Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act through international accounting standards: reasons why international accounting standards should serve as “thermostats”

Why should differences between regulatory and accounting policies be mitigated? Because mitigating such differences could facilitate convergence – as well as financial stability. The paper “Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality: Mitigating Regulatory and Accounting Policy Differences through Regulatory Structure Reforms and Enforced Self Regulation” illustrates how the implementation of accounting standards and policies, in certain instances, have contrasted with Basel Committee initiatives aimed at mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. The paper also highlights how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could (and should) be mitigated. This paper focuses on how recent regulatory reforms – with particular reference to the Dodd Frank Act, impact fair value measurements. Other potential implications for accounting measurements and valuation, will also be considered. Given the tendencies for discrepancies to arise between regulatory and accounting policies, and owing to discrepancies between Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act, would a more imposing and commanding role for international standards not serve as a powerful weapon in harmonizing Basel III and Dodd Frank – whilst mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences?financial stability; OTC derivatives markets; counterparty risks; disclosure; information asymmetry; transparency; living wills; Volcker Rule; Basel III; Basel II; pro cyclicality; international auditing standards; Dodd Frank Act; fair values

Great expectations, predictable outcomes and the G20's response to the recent global financial crisis

The meeting of the Governors and Heads of Supervision on the 12 September 2010, their decisions in relation to the new capital framework known as Basel III, as well as the endorsement of the agreements reached on the 26 July 2010, once again, reflect the typical situation where great expectations with rather unequivocal, and in a sense, disappointing results are delivered. The outcome of various consultations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, consultations which culminated in the present Basel III framework, also reflect the focus on measures aimed at addressing problems attributed to Basel II, that is, measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclicality. This is rather astonishing given one critical lesson which has been drawn from the recent Financial Crisis: namely, that capital measures on their own, were and are insufficient in addressing and averting the Financial Crisis. Furthermore, banks which have been complying with capital adequacy requirements could still face severe liquidity problems. As well as an increase of the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%, the recent agreement and decisions of the Governors and Heads of Supervision also include the stipulation that banks hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% - hence consolidating the stronger definition of capital (as agreed in the previous meeting held by the Governors and Heads of Supervision earlier in July 2010).pro cyclicality; liquidity; capital; Basel III; countercyclical; forward looking provisioning; financial regulation; financial crises

Mitigating the pro-cyclicality of Basel II

Policy discussions on the recent financial crisis feature widespread calls to address the pro-cyclicaleffects of regulation. The main concern is that the new risk-sensitive bank capital regulation (Basel II) may amplify business cycle fluctuations. This paper compares the leading alternative procedures that have been proposed to mitigate this problem. We estimate a model of the probabilities of default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 1987 2008, and use the estimated PDs to compute the corresponding series of Basel II capital requirements per unit of loans. These requirements move significantly along the business cycle, ranging from 7.6% (in 2006) to 11.9% (in 1993). The comparison of the different procedures is based on the criterion of minimizing the root mean square deviations of each adjusted series with respect to the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the original series. The results show that the best procedures are either to smooth the input of the Basel II formula by using through the cycle PDs or to smooth the output with a multiplier based on GDP growth. Our discussion concludes that the latter is better in terms of simplicity, transparency, and consistency with banks’ risk pricing and risk management systems. For the portfolio of Spanish commercial and industrial loans and a 45% loss given default (LGD), the multiplier would amount to a 6.5% surcharge for each standard deviation in GDP growth. The surcharge would be significantly higher with cyclically-varying LGD

Great Expectations, Predictable Outcomes and the G20's Response to the Recent Global Financial Crisis: When Matters Relating to Liquidity Risks Become Equally as Important as Measures Addressing Pro cyclicality.

The meeting of the Governors and Heads of Supervision on the 12 September 2010, their decisions in relation to the new capital framework known as Basel III, as well as the endorsement of the agreements reached on the 26 July 2010, once again, reflect the typical situation where great expectations with rather unequivocal, and in a sense, disappointing results are delivered. The outcome of various consultations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, consultations which culminated in the present Basel III framework, also reflect the focus on measures aimed at addressing problems attributed to Basel II, that is, measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclicality. This is rather astonishing given one critical lesson which has been drawn from the recent Financial Crisis: namely, that capital measures on their own, were and are insufficient in addressing and averting the Financial Crisis. Furthermore, banks which have been complying with capital adequacy requirements could still face severe liquidity problems. As well as an increase of the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%, the recent agreement and decisions of the Governors and Heads of Supervision also include the stipulation that banks hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% - hence consolidating the stronger definition of capital (as agreed in the previous meeting held by the Governors and Heads of Supervision earlier in July 2010)

Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive: Responding to the 2008/09 Financial Crisis

This paper addresses factors which have prompted the need for further revision of banking regulation, with particular reference to the Capital Requirements Directive. The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which comprises the 2006/48/EC Directive on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and the 2006/49/EC Directive on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, implemented the revised framework for the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) within EU member states. Pro cyclicality has attracted a lot of attention – particularly with regards to the recent financial crisis, owing to concerns arising from increased sensitivity to credit risk under Basel II. This paper not only considers whether such concerns are well-founded, but also the beneficial and not so beneficial consequences emanating from Basel II’s increased sensitivity to credit risk (as illustrated by the Internal Ratings Based approaches). In so doing it considers the effects of Pillar 2 of Basel II, namely, supervisory review, with particular reference to buffer levels, and whether banks’ actual capital ratios can be expected to correspond with Basel capital requirements given the fact that they are expected to hold certain capital buffers under Pillar 2. Furthermore, it considers how regulators can respond to prevent systemic risks to the financial system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend. In deciding to cut back on lending activities, are the decisions of such firms justified in situations where such firms’ credit risk models are extremely and unduly sensitive - hence the level of capital being retained is actually much higher than minimum regulatory Basel capital requirements

Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by the Basel Committee in relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital

Developments since the introduction of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord have resulted in growing realisation that new forms of risks have emerged and that previously existing and managed forms require further redress. The revised Capital Accord, Basel II, evolved to a form of meta regulation – a type of regulation which involves the risk management of internal risks within firms. The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives: Firstly, “…to help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system – this being facilitated where international banking organisations were encouraged to supplement their capital positions; and secondly, to mitigate competitive inequalities.” As well as briefly outlining various efforts and measures which have been undertaken and adopted by several bodies in response to the recent Financial Crisis, this paper considers why efforts aimed at developing a new framework, namely, Basel III, have been undertaken and global developments which have promulgated the need for such a framework. Further, it attempts to evaluate the strengths and flaws inherent in the present and future regulatory frameworks by drawing a comparison between Basel II and the enhanced framework which will eventually be referred to as Basel III

Measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclical effects of the Capital Requirements Framework: counter cyclical capital buffer proposals

As well as highlighting the importance of introducing counter cyclical capital buffers, this paper draws attention to the need for greater focus on “more forward looking provisions”, as well as provisions which are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans.” Whilst the need for forward looking provisioning has been echoed by some authorities on the literature, the paper also adds weight to the argument through its attempt to link such an argument to the ever increasing prominence assumed by liquidity risks – since liquidity also contributes to pro cyclicality. “The complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions - which to a large extent, is attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected on and off balance sheet maturity mismatches and excessive levels of leverage, has resulted in an increasingly important role for liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.” Owing to such increased importance of liquidity risks, this paper also attempts to highlight why the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical Buffer Proposal – a response to the recent financial crisis (which to a significant extent, focuses on banking sector capital requirements), should also take greater account of more forward looking provisions. In so doing, it draws attention to the importance of coupling forward looking provisions (as well as other measures) with counter cyclical charges and why this provides a better alternative to the mere introduction of counter cyclical capital charges.counter cyclical buffers; liquidity risks; pro cyclicality; capital; loan loss provisions; financial crises; bank; regulation

Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act through International Accounting Standards – Reasons why International Accounting Standards Should Serve as “Thermostats

Why should differences between regulatory and accounting policies be mitigated? Because mitigating such differences could facilitate convergence – as well as financial stability. The paper ―Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality: Mitigating Regulatory and Accounting Policy Differences through Regulatory Structure Reforms and Enforced Self Regulation‖ illustrates how the implementation of accounting standards and policies, in certain instances, have contrasted with Basel Committee initiatives aimed at mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. The paper also highlights how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could (and should) be mitigated. This paper focuses on how recent regulatory reforms – with particular reference to the Dodd Frank Act, impact fair value measurements. Other potential implications for accounting measurements and valuation, will also be considered. Given the tendencies for discrepancies to arise between regulatory and accounting policies, and owing to discrepancies between Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act, would a more imposing and commanding role for international standards not serve as a powerful weapon in harmonizing Basel III and Dodd Frank – whilst mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences

Extending the Scope of Prudential Supervision: Regulatory Developments during and beyond the “Effective” Periods of the Post BCCI and the Capital Requirements Directives.

The main argument of this paper is, namely, the need for greater emphasis on disclosure requirements and measures – particularly within the securities markets. This argument is justified on the basis of lessons which have been drawn from the recent Financial Crises, one of which is the inability of bank capital requirements on their own to address funding and liquidity problems. The engagement of market participants in the corporate reporting process, a process which would consequently enhance market discipline, constitutes a fundamental means whereby greater measures aimed at facilitating prudential supervision could be extended to the securities markets. Auditors, in playing a vital role in financial reporting, as tools of corporate governance, contribute to the disclosure process and towards engaging market participants in the process. This paper will however consider other means whereby transparency and disclosure of financial information within the securities markets could be enhanced, and also the need to accord greater priority to prudential supervision within the securities markets. Furthermore, the paper draws attention to the need to focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market discipline. It illustrates how through Pillar 3, market participants like credit agencies can determine the levels of capital retained by banks – hence their potential to rectify or exacerbate pro cyclical effects resulting from Pillars 1 and 2. The challenges encountered by Pillars 1 and 2 in addressing credit risk is reflected by problems identified with pro cyclicality, which are attributed to banks’ extremely sensitive internal credit risk models, and the level of capital buffers which should be retained under Pillar Two. Such issues justify the need to give greater prominence to Pillar 3. As a result of the influence and potential of market participants in determining capital levels, such market participants are able to assist regulators in managing more effectively, the impact of systemic risks which occur when lending criteria is tightened owing to Basel II's procyclical effects. Regulators are able to respond and to manage with greater efficiency, systemic risks to the financial system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend. This being particularly the case when such firms decide to cut back on lending activities, and the decisions of such firms cannot be justified in situations where such firms’ credit risk models are extremely sensitive – hence the level of capital being retained is actually much higher than minimum regulatory Basel capital requirements. In elaborating on Basel II's pro cyclical effects, the gaps which exist with internal credit risk model measurements will be considered. Gaps which exist with Basel II's risk measurements, along with the increased prominence and importance of liquidity risks - as revealed by the recent financial crisis, and proposals which have been put forward to mitigate Basel II's procyclical effects will also be addressed

Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector: Proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations

As well as addressing the Basel Committee's proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations, this paper also considers several reasons why information disclosure should be encouraged. These include the fact that imperfect information is considered to be a cause of market failure which “reduces the maximisation potential of regulatory competition”, and also because disclosure requirements would contribute to the reduction of risks which could be generated when granting reduced capital level rewards to banks who may have poor management systems. Furthermore it draws attention to the need for greater measures aimed at consolidating regulation within (and also extending regulation to) the securities markets – given the fact that „the globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and capital seeking companies to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.“capital; liquidity; regulations; bank; Basel II; risks; disclosure