In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions

Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are in-between perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quite-beliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and Maura Tumulty. Then, I address the relationship between the doxastic account of delusions and the role, nature, and prospects of folk psychology, which is discussed by Dominic Murphy, Keith Frankish, and Maura Tumulty in their contributions. In the final remarks, I turn to the continuity thesis and suggest that, although there are important differences between clinical delusions and non-pathological beliefs, these differences cannot be characterised satisfactorily in epistemic terms. \u

Agency, qualia and life: connecting mind and body biologically

Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal. From brain research and the locality principle of physics, I surmise that qualia are a fundamental, biological form of energy generated in specialized neurons. Subjectivity is explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochemical pulses. In exchange for this entropic benefit, phenomenal energy is spent as and where it is produced - which precludes the objective observation of qualia

Brain Imaging and Privacy: How Recent Advances in Neuroimaging Implicate Privacy Concerns

This paper deals with recent advances in neuroimaging technologies which could begin to implicate privacy concerns in the near future

When “altering brain function” becomes “mind control”

Functional neurosurgery has seen a resurgence of interest in surgical treatments for psychiatric illness. Deep brain stimulation (DBS) technology is the preferred tool in the current wave of clinical experiments because it allows clinicians to directly alter the functions of targeted brain regions, in a reversible manner, with the intent of correcting diseases of the mind, such as depression, addiction, anorexia nervosa, dementia, and obsessive compulsive disorder. These promising treatments raise a critical philosophical and humanitarian question. “Under what conditions does ‘altering brain function’ qualify as ‘mind control’?” In order to answer this question one needs a definition of mind control. To this end, we reviewed the relevant philosophical, ethical, and neurosurgical literature in order to create a set of criteria for what constitutes mind control in the context of DBS. We also outline clinical implications of these criteria. Finally, we demonstrate the relevance of the proposed criteria by focusing especially on serendipitous treatments involving DBS, i.e., cases in which an unintended therapeutic benefit occurred. These cases highlight the importance of gaining the consent of the subject for the new therapy in order to avoid committing an act of mind control

La neurociencia en las ciencias socio-humanas: una mirada transdiciplinar

Este artículo tiene como propósito plantear la neurociencia como un nuevo paradigma, que asume un campo amplio del conocimiento, que no solo ha estudiado la estructuración y funcionamiento de los mecanismos cerebrales, los procesos cognitivos, las relaciones mente-cerebro, sino que, además, ha propuesto el horizonte de explicación de las complejas interacciones sociales y culturales mediadas a través de la educación, como dispositivo transformador y posibilitador del aprendizaje, realizado gracias a la plasticidad cerebral que, a su vez, permite la adaptación del ser humano a las nuevas circunstancias y adquirir información permanente del medio y de los demás seres humanos e incorporarlos de nuevo a sus “acciones humanas”. Desde una mirada transdisciplinar, la neurociencia busca aunar cuestiones inherentes a su relación con las ciencias sociales y humanas como la comunicación, la filosofía, la antropología, la criminología, la sociología, así como las dimensiones relativas a la sociedad, la educación, la cultura, la política, la ética, la estética, la ecología, entre otros. No obstante, se enfatizarán en esta propuesta la neurociencia social, la neurocultura, la neuroeducación y la neuroética. Las reflexiones, desde esta perspectiva novedosa, abren nuevas puertas que permite acercarnos a los grandes avances en la explicación del cerebro y, especialmente, de las “acciones” humanas en un contexto socio-cultural

Genere

According to a standard interpretation of the term, ‘gender’ denotes sets of social roles and expectations conventionally associated with the sexual physiology of human beings. Originally introduced in psychology, the term is now widely used in the social sciences and humanities, as well as in the biological sciences. In this article we introduce and discuss the central themes of contemporary philosophical debates on gender. Particular attention is paid to recent feminist arguments concerning the distinction between sex and gender, and to how feminist debates today intersect with neuroscience research on sex-related differences between human brains

Preferential Consideration: Bartleby, Class, and Genocide in David Foster Wallace's “Consider the Lobster”

This article presents the case for reading Herman Melville's "Bartleby the Scrivener" as a key intertext for David Foster Wallace's 2004 essay, "Consider the Lobster". Focusing upon Wallace's assertion that "it may well be that an ability to form preferences is the decisive criterion for real suffering" the piece reads Wallace's work through the lenses of capital, class, political aesthetics, ecology, and genocide. Ultimately, though, this article argues that Wallace's essay ends with ethical stalemate since Wallace is unwilling to commit to a political stance. It is, as I here argue, as though Wallace's essay would "prefer not to" make an actual decision