Information Structure Design in Team Decision Problems

We consider a problem of information structure design in team decision problems and team games. We propose simple, scalable greedy algorithms for adding a set of extra information links to optimize team performance and resilience to non-cooperative and adversarial agents. We show via a simple counterexample that the set function mapping additional information links to team performance is in general not supermodular. Although this implies that the greedy algorithm is not accompanied by worst-case performance guarantees, we illustrate through numerical experiments that it can produce effective and often optimal or near optimal information structure modifications

Finite-Time Resilient Formation Control with Bounded Inputs

In this paper we consider the problem of a multi-agent system achieving a formation in the presence of misbehaving or adversarial agents. We introduce a novel continuous time resilient controller to guarantee that normally behaving agents can converge to a formation with respect to a set of leaders. The controller employs a norm-based filtering mechanism, and unlike most prior algorithms, also incorporates input bounds. In addition, the controller is shown to guarantee convergence in finite time. A sufficient condition for the controller to guarantee convergence is shown to be a graph theoretical structure which we denote as Resilient Directed Acyclic Graph (RDAG). Further, we employ our filtering mechanism on a discrete time system which is shown to have exponential convergence. Our results are demonstrated through simulations

Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria in two-network zero-sum games

This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents have opposing objectives with regards to the optimization of a common objective function. In the resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with neighbors in their respective network and have only partial knowledge of the state of the agents in the other network. For the case when the interaction topology of each network is undirected, we synthesize a distributed saddle-point strategy and establish its convergence to the Nash equilibrium for the class of strictly concave-convex and locally Lipschitz objective functions. We also show that this dynamics does not converge in general if the topologies are directed. This justifies the introduction, in the directed case, of a generalization of this distributed dynamics which we show converges to the Nash equilibrium for the class of strictly concave-convex differentiable functions with locally Lipschitz gradients. The technical approach combines tools from algebraic graph theory, nonsmooth analysis, set-valued dynamical systems, and game theory

Consensus of Multi-Agent Networks in the Presence of Adversaries Using Only Local Information

This paper addresses the problem of resilient consensus in the presence of misbehaving nodes. Although it is typical to assume knowledge of at least some nonlocal information when studying secure and fault-tolerant consensus algorithms, this assumption is not suitable for large-scale dynamic networks. To remedy this, we emphasize the use of local strategies to deal with resilience to security breaches. We study a consensus protocol that uses only local information and we consider worst-case security breaches, where the compromised nodes have full knowledge of the network and the intentions of the other nodes. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the normal nodes to reach consensus despite the influence of the malicious nodes under different threat assumptions. These conditions are stated in terms of a novel graph-theoretic property referred to as network robustness.Comment: This report contains the proofs of the results presented at HiCoNS 201