Group virtue: the importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups.

Although previous research has focused on competence and sociability as the characteristics most important to positive group evaluation, the authors suggest that morality is more important. Studies with preexisting and experimentally created in-groups showed that a set of positive traits constituted distinct factors of morality, competence, and sociability. When asked directly, Study 1 participants reported that their in-group's morality was more important than its competence or sociability. An unobtrusive factor analytic method also showed morality to be a more important explanation of positive in-group evaluation than competence or sociability. Experimental manipulations of morality and competence (Study 4) and morality and sociability (Study 5) showed that only in-group morality affected aspects of the group-level self-concept related to positive evaluation (i.e., pride in, or distancing from, the in-group). Consistent with this finding, identification with experimentally created (Study 2b) and preexisting (Studies 4 and 5) in-groups predicted the ascription of morality, but not competence or sociability, to the in-group

Giner on the Socio-genesis of Morality

I discuss the main claims in a new book on the origins of morality . These are: i) our time, far from being the twilight of morality, is the first time in human history when a universalistic and autonomous morality has emerges as a social phenomenon, not just as a philosophical theory; ii) even if thousand years of rational philosophical discussion of morality has yielded valuable insights, yet a fresh start of critical reflexion on morality qua phenomenon is first possible now, starting with a sociological understanding of morality as spontaneous emergence of codes of norms; iii) sociology is intrinsically ethical theory, since at a certain point, no empirical and technocratic proc-essing of social data still makes sense and sociological discourse has to become reflexive, interpretive, and most of all, construed in terms of explicit valuations

A Theory of Moral Persistence: Crypto-Morality and Political Legitimacy

Why, how, and under what conditions do moral beliefs persist despite institutional pressure for change? Why do the powerful often fail to promote the morality of their authority? This paper addresses these questions by presenting the role of crypto-morality in moral persistence. Crypto-morality is the secret adherence to one morality while practicing another in public. A simple overlapping generations model is developed to examine the conditions under which crypto-morality is practiced, decays and influences the direction of moral change. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of crypto-morality by discussing the moral foundations of political legitimacy in various historical episodes.crypto-morality, political legitimacy

Morality, Uncertainty

Non-Consequentialist moral theories posit the existence of moral constraints: prohibitions on performing particular kinds of wrongful acts, regardless of the good those acts could produce. Many believe that such theories cannot give satisfactory verdicts about what we morally ought to do when there is some probability that we will violate a moral constraint. In this article, I defend Non-Consequentialist theories from this critique. Using a general choice-theoretic framework, I identify various types of Non-Consequentialism that have otherwise been conflated in the debate. I then prove a number of formal possibility and impossibility results establishing which types of Non-Consequentialism can -- and which cannot -- give us adequate guidance through through a risky world

Проблема дослідження моральності в когнітивній парадигмі. (The problem of research morality in cognitive paradigm.)

У статті піднімається проблема дослідження моральності в сучасній когнітивній психології. Описуються три шляхи формування моральності – через страх покарання, емпатійний та рефлексивний. Шляхом емпіричного дослідження авторка доводить ефективність рефлексивного шляху і обґрунтовує необхідність дослідження моральності на метакогнітивному рівні. (In the article the problem of research of morality rises in modern cognitive psychology. Three ways of forming of morality are described – through fear of punishment, empatiyniy and reflectivity. By empiric research an author leads to efficiency of reflective way and substantiates necessity of research of morality on matacognitive levels.

Nietzschean Genealogy and Hegelian History in the Genealogy of Morals

I would like to offer an interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, of the relationship of master morality to slave morality, and of Nietzsche\u27s philosophy of history that is different from the interpretation that is normally offered by Nietzsche scholars. Contrary to Nehamas, Deleuze, Danto, and many others, I wish to argue that Nietzsche does not simply embrace master morality and spurn slave morality.1 I also wish to reject the view, considered simply obvious by most scholars, that the iibermensch develops out of, or on the model of, the master, not the slave.2 And to make the case for all of this, I want to explore the relationship between Hegel\u27s master-slave dialectic and the conflict Nietzsche sees between master morality and slave morality. That Nietzsche does not intend us to recall the famous master-slave dialectic of Hegel\u27s Phenomenology as we read the Genealogy of Morals, I find difficult to believe. Yet very few commentators ever notice, let alone explore, this connection. Those who do, like Deleuze, Greene, and Houlgate, think that Nietzsche, in direct opposition to Hegel, simply sides with the master, not the slave, and that Nietzschean genealogy renounces all Hegelian dialectic - or any sort of Hegelian developmental view ofhistory.3 I do not think any of these views are correct. I wish to argue that Nietzsche is very much influenced by Hegel and that Nietzschean genealogy and Hegelian history are intimately linked in the Genealogy of Morals. Thus I think that there is a limit that must be put to the recent tendency, otherwise most insightful and illuminating, to see Nietzsche as radically postmodem, as totally breaking with the nineteenth century, and, certainly, as having little to do with Hegel

The correlation between human capital and morality and its effect on economic performance : theory and evidence

This paper incorporates morality -- defined as lower utility from consuming goods obtained through appropriative rather than productive activities -- into a simple static general equilibrium model in which agents choose whether to be producers or appropriators. The authors analyze the relationship between the correlation between morality and human capital on the one hand, and aggregate economic performance on the other. They show that there is a main effect that tends to cause this relationship to be positive, and that there can be secondary effects thatcan either rein-force or oppose (or even overbalance) the main effect. They test the theory using the World Val-ues Survey as a source of proxies for morality. Using their preferred proxy, they find evidence that higher within-country correlation between morality and ability, holding constant the levels of morality and ability, increases per-capita income levels. Under the preferred specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in the correlation between morality and ability raises the log of per-capita income by about one-fourth of a standard deviation, equal to approximately $3,600 for the median income country in the sample. The results are robust to correcting for endogeneity and to changes in sample and specification. The results are mixed when the analysis uses alternative morality proxies, but the coefficient on the morality-ability correlation is still usually positive and statistically significant.Educational Sciences,Teaching and Learning,Economic Theory&Research,Ethics&Belief Systems,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences

The Function of Normative Process‐Requirements

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process‐requirements upon us. It has been argued that process‐requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process‐requirements. First, process‐requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process‐requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process‐requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process‐requirements