Montage As A Participatory System: Interactions with the Moving Image

Full version unavailable due to 3rd party copyright restrictionsRecent developments in network culture suggest a weakening of hierarchical narratives of power and representation. Online technologies of distributed authorship appear to nurture a complex, speculative, contradictory and contingent realism. Yet there is a continuing deficit where the moving image is concerned, its very form appearing resistant to the dynamic throughputs and change models of real-time interaction. If the task is not to suspend but encourage disbelief as a condition in the user, how can this be approached as a design problem? In the attempt to build a series of design projects suggesting open architectures for the moving image, might a variety of (pre-digital) precursors from the worlds of art, architecture and film offer the designer models for inspiration or adaptation? A series of projects have been undertaken. Each investigates the composite moving image, specifically in the context of real-time computation and interaction. This arose from a desire to interrogate the qualia of the moving image within interactive systems, relative to a range of behaviours and/or observer positions, which attempt to situate users as conscious compositors. This is explored in the thesis through reflecting on a series of experimental interfaces designed for real time composition in performance, exhibition and online contexts

Adaptive Resonance Theory

SyNAPSE program of the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (Hewlett-Packard Company, subcontract under DARPA prime contract HR0011-09-3-0001, and HRL Laboratories LLC, subcontract #801881-BS under DARPA prime contract HR0011-09-C-0001); CELEST, an NSF Science of Learning Center (SBE-0354378

Bring ART into the ACT

ACT is compared with a particular type of connectionist model that cannot handle symbols and use non-biological operations that cannot learn in real time. This focus continues an unfortunate trend of straw man "debates" in cognitive science. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, neural models of cognition can handle both symbols and sub-symbolic representations, and meets the Newell criteria at least as well as these models.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624

Adaptive Resonance: An Emerging Neural Theory of Cognition

Adaptive resonance is a theory of cognitive information processing which has been realized as a family of neural network models. In recent years, these models have evolved to incorporate new capabilities in the cognitive, neural, computational, and technological domains. Minimal models provide a conceptual framework, for formulating questions about the nature of cognition; an architectural framework, for mapping cognitive functions to cortical regions; a semantic framework, for precisely defining terms; and a computational framework, for testing hypotheses. These systems are here exemplified by the distributed ART (dART) model, which generalizes localist ART systems to allow arbitrarily distributed code representations, while retaining basic capabilities such as stable fast learning and scalability. Since each component is placed in the context of a unified real-time system, analysis can move from the level of neural processes, including learning laws and rules of synaptic transmission, to cognitive processes, including attention and consciousness. Local design is driven by global functional constraints, with each network synthesizing a dynamic balance of opposing tendencies. The self-contained working ART and dART models can also be transferred to technology, in areas that include remote sensing, sensor fusion, and content-addressable information retrieval from large databases.Office of Naval Research and the defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (N00014-95-1-0409, N00014-1-95-0657); National Institutes of Health (20-316-4304-5

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Perspectives on the Neuroscience of Cognition and Consciousness

The origin and current use of the concepts of computation, representation and information in Neuroscience are examined and conceptual flaws are identified which vitiate their usefulness for addressing problems of the neural basis of Cognition and Consciousness. In contrast, a convergence of views is presented to support the characterization of the Nervous System as a complex dynamical system operating in the metastable regime, and capable of evolving to configurations and transitions in phase space with potential relevance for Cognition and Consciousness

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

Consciousness CLEARS the Mind

A full understanding of consciouness requires that we identify the brain processes from which conscious experiences emerge. What are these processes, and what is their utility in supporting successful adaptive behaviors? Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) predicted a functional link between processes of Consciousness, Learning, Expectation, Attention, Resonance, and Synchrony (CLEARS), includes the prediction that "all conscious states are resonant states." This connection clarifies how brain dynamics enable a behaving individual to autonomously adapt in real time to a rapidly changing world. The present article reviews theoretical considerations that predicted these functional links, how they work, and some of the rapidly growing body of behavioral and brain data that have provided support for these predictions. The article also summarizes ART models that predict functional roles for identified cells in laminar thalamocortical circuits, including the six layered neocortical circuits and their interactions with specific primary and higher-order specific thalamic nuclei and nonspecific nuclei. These prediction include explanations of how slow perceptual learning can occur more frequently in superficial cortical layers. ART traces these properties to the existence of intracortical feedback loops, and to reset mechanisms whereby thalamocortical mismatches use circuits such as the one from specific thalamic nuclei to nonspecific thalamic nuclei and then to layer 4 of neocortical areas via layers 1-to-5-to-6-to-4.National Science Foundation (SBE-0354378); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624