Structuring International Financial Support for Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries

In the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009, developed countries agreed to provide start-up finance for adaptation in developing countries and expressed the ambition to scale this up to $100 billion per year by 2020. The financial mechanisms to deliver this support have to be tailored to country and sector specific needs so as to enable domestic policy processes and self sustaining business models, and to limit policy risk exposure for investors while complying with budgetary constraints in OECD countries. This paper structures the available financial mechanisms according to the needs they can address, and reports on experience with their application in bilateral and multilateral settings.Financial mechanism, risk guarantee, development, climate policy

The financing of small firms in Germany

In Germany, small firms are financed chiefly by small banks, which are grouped into two systems: the savings banks (Sparkassen) and the credit cooperatives. The government actively supports the financing of investments in small industry - especially business start-ups. The author explains how small firms are financed in Germany. The author contends that small and meduim-size firms contribute a lot to the German economy. Small firms are not subject to the control institutions - such as supervisory board seats, proxy voting and equity holdings - that shape the relationships between large firms and large banks. The author also points out that small banks, which are part of a decentralized market structure, over come imperfections in the financial market by building institutions that supersede the market mechanism. The savings bank and credit cooperatives systems have each developed an internal capital, not unlike those within large banks operating nationwide. Only central institutions participate in the domestic money market, to place the system's excess liquidity or to raise funds to cover the systems deficits. Also, the funding programs of the government banks can be seen as a refinancing mechanism that especially helps small banks. The same is true for rediscountable trade bills.Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation

OPTION VALUES FOR PROVISIONS IN EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES

All major exporting countries of agricultural commodities have some form of credit guarantee program. As the importance of credit programs escalates, it is incumbent on policy makers to examine the value of their program relative to those of competitors. In this study, a model based on option pricing theory was developed to estimate the value of credit guarantees extended to importers and applied to U.S. and competing countries' programs. The Canadian guarantee has the lowest implicit value, followed by the U.S., Australian, and French guarantees. French guarantees had the highest implicit value due to higher coverage for interest and freight and insurance.International Relations/Trade,

The typology of partial credit guarantee funds around the world

This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. Based on theory, the authors discuss different organizational features of credit guarantee schemes and their variation across countries. They focus on the respective role of government and the private sector and different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they are correlated across countries. The findings show that government has an important role to play in funding and management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms.

Partial Credit Guarantees: Principles and Practice

Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced renewed interest from governments keen to promote financial access for small enterprises. While the market can find used for partial credit guarantees, the attractions for public policy can be illusory: indeed their most attractive feature for myopic politicians may be the ease with which the true cost of guarantees can be understated, at least at the outset. In practice, the actual fiscal cost of existing schemes has varied widely across countries and has represented a high per dollar subsidy in some cases. Despite the recent application of some innovative techniques, the social benefit of such schemes have proved difficult to estimate, not least because their goals have been vague. Operational design has influenced the cost and apparent effectiveness of different schemes and has also varied widely. Clear and precise goals, against which performance is regularly monitored, realistic pricing verified by consistent and transparent accounting, and attention to the incentive features of operational design, especially for the intermediaries, are among the prerequisites for such schemes to have a good chance of truly achieving improvements in social welfare.

Valuing Option Provisions for Export Credit Guarantees

International Relations/Trade,

Collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) : a primer

The following descriptive paper surveys the various types of loan securitisation and provides a working definition of so-called collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). Free of the common rhetoric and slogans, which sometimes substitute for understanding of the complex nature of structured finance, this paper describes the theoretical foundations of this specialised form of loan securitisation. Not only the distinctive properties of CLOs, but also the information economics inherent in the transfer of credit risk will be considered, so that we can equally privilege the critical aspects of security design in the structuring of CLO transactions

Why infrastructure financing facilities often fall short of their objectives

To encourage the private funding and provision of infrastructure services, governments have used specialized financing facilities to offer financial support to investors, often in the form of grants, soft loans, or guarantees. The authors present case studies of infrastructure financing facilities in various stages of development in Colombia, India, and Pakistan. They also present case studies of government-sponsored financing facilities (not of infrastructure) in Argentina, and Moldova. They find that these facilities have often fallen short of their objectives for two main reasons. First, the environment was not conducive to private participation in infrastructure because of poor sector policies, an unstable macroeconomic environment, and inadequate financial sector policies, among other reasons. Second, the facility was faulty in design - in terms of sectors targeted, pricing of instruments, and consistency of objectives, and instruments.Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Municipal Financial Management,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Housing Finance,Public Sector Economics&Finance,National Governance

Farmers and farmers’ associations in developing countries and their use of modern financial instruments

This paper starts with an overview of the current literature on the cost of price risk exposure to developing country farmers. It then discusses market-based price risk management instruments (such as futures and options) that can be used by farmers, as well as various mechanisms through which farmers' associations can facilitate farmers' access to price risk management tools as well as lower-cost financing (using warehouse receipt finance, repos and other structured financings). The experiences with use of such modern financial tools by farmers in several developing countries (Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Uganda) are described. The report concludes with a discussion of the practicalities of farmers' associations starting to use such financial instruments, including the potential of new technologies such as smart cards.farmers structured finance warehouse receipts price risk management

Broadbasing and Deepening the Bond Market in India

At the time of its independence in 1947 India had only the traditional commercial banks, all with private sector ownership. Like the typical commercial banks in other parts of the world, all banks in India were also not keen to provide medium and long-term finance to industry and other sectors for their fixed asset formation. The banks were willing to fund basically the working capital requirements of the credit-worthy borrowers on the security of tangible assets. Since the government was keen to stimulate setting up of a wide range of new industrial units as also expansion/diversification of the existing units it decided to encourage setting up of financial intermediaries that provided term finance to projects in industry. Thus emerged a well-knit structure of national and state level development financial institutions (DFIs) for meeting requirements of medium and long-term finance of all range of industrial units, from the smallest to the very large ones. Reserve Bank of India (the central banking institutions of the country) and Government of India nurtured DFIS through various types of financial incentives and other supportive measures. The main objective of all these measures was to provide much needed long-term finance to the industry, which the then existing commercial banks were not keen to provide because of the fear of asset-liability mismatch. Since deposits with the banks were mainly short/medium term, extending term loans was considered by the banks to be relatively risky. The five-year development plans envisaged rapid growth of domestic industry even in the private sector to support the import substitution growth model adopted by the national planners. To encourage investment in industry, a conscious policy decision was taken that the DFIs should provide term-finance mainly to the private sector at interest rates that were lower than those applicable to working capital or any other short-term loans. In the early years of the post-Independence period, shortages of various commodities tended to make trading in commodities a more profitable proposition than investment in industry, which carried higher risk. Partly to correct this imbalance, the conscious policy design was to increase attractiveness of long-term investment in industry and infrastructure through relatively lower interest rates. To enable term-lending institutions to finance industry at concessional rates, Government and RBI gave them access to low cost funds. They were allowed to issue bonds with government guarantee, given funds through the budget and RBI allocated sizeable part of RBI's National Industrial Credit (Long Term Operations) funds to Industrial Development Bank of India, the large DFI of the country. Through an appropriate RBI fiat, the turf of the DFIs was also protected, until recently, by keeping commercial banks away from extending large sized term loans to industrial units. Banks were expected to provide small term loans to small-scale industrial units on a priority basis.