5 research outputs found
Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols
Security properties are often focused on the technological side of the
system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in the right way to
preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot be taken for granted.
In particular, security mechanisms that are difficult and costly to use are
often ignored by the users, and do not really defend the system against
possible attacks.
Here, we propose a graded notion of security based on the complexity of the
user's strategic behavior. More precisely, we suggest that the level to which a
security property is satisfied can be defined in terms of (a) the
complexity of the strategy that the voter needs to execute to make
true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The simpler
and cheaper to obtain , the higher the degree of security.
We demonstrate how the idea works in a case study based on an electronic
voting scenario. To this end, we model the vVote implementation of the \Pret
voting protocol for coercion-resistant and voter-verifiable elections. Then, we
identify "natural" strategies for the voter to obtain receipt-freeness, and
measure the voter's effort that they require. We also look at how hard it is
for the coercer to compromise the election through a randomization attack
Natural strategic ability under imperfect information
Strategies in game theory and multi-agent logics are mathematical objects of remarkable combinatorial complexity Recently, the concept of natural strategies has been proposed to model more human-like reasoning about simple plans and their outcomes So far, the theory of such simple strategic play was only considered in scenarios where all the agents have perfect information about the state of the game In this paper, we extend the notion of natural strategies to games with imperfect information We also show that almost all the complexity results for model checking carry over from the perfect to imperfect information setting That is, verification of natural strategies is usually no more complex for agents with uncertainty This tells games of natural strategic ability clearly apart from most results in game theory and multi-agent logics. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org) Ail rights reserved
Natural strategic ability under imperfect information
International audienceStrategies in game theory and multi-agent logics are mathematical objects of remarkable combinatorial complexity Recently, the concept of natural strategies has been proposed to model more human-like reasoning about simple plans and their outcomes So far, the theory of such simple strategic play was only considered in scenarios where all the agents have perfect information about the state of the game In this paper, we extend the notion of natural strategies to games with imperfect information We also show that almost all the complexity results for model checking carry over from the perfect to imperfect information setting That is, verification of natural strategies is usually no more complex for agents with uncertainty This tells games of natural strategic ability clearly apart from most results in game theory and multi-agent logics
Natural strategic ability under imperfect information
International audienceStrategies in game theory and multi-agent logics are mathematical objects of remarkable combinatorial complexity Recently, the concept of natural strategies has been proposed to model more human-like reasoning about simple plans and their outcomes So far, the theory of such simple strategic play was only considered in scenarios where all the agents have perfect information about the state of the game In this paper, we extend the notion of natural strategies to games with imperfect information We also show that almost all the complexity results for model checking carry over from the perfect to imperfect information setting That is, verification of natural strategies is usually no more complex for agents with uncertainty This tells games of natural strategic ability clearly apart from most results in game theory and multi-agent logics