Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by the firm's candidate. When the contract space includes application fees, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient, and it has a posted wage equal to match output. In the inefficient equilibria, the wage is below match output, and the value of a worker's application depends on whether he or she receives another offer. This allows individual firms to free ride on one another and gives firms market power. When we endogenize the number of applications and allow for general mechanisms, only the efficient equilibrium survives. By allowing for general mechanisms, we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications literature

The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: A Suggested Revision (March 26, 2020)

The FTC and DOJ requested comments on their draft Vertical Merger Guidelines in January 2020. This article is a complete alternative set of suggested Vertical Merger Guidelines that reflects and supplements the approach explained in the comments submitted by the author along with Jonathan. Baker, Nancy Rose and Fiona Scott Morton, as well as their other comments, and might be read in conjunction with those comments. This suggested revision of the Agencies’ draft expands the list of potential competition harms and provides illustrative examples. It expands and unifies the discussion and treatment of potential competitive benefits. It deletes the quasi-safe harbor and suggests the circumstances under which competitive harms raise lessened concerns on the one hand and heightened concerns on the other

Materials Handling Vehicles : Policy Framework for an Emerging Fuel Cell Market

© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Canadian Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Association. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND licenseThere are several challenges to wide-spread commercialisation of the technology hydrogen fuel-cell technology; including reliability and cost implications, infrastructure requirements, and safety aspects of the upcoming technology. Targeted policy initiatives are required to address two significant bottlenecks; reliability and cost constraints. Such policy measures and financial mechanisms providing incentives for manufacturers and end-users of the novel technology create an initial impetus for the introduction of the forthcoming technology into the market place. The current approach, policy mechanisms and their impacts are reviewed in the context of demonstration projects, deploying material handling equipment, involving public-private initiatives.Final Published versio

The regulation of agricultural biotechnology in Poland and the obstacles to EU compliance

Transition and accession have necessitated the establishment of a regulatory framework for agricultural crop biotechnology in Poland. This paper examines the theoretical and practical difficulties of complying with EU requirements. The first part of the study utilises evolutionary theory and path dependency to describe how policy makers interpret the requirements of accession through established conceptual models. Secondly the paper examines how accession programmes may alter path dependent trajectory but is simultaneously introducing or importing models which are fundamentally incompatible with national capabilities. Data presents the preaccession capacity building programmes and the import of German expertise as examples. The final section examines the issue of capacity and in particular, financial capacity, and uses this underlying theme to explore in detail why incompatibilities arise and why EU compliance is presented with certain obstacles