Mixing Probabilistic and non-Probabilistic Objectives in Markov Decision Processes

In this paper, we consider algorithms to decide the existence of strategies in MDPs for Boolean combinations of objectives. These objectives are omega-regular properties that need to be enforced either surely, almost surely, existentially, or with non-zero probability. In this setting, relevant strategies are randomized infinite memory strategies: both infinite memory and randomization may be needed to play optimally. We provide algorithms to solve the general case of Boolean combinations and we also investigate relevant subcases. We further report on complexity bounds for these problems.Comment: Paper accepted to LICS 2020 - Full versio

Stochastic Games with Disjunctions of Multiple Objectives (Technical Report)

Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural in situations where several - possibly conflicting - performance criteria like time and energy consumption are relevant. Such conjunctive combinations are the most studied multi-objective setting in the literature. In this paper, we consider the dual disjunctive problem. More concretely, we study turn-based stochastic two-player games on graphs where the winning condition is to guarantee at least one reachability or safety objective from a given set of alternatives. We present a fine-grained overview of strategy and computational complexity of such \emph{disjunctive queries} (DQs) and provide new lower and upper bounds for several variants of the problem, significantly extending previous works. We also propose a novel value iteration-style algorithm for approximating the set of Pareto optimal thresholds for a given DQ.Comment: Technical report including appendix with detailed proofs, 29 page

Characterising and Verifying the Core in Concurrent Multi-Player Mean-Payoff Games (Full Version)

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings, this paper explores an alternative solution concept: the core from cooperative game theory. This concept is particularly relevant for cooperative AI systems, as it enables the modelling of cooperation among agents, even when their goals are not fully aligned. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide a characterisation of the core using discrete geometry techniques and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness. We then use the characterisation to prove the existence of polynomial witnesses in the core. Second, we use the existence of such witnesses to solve key decision problems in rational verification and provide tight complexity bounds for the problem of checking whether some/every equilibrium in a game satisfies a given LTL or GR(1) specification. Our approach is general and can be adapted to handle other specifications expressed in various fragments of LTL without incurring additional computational costs.Comment: This is the full version of the paper with the same title that appears in the CSL'24 proceeding