Negotiation Games

Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.06858. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1405.682

Negotiating Relationally: The Dynamics of the Relational Self In Negotiations

Although negotiation research is thriving, it has been criticized as having an arelational bias—emphasizing autonomy, competition, and rationality over interdependence, cooperation, and relationality. In this article, we advance a new model of relationality in negotiation. Drawing on research in social psychology, we describe the construct of relational self-construals (RSC) and present a temporal model of RSC and negotiation. After delineating the conditions through which RSC becomes accessible in negotiation and conditions that inhibit its use, we discuss how RSC affects negotiators\u27 pre-negotiation psychological states, early and later tactics, and negotiation outcomes. We illustrate a number of distinct relational dynamics that can occur based on the dyadic composition of RSC, each of which brings distinct benefits and costs to the negotiation table. Implications for the science and practice of negotiation are discussed

SOLACE: A framework for electronic negotiations

Copyright @ 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbHMost existing frameworks for electronic negotiations today are tied to specific negotiation systems for which they were developed, preventing them from being applied to other negotiation scenarios. Thus, the evaluation of electronic negotiation systems is difficult as each one is based on a different framework. Additionally, each developer has to design a new framework for any system to be developed, leading to a ‘reinvention of the wheel’. This paper presents SOLACE—a generic framework for multi-issue negotiations, which can be applied to a variety of negotiation scenarios. In contrast with other frameworks for electronic negotiations, SOLACE supports hybrid systems in which the negotiation participants can be humans, agents or a combination of the two. By recognizing the importance of strategies in negotiations and incorporating a time attribute in negotiation proposals, SOLACE enhances existing approaches and provides a foundation for the flexible electronic negotiation systems of the future

Negotiation Stands Alone

Yes, the authors concede, “everybody” negotiates: but that’s like saying “everybody drives,” and then watching aghast when “everybody” climbs into a racing car, or an eighteen-wheeled tractor trailer. The authors draw from Tsur’s experience teaching Israeli hostage negotiators and in other high-pressure environments to argue for an entirely distinct concept of a professional negotiator, one that starts with a rather experienced “student” and builds a sharply different training regimen from there

Easing the conscience: feeling guilty makes people cooperate in divorce negotiations

Guilt is an emotion commonly experienced in divorce. Although guilt has been shown to increase cooperative negotiation behavior in organizational contexts, this is the first investigation of the role of guilt in divorce negotiations. Using survey data of 457 divorcing individuals, the authors examined how guilt was related to the most relevant negotiation styles, while controlling for the guilt-overlapping emotions shame and regret. Guilt was related to cooperative negotiation behavior (i.e., more yielding and problem-solving behavior, and less forcing behavior). Shame was related to uncooperative negotiation behavior (i.e., more forcing, more avoiding, less problem-solving behavior), whereas regret had no additional explanatory value

Negotiating Concurrently with Unknown Opponents in Complex, Real-Time Domains

We propose a novel strategy to enable autonomous agents to negotiate concurrently with multiple, unknown opponents in real-time, over complex multi-issue domains. We formalise our strategy as an optimisation problem, in which decisions are based on probabilistic information about the opponents' strategies acquired during negotiation. In doing so, we develop the first principled approach that enables the coordination of multiple, concurrent negotiation threads for practical negotiation settings. Furthermore, we validate our strategy using the agents and domains developed for the International Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC), and we benchmark our strategy against the state-of-the-art. We find that our approach significantly outperforms existing approaches, and this difference improves even further as the number of available negotiation opponents and the complexity of the negotiation domain increases

Being tough doesn’t always pay off: The culture of honor vs dignity in negotiation

Early work on cross-cultural negotiation has focused on East-West differences. In the current study we investigate the negotiation scripts employed by Middle Eastern negotiators, more specifically Iranian negotiators, in an intracultural interaction, compared to North American negotiators. We examine how the Iranian worldviews, beliefs, norms, and social behavior influence their goals and aspirations, negotiation tactics, and ultimately final outcome. We formulated our hypotheses based on the theory of honor-dignity cultures and illustrate how the importance of preserving and maintaining honor influences the Iranian negotiation strategies in business dealings. Our results illustrate that consistent with the culture of honor, Iranian negotiators are more likely to be competitive, express emotions, and employ distributive tactics compared to Canadian negotiators. Moreover, this competitive mindset leaves Iranian negotiators at a disadvantage as the overall joint gain is significantly lower than Canadian negotiators

Chronicling the Complexification of Negotiation Theory and Practice

The essay reviews the content of twenty-five years of the Harvard Program on Negotiation\u27s Negotiation Journal, identifying themes and issues explored on its pages in the past, the current issues challenging the field’s scholars and practitioners, and the issues likely to confront us in the future. It argues that while we in the field hoped for simple, elegant, and universal theories of negotiation and conflict resolution, the last twenty-five years have demonstrated the increasing complexification of negotiation theory and practice, from increased numbers of parties and issues, and dilemmas of intertemporal commitments, ethics, accountability, and relationships of private action to public responsibility

Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

We compare three common dispute resolution processes { negotiation, mediation, and arbitration { in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to the third party recommendation. We characterize and compare the optimal mediation and arbitration procedures. Both mediators and arbitrators should optimally filter information, but mediators should also add noise to it. We find that unmediated negotiation performs as well as mediation if and only if the degree of conflict between the parties is low