Die beiden Soziologien von Max Weber

Review Essay of: Max Weber, Gesamtausgabe. Abteilung I: Schriften und Reden, Band 22-1: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlass, Teilband 1: Gemeinschaften. Edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen in collaboration with Michael Meyer, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 2001, 402 pp.Rezension des Werkes: Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/22-1: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlass, 1. Gemeinschaften (ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen in collaboration with Michael Meyer; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2001), pp. xxvi + 402. ISBN 3-16147558-5 (hb)

Post-modernism's use and abuse of Nietzsche

I focus on Nietzsche's architectural metaphor of self-construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self-creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to "the problem that we are". Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that unity is not a pre-given, however he would disavow their rejection of unity as a goal. Where the postmodernists celebrate "the death of the subject" Nietzsche rejects this valorization of disunity as a form of Nihilism and prescribes the creation of a genuine unified subjectivity to those few capable of such a goal. Postmodernists are nearer Nietzsche's idea of the Last Man than his idea of the Overman.Articl

At the Crossroads of the Wittgenstein and Autobiography Highways

Book review of: Immler, Nicole L., Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins. Zu verführerischen Lesarten von (auto-)biographischen Texten. Edition Kulturwissenschaft Band 12. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011. 395 p

Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 403p (2000)(review revised 2019)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on W and on human behavior throughout the behavioral sciences and by the general public. As usual, nobody seems to grasp that philosophy is armchair psychology, and that W was (in my view) the greatest natural psychologist of all time. He laid out the general structure of how the mind works, which is often referred to as intentionality and is roughly equivalent to cognition or personality or thinking and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He can thus be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly anyone but me seems to realize it. W was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as the first to reject (though not entirely consistently) the blank slate or cultural view of human nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly the opposite of his overall thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). I provide a table of intentionality for a current frame of reference from the two systems point of view before remarking on each of the essays. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019)

On the role of three functions in the Riemann literatures

In Riemann's paper and Nachlass on the zeta function, $\pi^{-\frac{s}{2}}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})\zeta(s)$ has three different functional expressions, of which $$\pi^{-\frac{s}{2}}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})\zeta(s)=2\Re[\pi^{-\frac{s}{2}}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})f(s)],\qquad\Re(s)=1/2$$ still has no literature to study it so far. Based on its geometric meaning, we obtain the number of zeros of the Riemann zeta function on the critical line is $$\frac{T}{2\pi}\log\frac{T}{2\pi}-\frac{T}{2\pi}+\frac{\arg{f(1/2+iT)}}{\pi}+O(T^{-1}).$$ Research shows that Riemann's assertion about ~"One now finds indeed approximate this number of real roots within these limits" comes from this functional expression of $\pi^{-\frac{s}{2}}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})\zeta(s)$ which associated with the Jacobi function. Finally, this paper analyzes the reason why these conclusions are neglected.Comment: AMS-LaTeX v2.2, 11 page

Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989)(review revised 2019)

A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work since laid out (e.g., in my recent articles) was unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a good job and nicely complements the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed. Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation of W as I explain here and in my other reviews. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

Review of Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy by David Pears (2006)(review revised 2019)

Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into W in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal psychology, I expected this to be front and center in a work written during the golden age of evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much good recent work on W appearing. However, one would never guess from this book that W or philosophy had any connection with psychology or indeed that there is such a thing as evolutionary psychology. Hence, I cannot recommend Pears works and instead provide a framework for rationality totally lacking in Pears (and most writing on human behavior). Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

The Quinean Roots of Lewis's Humeanism

An odd dissensus between confident metaphysicians and neopragmatist antimetaphysicians pervades early twenty-first century analytic philosophy. Each faction is convinced their side has won the day, but both are mistaken about the philosophical legacy of the twentieth century. More historical awareness is needed to overcome the current dissensus. Lewis and his possible-world system are lionised by metaphysicians; Quine’s pragmatist scruples about heavy-duty metaphysics inspire antimetaphysicians. But Lewis developed his system under the influence of his teacher Quine, inheriting from him his empiricism, his physicalism, his metaontology, and, I will show in this paper, also his Humeanism. Using published as well as never-before-seen unpublished sources, I will make apparent that both heavy-duty metaphysicians and neopragmatist antimetaphysicians are wrong about the roles Quine and Lewis played in the development of twentieth-century philosophy. The two are much more alike than is commonly supposed, and Quine much more instrumental to the pedigree of current metaphysics