Mediocre year

Federal Reserve District, 12th ; Economic conditions - West (U.S.)

Jud, el mediocre

Cuento de Francisco Tario publicado por primera vez en México en la cultura, 14 de octubre de 1951, pp. 3-4. Se publica con la autorización de Julio Farell

Monk business: an example of the dynamics of organizations.

In this paper we present a dynamic model of an organization. It is shown that the quality of the members of the organization may cycle and that even if the organization promotes excellency, the organization may end up populated by mediocre agents only.Overlapping generations; Quanty organization;

A relationship between eye movement patterns and performance in a precognitive tracking task

Eye movements made by various subjects in the performance of a precognitive tracking task are studied. The tracking task persented by an antiaircraft artillery (AAA) simulator has an input forcing function represented by a deterministic aircraft fly-by. The performance of subjects is ranked by two metrics. Good, mediocre, and poor trackers are selected for analysis based on performance during the difficult segment of the tracking task and over replications. Using phase planes to characterize both the eye movement patterns and the displayed error signal, a simple metric is developed to study these patterns. Two characterizations of eye movement strategies are defined and quantified. Using these two types of eye strategies, two conclusions are obtained about good, mediocre, and poor trackers. First, the eye tracker who used a fixed strategy will consistently perform better. Secondly, the best fixed strategy is defined as a Crosshair Fixator

Bush Receives Mediocre Ratings in NH 5/05/2004

New Hampshire residents continue to give George W. Bush mediocre job approval ratings. Approval for Bush’s handling of the situation with Iraq has slightly improved and overall support for the war in Iraq remains solid

Mediocracy

In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.politicians, parties, political recruitment

Mediocracy

In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.