710 research outputs found

    Preventing Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks on the IMS Emergency Services Support through Adaptive Firewall Pinholing

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    Emergency services are vital services that Next Generation Networks (NGNs) have to provide. As the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is in the heart of NGNs, 3GPP has carried the burden of specifying a standardized IMS-based emergency services framework. Unfortunately, like any other IP-based standards, the IMS-based emergency service framework is prone to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. We propose in this work, a simple but efficient solution that can prevent certain types of such attacks by creating firewall pinholes that regular clients will surely be able to pass in contrast to the attackers clients. Our solution was implemented, tested in an appropriate testbed, and its efficiency was proven.Comment: 17 Pages, IJNGN Journa

    Security in Peer-to-Peer SIP VoIP

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    VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) is one of the fastest growing technologies in the world. It is used by people all over the world for communication. But with the growing popularity of internet, security is one of the biggest concerns. It is important that the intruders are not able to sniff the packets that are transmitted over the internet through VoIP. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is the most popular and commonly used protocol of VoIP. Now days, companies like Skype are using Peer-to-Peer SIP VoIP for faster and better performance. Through this project I am improving an already existing Peer-to-Peer SIP VoIP called SOSIMPLE P2P VoIP by adding confidentiality in the protocol with the help of public key cryptography

    Mitigating Denial-of-Service Attacks on VoIP Environment

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    IP telephony refers to the use of Internet protocols to provide voice, video, and data in one integrated service over LANs, BNs, MANs, not WANs. VoIP provides three key benefits compared to traditional voice telephone services. First, it minimizes the need fro extra wiring in new buildings. Second, it provides easy movement of telephones and the ability of phone numbers to move with the individual. Finally, VoIP is generally cheaper to operate because it requires less network capacity to transmit the same voice telephone call over an increasingly digital telephone network (FitzGerald & Dennis, 2007 p. 519). Unfortunately, benefits of new electronic communications come with proportionate risks. Companies experience losses resulting from attacks on data networks. There are direct losses like economic theft, theft of trade secrets and digital data, as well as indirect losses that include loss of sales, loss of competitive advantage etc. The companies need to develop their security policies to protect their businesses. But the practice of information security has become more complex than ever. The research paper will be about the major DoS threats the company’s VoIP environment can experience as well as best countermeasures that can be used to prevent them and make the VoIP environment and, therefore, company’s networking environment more secure

    Security Enhancements in Voice Over Ip Networks

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    Voice delivery over IP networks including VoIP (Voice over IP) and VoLTE (Voice over LTE) are emerging as the alternatives to the conventional public telephony networks. With the growing number of subscribers and the global integration of 4/5G by operations, VoIP/VoLTE as the only option for voice delivery becomes an attractive target to be abused and exploited by malicious attackers. This dissertation aims to address some of the security challenges in VoIP/VoLTE. When we examine the past events to identify trends and changes in attacking strategies, we find that spam calls, caller-ID spoofing, and DoS attacks are the most imminent threats to VoIP deployments. Compared to email spam, voice spam will be much more obnoxious and time consuming nuisance for human subscribers to filter out. Since the threat of voice spam could become as serious as email spam, we first focus on spam detection and propose a content-based approach to protect telephone subscribers\u27 voice mailboxes from voice spam. Caller-ID has long been used to enable the callee parties know who is calling, verify his identity for authentication and his physical location for emergency services. VoIP and other packet switched networks such as all-IP Long Term Evolution (LTE) network provide flexibility that helps subscribers to use arbitrary caller-ID. Moreover, interconnecting between IP telephony and other Circuit-Switched (CS) legacy telephone networks has also weakened the security of caller-ID systems. We observe that the determination of true identity of a calling device helps us in preventing many VoIP attacks, such as caller-ID spoofing, spamming and call flooding attacks. This motivates us to take a very different approach to the VoIP problems and attempt to answer a fundamental question: is it possible to know the type of a device a subscriber uses to originate a call? By exploiting the impreciseness of the codec sampling rate in the caller\u27s RTP streams, we propose a fuzzy rule-based system to remotely identify calling devices. Finally, we propose a caller-ID based public key infrastructure for VoIP and VoLTE that provides signature generation at the calling party side as well as signature verification at the callee party side. The proposed signature can be used as caller-ID trust to prevent caller-ID spoofing and unsolicited calls. Our approach is based on the identity-based cryptography, and it also leverages the Domain Name System (DNS) and proxy servers in the VoIP architecture, as well as the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and Call Session Control Function (CSCF) in the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) architecture. Using OPNET, we then develop a comprehensive simulation testbed for the evaluation of our proposed infrastructure. Our simulation results show that the average call setup delays induced by our infrastructure are hardly noticeable by telephony subscribers and the extra signaling overhead is negligible. Therefore, our proposed infrastructure can be adopted to widely verify caller-ID in telephony networks

    Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) Framework for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)

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    Mit dem Erscheinen mobiler Multimediadienste, wie z. B. Unified Messaging, Click-to-Dial-Applikationen, netzwerkübergeifende Multimedia-Konferenzen und nahtlose Multimedia-Streming-Dienste, begann die Konvergenz von mobilen Kommunikationsetzen und Festnetzen, begleitet von der Integration von Sprach- und Datenkommunikations-Übertragungstechnik Diese Entwicklungen bilden die Voraussetzung für die Verschmelzung des modernen Internet auf der einen Seite mit der Telekommunikation im klassischen Sinne auf der anderen. Das IP Multimedia-Subsystem (IMS) darf hierbei als die entscheidende Next-Generation-Service-Delivery-Plattform in einer vereinheitlichten Kommunikationswelt angesehen werden. Seine Architektur basiert auf einem modularen Design mit offenen Schnittstellen und bietet dedizierte Voraussetzungen zur Unterstützung von Multimedia-Diensten auf der Grundlage der Internet-Protokolle. Einhergehend mit dieser aufkommenden offenen Technologie stellen sich neue Sicherheits-Herausforderungen in einer vielschichtigen Kommunikationsinfrastruktur, im Wesentlichen bestehend aus dem Internet Protokoll (IP), dem SIP-Protokoll (Session Initiation Protocol) und dem Real-time Transport Protokoll (RTP). Die Zielsetzung des Secure Service Provisioning-Systems (SSP) ist, mögliche Angriffsszenarien und Sicherheitslücken in Verbindung mit dem IP Multimedia Subsystem zu erforschen und Sicherheitslösungen, wie sie von IETF, 3GPP und TISPAN vorgeschlagen werden, zu evaluieren. Im Rahmen dieser Forschungsarbeit werden die Lösungen als Teil des SSP-Systems berücksichtigt, mit dem Ziel, dem IMS und der Next-Generation-SDP einen hinreichenden Schutz zu garantieren. Dieser Teil, der als Sicherheitsschutzstufe 1 bezeichnet wird, beinhaltet unter anderem Maßnahmen zur Nutzer- und Netzwerk-Authentifizierung, die Autorisierung der Nutzung von Multimediadiensten und Vorkehrungen zur Gewährleistung der Geheimhaltung und Integrität von Daten im Zusammenhang mit dem Schutz vor Lauschangriffen, Session-Hijacking- und Man-in-the-Middle-Angriffen. Im nächsten Schritt werden die Beschränkungen untersucht, die für die Sicherheitsschutzstufe 1 charakteristisch sind und Maßnahmen zu Verbesserung des Sicherheitsschutzes entwickelt. Die entsprechenden Erweiterungen der Sicherheitsschutzstufe 1 führen zu einem Intrusion Detection and Prevention-System (IDP), das Schutz vor Denial-of-Service- (DoS) / Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS)-Angriffen, missbräuchlicher Nutzung und Täuschungsversuchen in IMS-basierten Netzwerken bietet. Weder 3GPP noch TISPAN haben bisher Lösungen für diesen Bereich spezifiziert. In diesem Zusammenhang können die beschriebenen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten einen Beitrag zur Standardisierung von Lösungen zum Schutz vor DoS- und DDoS-Angriffen in IMS-Netzwerken leisten. Der hier beschriebene Ansatz basiert auf der Entwicklung eines (stateful / stateless) Systems zur Erkennung und Verhinderung von Einbruchsversuchen (Intrusion Detection and Prevention System). Aus Entwicklungssicht wurde das IDP in zwei Module aufgeteilt: Das erste Modul beinhaltet die Basisfunktionen des IDP, die sich auf Flooding-Angriffe auf das IMS und ihre Kompensation richten. Ihr Ziel ist es, das IMS-Core-Netzwerk und die IMS-Ressourcen vor DoS- und DDoS-Angriffen zu schützen. Das entsprechende Modul basiert auf einer Online Stateless-Detection-Methodologie und wird aktiv, sobald die CPU-Auslastung der P-CSCF (Proxy-Call State Control Function) einen vordefinierten Grenzwert erreicht oder überschreitet. Das zweite Modul (IDP-AS) hat die Aufgabe, Angriffe, die sich gegen IMS Application Server (AS) richten abzufangen. Hierbei konzentrieren sich die Maßnahmen auf den Schutz des ISC-Interfaces zwischen IMS Core und Application Servern. Das betreffende Modul realisiert eine Stateful Detection Methodologie zur Erkennung missbräuchlicher Nutzungsaktivitäten. Während der Nutzer mit dem Application Server kommuniziert, werden dabei nutzerspezifische Zustandsdaten aufgezeichnet, die zur Prüfung der Legitimität herangezogen werden. Das IDP-AS prüft alle eingehenden Requests und alle abgehenden Responses, die von IMS Application Servern stammen oder die an IMS Application Server gerichtet sind, auf ihre Zulässigkeit im Hinblick auf die definierten Attack Rules. Mit Hilfe der Kriterien Fehlerfreiheit und Processing Delay bei der Identifikation potenzieller Angriffe wird die Leistungsfähigkeit der IDP-Module bewertet. Für die entsprechenden Referenzwerte werden hierbei die Zustände Nomallast und Überlast verglichen. Falls die Leistungsfähigkeit des IDP nicht unter den Erwartungen zurückbleibt, wird ein IDP-Prototyp zur Evaluation im Open IMS Playground des Fokus Fraunhofer 3Gb-Testbeds eingesetzt, um unter realen Einsatzbedingungen z. B. in VoIP-, Videokonferenz- , IPTV-, Presence- und Push-to-Talk-Szenarien getestet werden zu können.With the emergence of mobile multimedia services, such as unified messaging, click to dial, cross network multiparty conferencing and seamless multimedia streaming services, the fixed–mobile convergence and voice–data integration has started, leading to an overall Internet–Telecommunications merger. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is considered as the next generation service delivery platform in the converged communication world. It consists of modular design with open interfaces and enables the flexibility for providing multimedia services over IP technology. In parallel this open based emerging technology has security challenges from multiple communication platforms and protocols like IP, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). The objective of Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) Framework is to cram the potential attacks and security threats to IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and to explore security solutions developed by IETF, 3GPP and TISPAN. This research work incorporates these solutions into SSP Framework to secure IMS and next generation Service Delivery Platform (SDP). We define this part as level 1 security protection which includes user and network authentication, authorization to access multimedia services, providing confidentiality and integrity protection etc. against eavesdropping, session hijacking and man-in-the middle attacks etc. In the next step, we have investigated the limitations and improvements to level 1 security and proposed the enhancement and extension as level 2 security by developing Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system against Denial-of-Service (DoS)/Distributed DoS (DDoS) flooding attacks, misuses and frauds in IMS-based networks. These security threats recently have been identified by 3GPP and TISPAN but no solution is recommended and developed. Therefore our solution may be considered as recommendation in future. Our approach based on developing both stateless and stateful intrusion detection and prevention system. From development point of view, we have divided the work into two modules: the first module is IDP-Core; addressing and mitigating the flooding attacks in IMS core. Its objective is to protect the IMS resources and IMS-core entities from DoS/DDoS flooding attacks. This module based on online stateless detection methodology and activates when CPU processing load of P-CSCF (Proxy-Call State Control Function) reaches or crosses the defined threshold limit. The second module is IDP-AS; addressing and mitigating the misuse attacks facing to IMS Application Servers (AS). Its focus is to secure the ISC interface between IMS Core and Application Servers. This module is based on stateful misuse detection methodology by creating and comparing user state (partner) when he/she is communicating with application server to check whether user is performing legitimate or illegitimate action with attacks rules. The IDP-AS also compared the incoming request and outgoing response to and from IMS Application Servers with the defined attacks rules. In the performance analysis, the processing delay and attacks detection accuracy of both Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) modules have been measured at Fraunhofer FOKUS IMS Testbed which is developed for research purpose. The performance evaluation based on normal and overload conditions scenarios. The results showed that the processing delay introduced by both IDP modules satisfied the standard requirements and did not cause retransmission of SIP REGISTER and INVITE requests. The developed prototype is under testing phase at Fraunhofer FOKUS 3Gb Testbed for evaluation in real world communication scenarios like VoIP, video conferencing, IPTV, presence, push-to-talk etc

    Securing the Edges of IoT Networks: a Scalable SIP DDoS Defense Framework with VNF, SDN, and Blockchain

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    An unintended consequence of the global deployment of IoT devices is that they provide a fertile breeding ground for IoT botnets. An adversary can take advantage of an IoT botnet to launch DDoS attacks against telecommunication services. Due to the magnitude of such an attack, legacy security systems are not able to provide adequate protection. The impact ranges from loss of revenue for businesses to endangering public safety. This risk has prompted academia, government, and industry to reevaluate the existing de- fence model. The current model relies on point solutions and the assumption that adversaries and their attacks are readily identifiable. But adversaries have challenged this assumption, building a botnet from thousands of hijacked IoT devices to launch DDoS attacks. With bot- net DDoS attacks there are no clear boundary where the attacks originate and what defensive measures to use. The research question is: in what ways programmable networks could defend against Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) flooding attacks from IoT botnets? My significant and original contribution to the knowledge is a scalable and collaborative defence framework that secures the edges of IoT networks with Virtual Network Function (VNF), Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and Blockchain technology to prevent, detect, and mitigate SIP DDoS flooding attacks from IoT botnets. Successful experiments were performed using VNF, SDN, and Blockchain. Three kinds of SIP attacks (scan, brute force, and DDoS) were launched against a VNF running on a virtual switch and each was successfully detected and mitigated. The SDN controller gathers threat intelligence from the switch where the attacks originate and installs them as packet filtering rules on all switches in the organisation. With the switches synchronised, the same botnet outbreak is prevented from attacking other parts of the organisation. A distributed application scales this framework further by writing the threat intelligence to a smart contract on the Ethereum Blockchain so that it is available for external organisations. The receiving organisation retrieves the threat intelligence from the smart contract and installs them as packet filtering rules on their switches. In this collaborative framework, attack detection/mitigation efforts by one organisation can be leveraged as attack prevention efforts by other organisations in the community
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