Competition against peer-to-peer networks

In this paper, we consider the competition of providers of information products against P2P networks that offer illegal versions of the information products. Depending on the generic cost factor of downloading—incorporating factors including, among other things, the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual property rights—we find that the firm may employ pricing strategies to either deter the entry of a network or to accommodate it. In the latter case, we find that the equilibrium price moves in the opposite direction of the generic cost factor of downloading. This counter-intuitive result corresponds to a very subtle form of platform competition between the firm and the network. Furthermore, profits for the firm ambiguously decrease when the generic cost factor of downloading declines, whereas total welfare unambiguously increases. This implies that it may well be welfare enhancing to relax the legal enforcements of intellectual property rights.Strategy;

Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing

This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive contents available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.tying, two-sided markets, (indirect) network effects, multi-homing

Design for Optimized Multi-Lateral Multi-Commodity Markets

In this paper, we propose a design for an an economically efficient, optimized, centralized, multi-lateral, periodic commodity market that addresses explicitly three issues: (i) substantial transportation costs between sellers and buyers; (ii) non homogeneous, in quality and nature, commodities; (iii) complementary commodities that have to be traded simultaneously. The model allows sellers to offer their commodities in lots and buyers to explicitly quantify the differences in quality of the goods produced by each individual seller. The model does not presume that products must be shipped through a market hub. We also propose a multi-round auction that enables the implementation of the direct optimized market and approximates the behaviour of the "ideal" direct optimized mechanism. The process allows buyers and sellers to modify their initial bids, including the technological constraints. The proposed market designs are particularly relevant for industries related to natural resources. We present the models and algorithms required to implement the optimized market mechanisms, describe the operations of the multi-round auction, and discuss applications and perspectives. Nous présentons un concept de marché optimisé, centralisé, multilatéral et périodique pour l'acquisition de produits qui traite explicitement les trois aspects suivants: (i) des coûts de transport importants des vendeurs vers les acheteurs; (ii) des produits non homogènes en valeur et qualité; des complémentarités entre les divers produits qui doivent donc être négociés simultanément. Le modèle permet aux vendeurs d'offrir leurs produits groupés en lots et aux acheteurs de quantifier explicitement leur évaluation des lots mis sur le marché par chaque vendeur. Le modèle ne suppose pas que les produits doivent être expédiés par un centre avant d'être livrés. Nous proposons également un mécanisme de tâtonnement à rondes multiples qui approxime le comportement du marché direct optimisé et qui permet de mettre ce dernier en oeuvre. Le processus de tâtonnement permet aux vendeurs et aux acheteurs de modifier leurs mises initiales, incluant les contraintes technologiques. Les concepts proposés sont particulièrement adaptés aux industries reliées aux matières premières. Nous présentons les modèles et algorithmes requis à la mise en oeuvre du marché multi-latéral optimisé, nous décrivons le fonctionnement du processus de tâtonnement, et nous discutons les applications et perspectives reliées à ces mécanismes de marché.Market design, optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets, multi-round auctions, Design de marché, marché multi-latéraux optimisés, processus de tâtonnement

Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the Cost Benefit test?

This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour.transport infrastructure, cost benefit analysis, Europe Union

Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the cost benefit test?.

This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour.

Network competition - the co-existence of hub-and-spoke and point-to-point

Airlines network choices are analysed to describe the co-existence of alternative business models: the full service model based on the hub-and-spoke (HS) system and the low cost model based on point-to-point (PP) system. The analysis is carried on both theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical part, we show that the rise of the low costs business model can be the consequence of a simple two-player game. When two carriers compete in designing their network configurations (HS or PP), asymmetric equilibria emerge, i.e. one carrier will choose HS and the other PP. Full service carriers are stuck to a HS configuration to serve intercontinental destinations, whilst non-flag carriers implement a point-to-point network. In the second part, the recent network evolution in Europe is empirically evaluated by means of different spatial measures of concentration, such as Gini index, Freeman centrality index and Bonacich centrality. In addition, we also provide an airline-specific measure of centrality based on scheduled time comparison of direct to one-stop services. Spatial measures of centrality capture a reduction of centrality in non-flag carriers and small changes in the network centrality of flag carriers. Indeed, the time-based measure of centrality suggests an increase of centrality of flag carriers.

Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives

This paper analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. We show that the ISP’s decision on the introduction of discrimination across content depends on a potential trade-off between network access fee and the revenue from the trade of the first-priority. Concerning the ISP’s investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion affects the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Because the relative merit of the first priority, and thus its value, becomes relatively small for higher capacity levels, the ISP’s incentive to invest on capacity under a discriminatory network can be smaller than that under a neutral regime where such rent extraction effects do not exist. Contrary to ISPs’ claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite.net neutrality, investment (innovation) incentives, queuing theory, hold-up problem, two-sided markets, vertical integration

Agent-based transportation planning compared with scheduling heuristics

Here we consider the problem of dynamically assigning vehicles to transportation orders that have di¤erent time windows and should be handled in real time. We introduce a new agent-based system for the planning and scheduling of these transportation networks. Intelligent vehicle agents schedule their own routes. They interact with job agents, who strive for minimum transportation costs, using a Vickrey auction for each incoming order. We use simulation to compare the on-time delivery percentage and the vehicle utilization of an agent-based planning system to a traditional system based on OR heuristics (look-ahead rules, serial scheduling). Numerical experiments show that a properly designed multi-agent system may perform as good as or even better than traditional methods

European Transport Policy and Cohesion - An Assessment by CGE Analysis

This paper studies the spatial impact of two main aspects of European transport policy, namely infrastructure investments and pricing. In its "White Paper: European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide" the European Commission has laid down a comprehensive programme of transport policy within the EU, aiming at increasing the efficiency of the transport industry, developing the so-called trans-European infrastructure network and bringing the prices of transport services closer to the true marginal social cost. It is an important political issue whether the policy will enhance spatial cohesion in Europe or run counter the objective of a balanced economic development in the entire area of the EU. For one thing this is because spatial development objectives are themselves prominent goals among the catalogue of objectives to be attained by transport policy. Particularly infrastructure investments which are co-financed by the structural funds, are regarded a means of regional policy supporting less favoured regions. Furthermore, transport policies motivated by efficiency or environmental reasons may have undesired regional side effects, that could generate political backlash, unless one offers some compensation. The spatial impact of the two named policies is studied with the help of a spatial computable general equilibrium model, called CGEurope. It is a static model with a large number of regions covering the whole area of the EU including the new member states, plus neighbouring countries, some of them also subdivided by regions. Regions interact by trade flows. Interregional trade is costly, with trade costs depending inter alia on the state of infrastructure and on gasoline prices and infrastructure charges. Transport policies are simulated by varying the costs of transport and quantifying the impact on the welfare of households brought about by changes in goods and factor prices. We develop a series of policy scenarios and evaluate their impact an spatial equality or inequality using a whole bundle of indicators of spatial inequality. The paper documents theses scenarios, explains the modelling framework in brief, discusses the inequality indicators to be used and maps and tabulates the main results.