The modal logic of forcing

What are the most general principles in set theory relating forceability and truth? As with Solovay's celebrated analysis of provability, both this question and its answer are naturally formulated with modal logic. We aim to do for forceability what Solovay did for provability. A set theoretical assertion psi is forceable or possible, if psi holds in some forcing extension, and necessary, if psi holds in all forcing extensions. In this forcing interpretation of modal logic, we establish that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in the modal theory known as S4.2.Comment: 31 page

The bounded proper forcing axiom and well orderings of the reals

We show that the bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA implies that there is a well-ordering of P(ω_1) which is Δ_1 definable with parameter a subset of ω_1. Our proof shows that if BPFA holds then any inner model of the universe of sets that correctly computes N_2 and also satisfies BPFA must contain all subsets of ω_1. We show as applications how to build minimal models of BPFA and that BPFA implies that the decision problem for the Härtig quantifier is not lightface projective