3,655 research outputs found
Perspectives for proof unwinding by programming languages techniques
In this chapter, we propose some future directions of work, potentially
beneficial to Mathematics and its foundations, based on the recent import of
methodology from the theory of programming languages into proof theory. This
scientific essay, written for the audience of proof theorists as well as the
working mathematician, is not a survey of the field, but rather a personal view
of the author who hopes that it may inspire future and fellow researchers
Constructive Provability Logic
We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that
validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting
logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL
and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which
are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of
constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic
programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl
A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax
In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his
1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of
problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a
[standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be
created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and
problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative
extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical
predicate calculus QC.
The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a
pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying
posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation
translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto
QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal
propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment,
identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic
modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel -
and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type
theories.
The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the
axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual
interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation
(incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof
interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two
interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC
neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a
simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic
Predicativity and parametric polymorphism of Brouwerian implication
A common objection to the definition of intuitionistic implication in the
Proof Interpretation is that it is impredicative. I discuss the history of that
objection, argue that in Brouwer's writings predicativity of implication is
ensured through parametric polymorphism of functions on species, and compare
this construal with the alternative approaches to predicative implication of
Goodman, Dummett, Prawitz, and Martin-L\"of.Comment: Added further references (Pistone, Poincar\'e, Tabatabai, Van Atten
Unifying Functional Interpretations: Past and Future
This article surveys work done in the last six years on the unification of
various functional interpretations including G\"odel's dialectica
interpretation, its Diller-Nahm variant, Kreisel modified realizability,
Stein's family of functional interpretations, functional interpretations "with
truth", and bounded functional interpretations. Our goal in the present paper
is twofold: (1) to look back and single out the main lessons learnt so far, and
(2) to look forward and list several open questions and possible directions for
further research.Comment: 18 page
Buying Logical Principles with Ontological Coin: The Metaphysical Lessons of Adding epsilon to Intuitionistic Logic
We discuss the philosophical implications of formal results showing the con-
sequences of adding the epsilon operator to intuitionistic predicate logic. These
results are related to Diaconescu’s theorem, a result originating in topos theory
that, translated to constructive set theory, says that the axiom of choice (an
“existence principle”) implies the law of excluded middle (which purports to be
a logical principle). As a logical choice principle, epsilon allows us to translate
that result to a logical setting, where one can get an analogue of Diaconescu’s
result, but also can disentangle the roles of certain other assumptions that are
hidden in mathematical presentations. It is our view that these results have not
received the attention they deserve: logicians are unlikely to read a discussion
because the results considered are “already well known,” while the results are
simultaneously unknown to philosophers who do not specialize in what most
philosophers will regard as esoteric logics. This is a problem, since these results
have important implications for and promise signif i cant illumination of contem-
porary debates in metaphysics. The point of this paper is to make the nature
of the results clear in a way accessible to philosophers who do not specialize in
logic, and in a way that makes clear their implications for contemporary philo-
sophical discussions. To make the latter point, we will focus on Dummettian discussions of realism and anti-realism.
Keywords: epsilon, axiom of choice, metaphysics, intuitionistic logic, Dummett,
realism, antirealis
- …