The Manager’s Dilemma: Role Conflict in Marketing

Norris Brisco, Melvin Copeland, Henry Erdman, Benjamin Hibbard, George Hotchkiss, Leverett Lyon, Stanley Resor, Clarence Saunders, Harry Tosdal, Roland Vaile: Who are these people? They are great men in the history of marketing, according to Wright and Dinsdale (1974). They are marketing heroes. But riot society’s heroes. Rather than hero, the marketing man is usually a villain in novels; he is the butt of jokes; and respondents to surveys think poorly of him.conflict, marketing, manager

Never Trust a Corporation

I would like to start by noting multitudinous objections to assertions made in Larry Mitchell\u27s Corporate Irresponsibility: America\u27s Newest Export. But I waive these points for purposes of this Symposium. I would prefer to take the occasion to celebrate the book. So I will make two points on the subject of corporate social responsibility on which the book and I stand in complete accord

Limited Liability, Rights of Control and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibilty

There has long been a tendency to see the corporate legal form as presently constituted as economically determined, as the more or less inevitable product of the demands of advanced technology and economic efficiency. Through an examination of its historical emergence, focusing in particular on the introduction of general limited liability and the development of the modern doctrine of separate corporate personality, this paper takes issue with this view, arguing that the corporate legal form was, and is, in large part a political construct developed to accommodate and protect the rentier investor. It is, moreover, a construct which institutionalises irresponsibility. Against this backdrop different ways of trying to resolve the problem of corporate irresponsibility are explored. The key, the paper suggests, is to be found in decoupling the privilege of limited liability from rights of control

The Manager’s Dilemma: Role Conflict in Marketing

Norris Brisco, Melvin Copeland, Henry Erdman, Benjamin Hibbard, George Hotchkiss, Leverett Lyon, Stanley Resor, Clarence Saunders, Harry Tosdal, Roland Vaile: Who are these people? They are great men in the history of marketing, according to Wright and Dinsdale (1974). They are marketing heroes. But riot society’s heroes. Rather than hero, the marketing man is usually a villain in novels; he is the butt of jokes; and respondents to surveys think poorly of him

Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud

Warren discusses the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the National Securities Market Improvement Act, among other issues. Predominant federalism postulates foreclose the proposed intrusion into investors\u27 tort remedies traditionally allowed by the states under common law

Bulletin of the Center for Children's Books 39 (04) 1985

published or submitted for publicatio

Why New Corporate Law Arises: Implications for the 21st Century

The corporate governance landscape is much different than a generation ago. Independent directors now hold a great majority of all board seats, institutional shareholders hold a supermajority of all shares in public corporations, and activist shareholders have become a recurring player in entity governance. In turn, other corporate stakeholders express increasing concern about shareholders’ use of their power for selfish reasons and the perceived pernicious impact of shareholder wealth maximization as a guide for corporate law. This chapter, part of a book on “The Corporate Contract in Changing Times” asks: Why does corporate law change and how it might change now? Corporate law changed regularly in the first half of our country’s history. A series of innovations followed one after another during the nineteenth century—limited liability; general incorporation statutes; a strong shift to director-centric corporate governance; authorization of corporations holding stock in other corporations; and the disappearance of ultra vires and other limits on corporate behavior. By the arrival of the twentieth century all the key economic elements of the modern corporation were in view and corporate law settled into a stable pattern we still see today. State law abandoned its prior regulatory approach and its continual change in favor of a director-centric structure with expansive room for private ordering that has remained remarkably stable. Federal law stepped in to restrain economic concentration (antitrust law), to protect employees and consumers against corporate power (done by industry regulation, employment and consumer laws not corporate governance), to limit corporate political contributions, and to make recurring, if sporadic and non-comprehensive, efforts to enhance the role of shareholders against managers. This chapter examines this history of change in corporate law in America, the dramatic and abrupt shift in the focus of state corporate law visible in last decade or so of the nineteenth century, the interactive pattern of state and federal law that has grown up over the second half of the country’s history and prominent theories explaining what leads to corporate law change. Together these various strands suggest there will be no fundamental change in state corporate law even in this time of visible stress to the now classic structure. Changes that we see is more likely to come from federal law or, as has been most visible in recent times, because of market and technological-driven changes outside of law

Social Irresponsibility in Management

Previously published research suggested that the typical manager may be expected to harm others in his role as a manager. Further support for this was drawn from the Panalba role-playing case. None of the 57 control groups in this case were willing to remove a dangerous drug from the market. In fact, 79% of these groups took active steps to prevent its removal. This decision was classified as irresponsible by 97% of the respondents to a questionnaire. Because the role exerts such powerful effects, an attempt was made to modify subject’s perceptions of their role so that managers would feel responsible to all of the firm’s interest groups. Some subjects were told that board members should represent all interest groups; other subjects were placed on boards of directors where the different groups were represented. Subjects in both groups also received information on the impact of the decisions upon stockholders, employees, and customers. The percentage of irresponsible decisions was reduced under these conditions as only 22% of the 116 groups selected the highly irresponsible decision.obedience to authority, Panalba, role-playing, social accounting, social responsibility, stakeholder theory

Binding stakeholders into moral communities: A review of studies on social responsibility of business

This paper revisits the issue of business social responsibility with a view to reiterate its relevance in the contemporary scenario characterised by an overarching presence of private businesses and blurring of the barriers between not-for-profit and for-profit enterprises. The paper reviews the evolution of major theoretical positions of business social responsibility to demonstrate how the basic understanding of the term traversed through time and alongside changes in forms of business organisation and interpretations of the morality of private property. It draws on stakeholding and social contract theories to underscore the moral and social responsibility of businesses to broaden their vision beyond profit and stakeholder value.social responsibility, stakeholder, social contract, moral communities

Heterodox Critiques of Corporate Social Responsibility

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is in vogue in recent times. It has been widely received by socially concerned people in business, academia, and NGOs that CSR would lend support to the improvement in social welfare and the protection of environment. However, the question that whether corporations are socially responsible or corporations should behave responsibly is beside the point from the heterodox economic perspective. The proper question to pose is how corporations manipulate the social by means of CSR. Drawing upon the heterodox theory of the business enterprise along with the social provisioning perspective, I argue that the business corporation has always acted in a socially responsible manner by generating ethical-political-cultural values, norms, and beliefs that legitimize whatever the business corporation does is socially responsible. In this respect, CSR is a market-based means to control the social provisioning process by way of creating an illusionary image of corporations and, thereby, hiding the ruthless acquisitive drive and the exploitation of human beings and nature.Corporate social responsibility, social provisioning process, the business enterprise, social welfare