. We propose a distributed scheme where
users adjust their transmission probability to maximize their rates according
to the current network state, while maintaining the desired load on the
channels. We show that our approach plays an important role in achieving the
Nash bargaining solution among users. Sequential and parallel algorithms are
proposed to achieve the target solution in a distributed manner. The
efficiencies of the algorithms are demonstrated through both theoretical and
simulation results.Comment: 34 pages, 6 figures, accepted for publication in the IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, part of this work was presented at IEEE CAMSAP
201
Game Theory in Communications:a Study of Two Scenarios
Multi-user communication theory typically studies the fundamental limits of communication systems, and considers communication schemes that approach or even achieve these limits. The functioning of many such schemes assumes that users always cooperate, even when it is not in their own best interest. In practice, this assumption need not be fulfilled, as rational communication participants are often only interested in maximizing their own communication experience, and may behave in an undesirable manner from the system's point of view. Thus, communication systems may operate differently than intended if the behavior of individual participants is not taken into account. In this thesis, we study how users make decisions in wireless settings, by considering their preferences and how they interact with each other. We investigate whether the outcomes of their decisions are desirable, and, if not, what can be done to improve them. In particular, we focus on two related issues. The first is the decision-making of communication users in the absence of any central authority, which we consider in the context of the Gaussian multiple access channel. The second is the pricing of wireless resources, which we consider in the context of the competition of wireless service providers for users who are not contractually tied to any provider, but free to choose the one offering the best tradeoff of parameters. In the first part of the thesis, we model the interaction of self-interested users in a Gaussian multiple access channel using non-cooperative game theory. We demonstrate that the lack of infrastructure leads to an inefficient outcome for users who interact only once, specifically due to the lack of coordination between users. Using evolutionary game theory, we show that this inefficient outcome would also arise as a result of repeated interaction of many individuals over time. On the other hand, if the users correlate their decoding schedule with the outcome of some publicly observed (pseudo) random variable, the resulting outcome is efficient. This shows that sometimes it takes very little intervention on the part of the system planner to make sure that users choose a desirable operating point. In the second part of the thesis, we consider the competition of wireless service providers for users who are free to choose their service provider based on their channel parameters and the resource price. We model this situation as a two-stage game where the providers announce unit resource prices in the first stage and the users choose how much resource they want to purchase from each provider in the second stage. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the competitive interaction of users and providers results in socially optimal resource allocation. We also provide a decentralized primal-dual algorithm and prove its convergence to the socially optimal outcome