Propositional Logics Complexity and the Sub-Formula Property

In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M-imply) is PSPACE-complete. He showed a polynomially bounded translation from full Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Goedel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic Logic, the PSPACE- completeness of M-imply is drawn. The sub-formula principle for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever F1,...,Fk proves A, there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is either a sub-formula of A or of some of Fi. In this work we extend Statman result and show that any propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular formulation of the sub-formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes the minimal purely implicational logic then it is PSPACE-complete. As a consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular sub-formula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our technique can be used to prove that any finitely many-valued logic has the set of its tautologies in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2014, arXiv:1504.0192

Proof-graphs for Minimal Implicational Logic

It is well-known that the size of propositional classical proofs can be huge. Proof theoretical studies discovered exponential gaps between normal or cut free proofs and their respective non-normal proofs. The aim of this work is to study how to reduce the weight of propositional deductions. We present the formalism of proof-graphs for purely implicational logic, which are graphs of a specific shape that are intended to capture the logical structure of a deduction. The advantage of this formalism is that formulas can be shared in the reduced proof. In the present paper we give a precise definition of proof-graphs for the minimal implicational logic, together with a normalization procedure for these proof-graphs. In contrast to standard tree-like formalisms, our normalization does not increase the number of nodes, when applied to the corresponding minimal proof-graph representations.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2013, arXiv:1403.768

Proof Theory of Finite-valued Logics

The proof theory of many-valued systems has not been investigated to an extent comparable to the work done on axiomatizatbility of many-valued logics. Proof theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction, and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight variations in design and presentation. The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory of finite-valued first order logics in a general way, and to present some of the more important results in this area. In Systems covered are the resolution calculus, sequent calculus, tableaux, and natural deduction. This report is actually a template, from which all results can be specialized to particular logics

Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic

This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunction, to which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbourhood function: modal Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives are added to the language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by instantiating it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to reason about the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a variety of examples

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later