Multi-Agent Adversarial Inverse Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning agents are prone to undesired behaviors due to reward mis-specification. Finding a set of reward functions to properly guide agent behaviors is particularly challenging in multi-agent scenarios. Inverse reinforcement learning provides a framework to automatically acquire suitable reward functions from expert demonstrations. Its extension to multi-agent settings, however, is difficult due to the more complex notions of rational behaviors. In this paper, we propose MA-AIRL, a new framework for multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning, which is effective and scalable for Markov games with high-dimensional state-action space and unknown dynamics. We derive our algorithm based on a new solution concept and maximum pseudolikelihood estimation within an adversarial reward learning framework. In the experiments, we demonstrate that MA-AIRL can recover reward functions that are highly correlated with ground truth ones, and significantly outperforms prior methods in terms of policy imitation.Comment: ICML 201

Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Certain General-sum Stochastic Games

This paper addresses the problem of multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL) in a two-player general-sum stochastic game framework. Five variants of MIRL are considered: uCS-MIRL, advE-MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL, each distinguished by its solution concept. Problem uCS-MIRL is a cooperative game in which the agents employ cooperative strategies that aim to maximize the total game value. In problem uCE-MIRL, agents are assumed to follow strategies that constitute a correlated equilibrium while maximizing total game value. Problem uNE-MIRL is similar to uCE-MIRL in total game value maximization, but it is assumed that the agents are playing a Nash equilibrium. Problems advE-MIRL and cooE-MIRL assume agents are playing an adversarial equilibrium and a coordination equilibrium, respectively. We propose novel approaches to address these five problems under the assumption that the game observer either knows or is able to accurate estimate the policies and solution concepts for players. For uCS-MIRL, we first develop a characteristic set of solutions ensuring that the observed bi-policy is a uCS and then apply a Bayesian inverse learning method. For uCE-MIRL, we develop a linear programming problem subject to constraints that define necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed policies to be correlated equilibria. The objective is to choose a solution that not only minimizes the total game value difference between the observed bi-policy and a local uCS, but also maximizes the scale of the solution. We apply a similar treatment to the problem of uNE-MIRL. The remaining two problems can be solved efficiently by taking advantage of solution uniqueness and setting up a convex optimization problem. Results are validated on various benchmark grid-world games.Comment: 30 page