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Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival time, duration, or value. The family of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule, and includes a generalization of McAfee’s truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We present an empirical study, in which we study the allocative-surplus and agent surplus for a number of different DAs. Our results illustrate that dynamic pricing rules are important to provide good market efficiency for markets with high volatility or low volume.Engineering and Applied Science
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of
truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single
commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers
and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides
the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be
constructed from a truthful, single-period (i.e. static) double-auction rule.
The pricing and matching method of the Chain construction is unique amongst
dynamic-auction rules that adopt the same building block. We examine
experimentally the allocative efficiency of Chain when instantiated on various
single-period rules, including the canonical McAfee double-auction rule. For a
baseline we also consider non-truthful double auctions populated with
zero-intelligence plus"-style learning agents. Chain-based auctions perform
well in comparison with other schemes, especially as arrival intensity falls
and agent valuations become more volatile
PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively studied in recent years.
Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true valuations, simplifying greatly the
analysis of auctions. However, revealing one's true valuation causes severe
privacy disclosure to the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse,
previous work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate security.
In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure solution
for truthful double spectrum auctions. Besides maintaining the properties of
truthfulness and special spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable
security against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography.
Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone in the auction,
except the auction result. To the best of our knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first
provably secure solution for spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental
results show that the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is
modest, and its practical applications are feasible.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, submitted to Infocom 201
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of
different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage
costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which
coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to
obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are
achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a
polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of
the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the
property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that
are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the
constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms
is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we
present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with
several case studies based on electricity market data
FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market with Flexible Auction
In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum
holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless
service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to
stimulate more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. As
buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to better
serve their end users.
In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consisting
of the SH, the WSPs and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of the
three parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to
optimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms of
both demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. We
design FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism for this market to enable dynamic
supplies and demands in the auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc not
only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such
as truthfulness and computational tractability.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures, Preliminary version accepted in INFOCOM 201
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions,
there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided
markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an
asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders'
valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We
extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets
with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations.
We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free,
truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade
when market sizes of all goods grow to at a similar rate.Comment: Full version of IJCAI-18 paper, with 2 figures. Previous names:
"MIDA: A Multi Item-type Double-Auction Mechanism", "A Random-Sampling
Double-Auction Mechanism". 10 page
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