Packet flow analysis in IP networks via abstract interpretation

Static analysis (aka offline analysis) of a model of an IP network is useful for understanding, debugging, and verifying packet flow properties of the network. There have been static analysis approaches proposed in the literature for networks based on model checking as well as graph reachability. Abstract interpretation is a method that has typically been applied to static analysis of programs. We propose a new, abstract-interpretation based approach for analysis of networks. We formalize our approach, mention its correctness guarantee, and demonstrate its flexibility in addressing multiple network-analysis problems that have been previously solved via tailor-made approaches. Finally, we investigate an application of our analysis to a novel problem -- inferring a high-level policy for the network -- which has been addressed in the past only in the restricted single-router setting.Comment: 8 page

Toward Synthesis of Network Updates

Updates to network configurations are notoriously difficult to implement correctly. Even if the old and new configurations are correct, the update process can introduce transient errors such as forwarding loops, dropped packets, and access control violations. The key factor that makes updates difficult to implement is that networks are distributed systems with hundreds or even thousands of nodes, but updates must be rolled out one node at a time. In networks today, the task of determining a correct sequence of updates is usually done manually -- a tedious and error-prone process for network operators. This paper presents a new tool for synthesizing network updates automatically. The tool generates efficient updates that are guaranteed to respect invariants specified by the operator. It works by navigating through the (restricted) space of possible solutions, learning from counterexamples to improve scalability and optimize performance. We have implemented our tool in OCaml, and conducted experiments showing that it scales to networks with a thousand switches and tens of switches updating.Comment: In Proceedings SYNT 2013, arXiv:1403.726

Directed Security Policies: A Stateful Network Implementation

Large systems are commonly internetworked. A security policy describes the communication relationship between the networked entities. The security policy defines rules, for example that A can connect to B, which results in a directed graph. However, this policy is often implemented in the network, for example by firewalls, such that A can establish a connection to B and all packets belonging to established connections are allowed. This stateful implementation is usually required for the network's functionality, but it introduces the backflow from B to A, which might contradict the security policy. We derive compliance criteria for a policy and its stateful implementation. In particular, we provide a criterion to verify the lack of side effects in linear time. Algorithms to automatically construct a stateful implementation of security policy rules are presented, which narrows the gap between formalization and real-world implementation. The solution scales to large networks, which is confirmed by a large real-world case study. Its correctness is guaranteed by the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.Comment: In Proceedings ESSS 2014, arXiv:1405.055

Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications

Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes, thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial

Abstract Interpretation of Stateful Networks

Modern networks achieve robustness and scalability by maintaining states on their nodes. These nodes are referred to as middleboxes and are essential for network functionality. However, the presence of middleboxes drastically complicates the task of network verification. Previous work showed that the problem is undecidable in general and EXPSPACE-complete when abstracting away the order of packet arrival. We describe a new algorithm for conservatively checking isolation properties of stateful networks. The asymptotic complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the size of the network, albeit being exponential in the maximal number of queries of the local state that a middlebox can do, which is often small. Our algorithm is sound, i.e., it can never miss a violation of safety but may fail to verify some properties. The algorithm performs on-the fly abstract interpretation by (1) abstracting away the order of packet processing and the number of times each packet arrives, (2) abstracting away correlations between states of different middleboxes and channel contents, and (3) representing middlebox states by their effect on each packet separately, rather than taking into account the entire state space. We show that the abstractions do not lose precision when middleboxes may reset in any state. This is encouraging since many real middleboxes reset, e.g., after some session timeout is reached or due to hardware failure