The Complementary Brain: From Brain Dynamics To Conscious Experiences

How do our brains so effectively achieve adaptive behavior in a changing world? Evidence is reviewed that brains are organized into parallel processing streams with complementary properties. Hierarchical interactions within each stream and parallel interactions between streams create coherent behavioral representations that overcome the complementary deficiencies of each stream and support unitary conscious experiences. This perspective suggests how brain design reflects the organization of the physical world with which brains interact, and suggests an alternative to the computer metaphor suggesting that brains are organized into independent modules. Examples from perception, learning, cognition, and action are described, and theoretical concepts and mechanisms by which complementarity is accomplished are summarized.Defense Advanced Research Projects and the Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-1-0409); National Science Foundation (ITI-97-20333); Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-1-0657

How Does the Cerebral Cortex Work? Developement, Learning, Attention, and 3D Vision by Laminar Circuits of Visual Cortex

A key goal of behavioral and cognitive neuroscience is to link brain mechanisms to behavioral functions. The present article describes recent progress towards explaining how the visual cortex sees. Visual cortex, like many parts of perceptual and cognitive neocortex, is organized into six main layers of cells, as well as characteristic sub-lamina. Here it is proposed how these layered circuits help to realize the processes of developement, learning, perceptual grouping, attention, and 3D vision through a combination of bottom-up, horizontal, and top-down interactions. A key theme is that the mechanisms which enable developement and learning to occur in a stable way imply properties of adult behavior. These results thus begin to unify three fields: infant cortical developement, adult cortical neurophysiology and anatomy, and adult visual perception. The identified cortical mechanisms promise to generalize to explain how other perceptual and cognitive processes work.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624

Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar

The Complementary Brain: A Unifying View of Brain Specialization and Modularity

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-I-0409); National Science Foundation (ITI-97-20333); Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-I-0657

Neural coding strategies and mechanisms of competition

A long running debate has concerned the question of whether neural representations are encoded using a distributed or a local coding scheme. In both schemes individual neurons respond to certain specific patterns of pre-synaptic activity. Hence, rather than being dichotomous, both coding schemes are based on the same representational mechanism. We argue that a population of neurons needs to be capable of learning both local and distributed representations, as appropriate to the task, and should be capable of generating both local and distributed codes in response to different stimuli. Many neural network algorithms, which are often employed as models of cognitive processes, fail to meet all these requirements. In contrast, we present a neural network architecture which enables a single algorithm to efficiently learn, and respond using, both types of coding scheme

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Anticipatory Semantic Processes

Why anticipatory processes correspond to cognitive abilities of living systems? To be adapted to an environment, behaviors need at least i) internal representations of events occurring in the external environment; and ii) internal anticipations of possible events to occur in the external environment. Interactions of these two opposite but complementary cognitive properties lead to various patterns of experimental data on semantic processing. How to investigate dynamic semantic processes? Experimental studies in cognitive psychology offer several interests such as: i) the control of the semantic environment such as words embedded in sentences; ii) the methodological tools allowing the observation of anticipations and adapted oculomotor behavior during reading; and iii) the analyze of different anticipatory processes within the theoretical framework of semantic processing. What are the different types of semantic anticipations? Experimental data show that semantic anticipatory processes involve i) the coding in memory of sequences of words occurring in textual environments; ii) the anticipation of possible future words from currently perceived words; and iii) the selection of anticipated words as a function of the sequences of perceived words, achieved by anticipatory activations and inhibitory selection processes. How to modelize anticipatory semantic processes? Localist or distributed neural networks models can account for some types of semantic processes, anticipatory or not. Attractor neural networks coding temporal sequences are presented as good candidate for modeling anticipatory semantic processes, according to specific properties of the human brain such as i) auto-associative memory; ii) learning and memorization of sequences of patterns; and iii) anticipation of memorized patterns from previously perceived patterns