Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, 'collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.Telecommunication, Mobile phones, Mobile-to-mobile access charges, Network effects

The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice

This paper evaluates the main measures that have been used to regulate the interconnection prices in the telecommunication sector. We show that many of the regulations that are applying the vast majority of countries have very little theoretical support, and we identify the restrictions that prevent a more efficient intervention in the sector. In order to conduct this research, we firstly review the results of the theoretical literature on one and two-ways interconnections and we explain the problems that the national regulatory agencies have had when introducing the lessons of the academic contributions in their regulations. Secondly, we analyse the cost orientated interconnection prices, which are at present the regulatory practices most widely used. We evaluate the efficiency of some versions of this mechanism and explain the efforts that are being made to improve it.Telecommunications, regulation, interconnection, access charges

Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market

This thesis discusses the role of sector-specific regulators in the rapidly changing telecommunications industry. In particular, it studies the access pricing policy which provides the optimal balance between static and dynamic efficiency that better reflects the changing regulatory goals in a highly variable economic and technological environment. Static efficiency concerns the maximization of social welfare by intensifying the competition for providing differentiated services (service-based competition), whereas dynamic efficiency concerns the maximization of social welfare by incentivizing investments in competitive infrastructures (facilities-based competition). It is thus obvious that the role of regulators is to facilitate the gradual transition from static to dynamic efficiency by influencing the investment and competition outcomes through the regulation of the access price. Therefore, there is an interplay between regulatory policy and technological development which leads to rapidly changing market structures and industry performance

Network interconnection with participation constraints

10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.005Information Economics and Policy163347-373IEPO

Network Interconnection with Participation Constraints

differentconclusionsregardingthescopeforcollusionbyinterconnectingnetworks. Keywords:AccessPricing;Telecommunications;Regulation accountconsumers’participationdecision.Thissinglechangeleadstodramatically