Desensitization and Deception in Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

Desensitization addresses safe optimal planning under parametric uncertainties by providing sensitivity function-based risk measures. This paper expands upon the existing work on desensitization to address safe planning for a class of two-player differential games. In the proposed game, parametric uncertainties correspond to variations in a vector of model parameters about its nominal value. The two players in the proposed formulation are assumed to have information about the nominal value of the parameter vector. However, only one of the players is assumed to have complete knowledge of parametric variation, creating a form of information asymmetry in the proposed game. The lack of knowledge regarding the parametric variations is expected to result in state constraint violations for the player with an information disadvantage. In this regard, a desensitized feedback strategy that provides safe trajectories is proposed for the player with incomplete information. The proposed feedback strategy is evaluated in instances involving one pursuer and one evader with an uncertain dynamic obstacle, where the pursuer is assumed to know only the nominal value of the obstacle's speed. At the same time, the evader knows the obstacle's true speed, and also the fact that the pursuer possesses only the nominal value. Subsequently, deceptive strategies are proposed for the evader, who has an information advantage, and these strategies are assessed against the pursuer's desensitized strategy

Norms(2):Norms About Norms

In this paper, I outline and defend the view that variations in compliance levels with one and the same norm represent different norms about following norms. In support of this claim, I first argue that classic game-theoretic accounts, which define norms as Nash equilibria of noncooperative games, typically consider variations in compliance levels as separate norms. After that, I suggest a more fine-grained, game-theoretic distinction that accounts for degrees of compliance with the same norm and I show how to incorporate such an account into a psychological framework. Finally, the paper examines what given degrees of compliance can reveal about the dynamics underlying the process of norm change. I will argue that they are indicators of different reactions to the introduction of new norms.</p

Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Vol. III. Collected papers presented on the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management.

The collection contains papers accepted for the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 24-26, 2009, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.

A closer look at economic psychology

Economic History;Economic Psychology

Deception in Game Theory: A Survey and Multiobjective Model

Game theory is the study of mathematical models of conflict. It provides tools for analyzing dynamic interactions between multiple agents and (in some cases) across multiple interactions. This thesis contains two scholarly articles. The first article is a survey of game-theoretic models of deception. The survey describes the ways researchers use game theory to measure the practicality of deception, model the mechanisms for performing deception, analyze the outcomes of deception, and respond to, or mitigate the effects of deception. The survey highlights several gaps in the literature. One important gap concerns the benefit-cost-risk trade-off made during deception planning. To address this research gap, the second article introduces a novel approach for modeling these trade-offs. The approach uses a game theoretic model of deception to define a new multiobjective optimization problem called the deception design problem (DDP). Solutions to the DDP provide courses of deceptive action that are efficient in terms of their benefit, cost, and risk to the deceiver. A case study based on the output of an air-to-air combat simulator demonstrates the DDP in a 7 x 7 normal form game. This approach is the first to evaluate benefit, cost, and risk in a single game theoretic model of deception

ESTIMATION-BASED SOLUTIONS TO INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PURSUIT-EVASION GAMES

Differential games are a useful tool both for modeling conflict between autonomous systems and for synthesizing robust control solutions. The traditional study of games has assumed decision agents possess complete information about one another’s strategies and numerical weights. This dissertation relaxes this assumption. Instead, uncertainty in the opponent’s strategy is treated as a symptom of the inevitable gap between modeling assumptions and applications. By combining nonlinear estimation approaches with problem domain knowledge, procedures are developed for acting under uncertainty using established methods that are suitable for applications on embedded systems. The dissertation begins by using nonlinear estimation to account for parametric uncertainty in an opponent’s strategy. A solution is proposed for engagements in which both players use this approach simultaneously. This method is demonstrated on a numerical example of an orbital pursuit-evasion game, and the findings motivate additional developments. First, the solutions of the governing Riccati differential equations are approximated, using automatic differentiation to obtain high-degree Taylor series approximations. Second, constrained estimation is introduced to prevent estimator failures in near-singular engagements. Numerical conditions for nonsingularity are approximated using Chebyshev polynomial basis functions, and applied as constraints to a state estimate. Third and finally, multiple model estimation is suggested as a practical solution for time-critical engagements in which the form of the opponent’s strategy is uncertain. Deceptive opponent strategies are identified as a candidate approach to use against an adaptive player, and a procedure for designing such strategies is proposed. The new developments are demonstrated in a missile interception pursuit-evasion game in which the evader selects from a set of candidate strategies with unknown weights